How do prizes induce innovation?
learning from the Google Lunar X-prize by Kay, Luciano
 
HOW DO PRIZES INDUCE INNOVATION? 





























In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Doctor of Philosophy in the 
School of Public Policy 
 
 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
August 2011 
 
Copyright © Luciano Kay 2011  
 
HOW DO PRIZES INDUCE INNOVATION? 
























Dr. Philip Shapira, Advisor 
School of Public Policy 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 Dr. Diana M. Hicks 
School of Public Policy 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
   
Dr. Juan D. Rogers 
School of Public Policy 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 Dr. Alan W. Wilhite 
School of Aerospace Engineering 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
   
Dr. Gordon Kingsley 
School of Public Policy 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
  































 This project is the culmination of three years of arduous work to both increase our 
understanding of the effect of technology prizes on innovation and, more generally, 
contribute original research and lessons to policy sciences and innovation policy. Many 
people and organizations have made this possible and I generally extend my gratitude to 
all of them. In particular, I am very grateful to the following. 
 First and foremost, I must thank Dr. Phil Shapira, my Academic Advisor and 
Committee Chair. His constant encouragement and support have been essential for the 
completion of this challenging dissertation project. Also his savvy advice has been key 
along the way in both developing this research and managing administrative aspects of 
the project. Certainly, I have also benefited from the encouragement and support of Dr. 
Diana Hicks, Dr. Juan Rogers, Dr. Alan Wilhite, and Dr. Gordon Kingsley—valued 
members of my Dissertation Committee—to pursue and complete this project. I am very 
grateful to them. Their qualified comments and suggestions have also been very 
important to improve this research. Dr. Jan Youtie, though not part of my Committee, has 
also provided valued advice in a number of topics related with this research. 
 Undoubtedly, this research would have been impossible without the valuable and 
unselfish contributions from key informants, interviewees, and leaders and members of 
the teams participating in the Google Lunar X Prize (GLXP.) In particular, I must thank 
William Pomerantz, X Prize Foundation‘s Director for Space prizes. He helped to contact 
a number of GLXP teams, collaborated in the initial steps of the process of data 
gathering, offered an interview to learn more about the GLXP, and provided general 
insights about this and other competitions. I am also grateful for his invitation to attend 
the 4
th
 annual GLXP Summit held in the Isle of Man (U.K.) in October 2010—my 
participation in this event was very useful to collect additional data and meet some GLXP 
v 
 
team leaders. I also thank Amanda Stiles from the X Prize Foundation, who provided 
access to the archives of the GLXP forum. 
 I am very grateful to GLXP team leaders and members, particularly those who, 
despite their hard work and focus to compete and win the prize, were trustful and willing 
to collaborate with this research project and accepted interviews and visits to their 
workplaces. Other team members were also very kind and collaborated with interviews, 
filled out questionnaires, and contributed valued comments. All of them have been very 
generous to divert their attention from the competition and use their time to help me with 
this research. The author is especially thankful to William "Red" Whittaker, Ruben 
Nunez, Andrew Barton, Neven Dološ, Robert Boehme, and Dumitru Popescu. Also to 
Rex Ridenoure, David Gump, Dillon Sances, Steve Murphy, Aad Eggers, Christian 
Bennat, Mario Kulczynski, Karsten Becker, Sebastian Rattay, and Simona Popescu. 
Other team leaders and members that kindly collaborated are Bob Richards, Richard 
Speck, Michael Joyce, Pete Bitar, Adil Jafry, Izmirov Yaminovich, Palle Haastrup, 
Markus Bindhammer, Marc Zaballa, Alex Last, and Nikolay Dzis-Voynarovskiy. 
 A number of prize and industry experts also collaborated with interviews and key 
insights for my research on prizes, and I am very grateful to them: Ken Davidian 
(Director of Research at the FAA Office of Commercial Space Transportation—AST,) 
Dennis Stone (Assistant Manager for NASA's Commercial Crew & Cargo Program,) Jeff 
Greason (Founder and President of XCOR Aerospace,) G. Thomas Marsh (retired 
Executive Vice President of Lockheed Martin,) Gregg Maryniak (Vice President of 
Aerospace Science, St. Louis Science Center and X Prize Foundation‘s Advisor,) and 
Norman Whitaker (DARPA's Deputy Director of The Transformational Convergence 
Technology Office.) 
 From the School of Public Policy at Georgia Tech, I have to thank Clark Bonilla, 
who helped in the process of grant application and administration, and Jade Charnigo, for 
her support with mail processing in the stage of data gathering. Also Georgia Tech 
vi 
 
students Tara Garland and Corey T. Bone, who helped with interview transcriptions. Luis 
Miguel Cortés-Peña, Greg Dubos, and Vasileios Lakafosis, graduate students from the 
Satellite Communication and Navigation Systems class of Fall 2007 at Georgia Tech, 
also generously helped in the process of testing questionnaires for data gathering. 
 This project would have not been feasible without the appropriate economic 
support. This work has been supported in part by the U.S. National Science Foundation 
under Grant Number SBE-0965103 (any opinions, findings and conclusions or 
recommendations expressed in this work are those of the author and do not necessarily 
reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.) I am also thankful to The IBM 
Center for the Business of Government for the support given for the preparation of the 
report Managing Innovation Prizes in Government, which seeks to translate research 
findings into practicable recommendations for policy-makers. 
 Last but not least, I am very, very grateful to my family and friends. They are 
always there to both encourage you when you are going through tough times and 






TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv 
LIST OF TABLES xi 
LIST OF FIGURES xv 
LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS xvii 
SUMMARY xviii 
CHAPTER 
1 INTRODUCTION 1 
2 INNOVATION AND PRIZES 6 
2.1 Prize renaissance 6 
2.2 Types and structure of prizes 10 
2.3 Prizes and other incentives for innovation 12 
2.4 Prizes and S&T and innovation policy 17 
3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 23 
3.1 Incentives and motivations of prize entrants 23 
3.2 Prize R&D activities 29 
3.3 Prize technology outputs 35 
3.4 The overall effect of prizes on innovation 40 
4 METHODS AND DATA 46 
4.1 Methodological approach 46 
4.2 A model of innovation applied to prizes 49 
 4.2.1 Prior work 49 
 4.2.2 The model 52 
viii 
 
4.3 Case studies 60 
4.4 Data and data gathering 64 
 4.4.1 Pilot case studies 64 
 4.4.2 Main case study 66 
5 A FIRST APPROACH: THE ANSARI X PRIZE AND THE NGLLC 72 
5.1 The Ansari X Prize 72 
 5.1.1 The prize 72 
 5.1.2 The context 75 
 5.1.3 Prize entrants 76 
 5.1.4 Motivations 77 
 5.1.5 R&D activities 77 
 5.1.6 Technology outputs 79 
5.2 The Northrop Grumman Lunar Lander Challenge 82 
 5.2.1 The prize 82 
 5.2.2 The context 85 
 5.2.3 Prize entrants 85 
 5.2.4 Motivations 86 
 5.2.5 R&D activities 87 
 5.2.6 Technology outputs 88 
5.3 Discussion 91 
5.4 Lessons for next steps 94 
6 A CLOSER LOOK: THE GOOGLE LUNAR X PRIZE 96 
6.1 The GLXP Prize 96 
 6.1.1 The challenge 97 
 6.1.2 History 101 
ix 
 
 6.1.3 Organizers, sponsors, and partners 101 
6.2 The context of the competition 103 
 6.2.1 Planetary robotic exploration 103 
 6.2.2 Sector structure 107 
 6.2.3 Technological capabilities/gaps 113 
 6.2.4 Technology scenarios 119 
 6.2.5 Technology-related incentives 123 
 6.2.6 Other prizes 130 
6.3 The prize entrants 130 
6.4 Motivations of prize entrants 144 
6.5 Prize R&D activities 159 
 6.5.1 Design criteria and sources 159 
 6.5.2 Own development vs. use of existing technologies 165 
 6.5.3 Organization of R&D activities 170 
 6.5.4 R&D effort 179 
 6.5.5 Constraints and challenges 186 
6.6 Technology outputs 192 
7 DISCUSSION 210 
7.1 Prize incentives and the motivation of entrants 210 
7.2 Prize R&D activities 223 
7.3 Prize technology outputs 235 
7.4 The overall effect on innovation 251 
8 IMPLICATIONS 262 
8.1 Theoretical implications 262 
8.2 The prize process 270 
x 
 
8.3 Team strategies 273 
8.4 R&D program and policy implications 276 
8.5 Methodological considerations 289 
9 CONCLUSIONS 293 
APPENDIX A: Supplementary tables 297 
APPENDIX B: Supplementary figures 329 
APPENDIX C: Questionnaire applied to GLXP teams 332 
APPENDIX D: Guiding questions for interview with GLXP team leaders 339 





LIST OF TABLES 
Page 
Table 2.1: Prize datasets recently compiled by the literature  7 
Table 2.2: Recent prize competitions posted on Challenge.gov (selected examples) 22 
Table 3.1: Technology Readiness Levels (TRL levels) 39 
Table 4.1: Dimensions, identified topics, literature references, and proposed categories 
for a model to study prizes 56 
Table 4.2: Selected research questions and dimensions in the study of prizes 59 
Table 4.3: Summary of information for prizes investigated in this research 63 
Table 4.4: Data coding inventory for pilot case studies 65 
Table 4.5: Summary of data gathering to investigate the GLXP 67 
Table 4.6: Industry experts participating in interviews 71 
Table 5.1: Summary of data for embedded cases in the Ansari X Prize 74 
Table 5.2: Summary of data for embedded cases in the NGLLC 84 
Table 6.1: Selected robotic planetary exploration programs 106 
Table 6.2: Main differences between traditional space programs and small missions 111 
Table 6.3: Challenges faced by GLXP teams according to the X Prize Foundation 114 
Table 6.4: Maturity of planetary robotic exploration technologies, selected examples 117 
Table 6.5: Comparison of past and future robotic planetary exploration capabilities 122 
Table 6.6: Technology state of the art and NASA‘s roadmap for GLXP-related 
technologies (selected examples) 123 
Table 6.7: Perceived technology incentives and expected scenarios related to the GLXP 
technologies 126 
Table 6.8: Lunar market size estimate, by segment 127 
Table 6.9: LunaCorp private initiative in the 1990s and Team Astrobotic, a GLXP 
business case example 129 
xii 
 
Table 6.10: Main characteristics of GLXP teams that participated in this study 140 
Table 6.11: Types of team goals in the GLXP (selected examples) 143 
Table 6.12: Motivations of GLXP teams 149 
Table 6.13: Risks perceived from participation in the GLXP, by type of entrant 158 
Table 6.14: Design criteria used by GLXP teams, by type of entrant 162 
Table 6.15: Additional design criteria in GLXP projects as reported by interviewees 163 
Table 6.16: Most important design sources of GLXP teams, by type of entrant 164 
Table 6.17: Further reasons to use existing technologies or develop new ones in the 
GLXP 168 
Table 6.18: GLXP teams that use subcontracting and COTS technologies, by type of 
entrant 170 
Table 6.19: Number and type of partners of GLXP teams, by type of entrant 171 
Table 6.20: Organization of R&D activities of GLXP teams (identified examples) 175 
Table 6.21: Factors that constrain or challenge GLXP teams, by type of entrant 188 
Table 6.22: Evolution of the GLXP‘s Master Team Agreement over time 189 
Table 6.23: Selected responses to a lack of funding and the need to speed up technology 
development 190 
Table 6.24: Selected responses to a lack of funding and the need to speed up technology 
development, by type of entrant 192 
Table 6.25: Novelty in GLXP teams subsystems, by type of entrant 197 
Table 6.26: Number of GLXP teams that achieved significant innovations, by type of 
entrant 198 
Table 6.27: Selected examples of GLXP technology outputs (unconventional entrants)
 201 
Table 6.28: Selected examples of GLXP technology outputs (conventional entrants) 202 
Table 6.29: Planned/actual revenue sources in the GLXP (selected examples) 206 
Table 6.30: Number of GLXP teams that would pursue similar projects if the prize did 
not exist, by type of entrant 209 
xiii 
 
Table 7.1: Prize incentives offered by the GLXP 212 
Table 7.2: Re-classification of GLXP entrants based on priority goals 214 
Table 7.3: Classification of entrants based on industry experience 222 
Table 7.4: Main differences between selected instances of technology R&D in space 
projects 227 
Table 7.5: Selected prize cases, prize challenge definitions, technology gaps, and 
technology outputs 243 
Table 7.6: Typology of prizes based on expected technology outputs 246 
Table 7.7: Examples of PTOs based on team goals 250 
Table 8.1: Summary of research probes and general implications 263 
Table 8.2: Potential technology-related effects of prizes 276 
Table 8.3: Types of prizes and possible target areas for prize programs 279 
Table 8.4: Selected motivation targets and recommended prize design actions 280 
Table 8.5: Examples of prize-based program goals and definition of key prize design 
parameters 284 
Table 8.6: Prizes compared to NASA‘s SBIR/STTR programs (selected dimensions) 286 
Table A.1: Ansari X-Prize entrants 298 
Table A.2: Data gathering summary for embedded cases in Ansari X Prize 300 
Table A.3: NGLLC entrants (2006-2009) 305 
Table A.4: Data gathering summary for embedded cases in NGLLC 307 
Table A.5: GLXP entrants 310 
Table A.6: Additional reasons to participate in the GLXP given by questionnaire 
respondents 312 
Table A.7: Top reasons to participate in the GLXP according to interviewed team 
members 313 
Table A.8: Additional design criteria in GLXP projects as reported by interviewees 315 
Table A.9: Coding summary for GLXP team interviews 316 
xiv 
 
Table A.10: Overall assessment of selected historic prizes 327 





LIST OF FIGURES 
Page 
Figure 2.1: Amount of U.S. federally-funded prize rewards compared to U.S. R&D 
spending, R&D incentives, and total philanthropic prize rewards 21 
Figure 4.1: Case study method and process 47 
Figure 4.2: Case study design and implementation 48 
Figure 4.3: Innovation model applied to the study of technology prizes 55 
Figure 5.1: Scaled Composites‘ White Knight turbojet aircraft with SpaceShipOne 
spacecraft attached underneath 80 
Figure 5.2: Summary of analysis of the Ansari X Prize 81 
Figure 5.3: Team Armadillo Aerospace and its MOD vehicle at the NGLLC 2007 89 
Figure 5.4: Summary of analysis of the Northrop Grumman Lunar Lander Challenge 90 
Figure 6.1: Timeline with official entry period of GLXP teams 132 
Figure 6.2: Countries of GLXP team headquarters and member locations 133 
Figure 6.3: GLXP teams‘ professional experience 137 
Figure 6.4: Future activities of members of GLXP teams 144 
Figure 6.5: Motivations of GLXP teams, by type of entrant and period of entry to the 
prize 153 
Figure 6.6: Reasons to use existing technologies in the GLXP 166 
Figure 6.7: Topics of information exchange of GLXP teams with selected individuals and 
organizations 179 
Figure 6.8: Schedule/cost comparison for past robotic missions, literature, and selected 
GLXP projects 181 
Figure 6.9: Cycles and cost estimates of an illustrative $30 million GLXP mission 183 
Figure 6.10: Time of competition and time of actual development for GLXP teams 194 
Figure 6.11: Selected examples of GLXP technology outputs 203 
Figure 6.12: Selected technology outputs in a novelty/implementation scale 205 
xvi 
 
Figure 6.13: Sources and use of intellectual property created by GLXP teams 208 
Figure 7.1: Factors that define participation in the GLXP 218 
Figure 7.2: Evolution of the number of ―believers‖ in the GLXP 221 
Figure 7.3: Approximation to the solutions space created by the GLXP 232 
Figure 7.4: Basic innovation-related problem-solving cycle in the GLXP 234 
Figure 7.5: GLXP technology development activity 239 
Figure 7.6: Generic effect of more stringent prize challenge conditions and increasing 
technology incentives on expected prize technology outputs 248 
Figure 7.7: Main factors affecting the ultimate innovation effect of prizes 253 
Figure 7.8: Anticipated effect of the GLXP on innovation 255 
Figure 7.9: Contribution of different types of prize technology outputs to innovation 255 
Figure B.1: Number of official GLXP teams, letters of intent to compete, and withdrawn 
teams (2007-present) 329 
Figure B.2: Reasons to participate in the GLXP 329 
Figure B.3: Risks perceived from participation in the GLXP 330 
Figure B.4: Design criteria used by GLXP teams 330 






AXP  Ansari X Prize 
NGLLC  Northrop Grumman Lunar Lander Challenge 
GLXP  Google Lunar X Prize 
XPF  X Prize Foundation 
 
PC  Prize Challenge 
PIs  Prize incentives 
TIs  Technology incentives 
PTOs  Prize technology outputs 
IP  Intellectual property 
TRL  Technology readiness level 
 
DARPA  U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
FAA  U.S. Federal Aviation Administration 
JAXA  Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency 
NASA  U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NACA  U.S. National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics 







Inducement prizes–where cash rewards are given to motivate the attainment of 
targets—have been long used to stimulate individuals, groups, and communities to 
accomplish diverse types of goals. In the 18th and 19th centuries, prizes encouraged 
scientific research and may have also been decisive to develop early innovations such as 
the marine chronometer and induce the initial development of the aviation industry in the 
20th century. Lately, prizes have increasingly attracted the attention of policy-makers, 
managers, philanthropists, and the media due to their potential to induce path-breaking 
innovations and accomplish related goals, such as economic recovery or the engagement 
of social groups to create innovation communities. Academic research, however, has 
barely investigated these prizes in spite of their long history, recent popularity, and 
notable potential. 
This research investigates prizes and the means by which they induce innovation. 
In particular, four questions that are relevant from the viewpoint of both scientific inquiry 
and policy-making are addressed: (1) How do different types of incentives weigh in the 
overall motivation of prize entrants? (2) What are the characteristics of prize R&D 
activities and how do they differ from traditional industry‘s R&D activities? (3) What are 
the characteristics of the prize technology outputs and how do they relate to the 
characteristics of prize entrants and their R&D activities? (4) Do prizes spur innovation 
over and above what would have occurred anyway? 
This research uses an empirical, multiple case-study methodology and multiple 
data sources to investigate three cases of recent aerospace technology prizes: a main case 
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study, the Google Lunar X Prize (GLXP) for robotic Moon exploration; and two pilot 
cases, the Ansari X Prize (AXP) for the first private reusable manned spacecraft and the 
Northrop Grumman Lunar Lander Challenge (NGLLC) for flights of reusable rocket-
powered vehicles. This research also introduces an innovation model to investigate prizes 
that focuses on the competition as unit of analysis and articulates internal and external 
factors that can potentially explain the effect of prizes on innovation. 
The investigation unveils the dynamics of prizes and contributes a better 
understanding of their potential and disadvantages in a context in which more traditional 
mechanisms are used to induce innovation. 
The incentives offered by prizes attract entrants with diverse characteristics, 
including unconventional entrants—individuals and organizations generally not involved 
with the prize technologies. Entrants are generally attracted by the non-monetary benefits 
of participation (e.g. reputation, visibility, opportunity to participate in technology 
development and accomplish other personal and organizational goals) and the potential 
market value of the technologies involved in competitions. Many more volunteers, 
collaborators, and partners also participate—though only indirectly—and support official 
entries as they also perceive opportunities to accomplish personal and organizational 
goals. The monetary reward is not as important as other prize incentives, yet it is still 
important to position and disseminate the idea of the prize. 
Prizes can induce increasing R&D activities and re-direct industry projects to 
target diverse technological goals, yet the evolution of prize competitions is generally 
difficult to anticipate. The overall organization of prize R&D activities depends on 
entrant-level factors such as goals, strategies, and resources, and can only be indirectly 
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influenced by setting specific competition rules. The most remarkable characteristic of 
prize R&D activities is their interaction with fundraising efforts which, in some 
circumstances, may constrain the activities of entrants. Prizes can also selectively focus 
the advancement of technologies at different levels of maturity (e.g. experimental 
research, incremental developments, commercialization,) yet the quality of the 
technological outputs is also generally difficult to anticipate and depends on entrant-level 
factors as well. 
Prizes can also induce innovation over and above what would have occurred 
anyway, yet their overall effect depends significantly on the characteristics of the prize 
entrants and the evolution of the context of the competition. The ability of prizes to 
induce innovation is larger when there are larger prize incentives, more significant 
technology gaps implicit in the prize challenge, and open-ended challenge definitions. 
Moreover, prizes can induce technological breakthroughs but complementary incentives 
(e.g. commitments to purchase technology) or support (e.g. seed funding) may be needed 
in some circumstances. 
This research shows that prizes are a more complex mechanism and their 
investigation requires analyzing entrant- and context-level factors generally not 
considered by the literature. Prizes complement and not replace patents and other 
incentive mechanisms. The ability of entrants to retain IP rights on their technologies 
enables the R&D process and hybrid prize schemes that include financial support for 
qualified entrants (e.g. R&D grants) or commitment to purchase prize technologies (e.g. 
procurement contracts) are optional designs for these competitions. 
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Prizes are only one of the forms of intervention to stimulate technological 
innovation, but are particularly appropriate to, for example, explore new, experimental 
methods and technologies that imply high-risk R&D; induce technological development 
to break critical technological barriers; accelerate technological development to achieve 
higher performance standards; and, accelerate diffusion, adoption, and/or 
commercialization of technologies. Prizes can selectively target certain technologies, 
R&D performers and geographic areas, and also leverage funding significantly due to 
their widespread, decentralized impact. They involve, however, higher programmatic 
risks than other more traditional mechanisms and their routine use, and/or challenge 
definitions that overlap, can weaken the incentive power of the mechanism. Successful 







 Prizes are incentives that have long been used by public or private sponsors to 
elicit effort from individuals and organizations and attain diverse goals, including 
scientific discovery and technology development. For instance, in the 18th and 19th 
centuries, prizes were used to encourage basic research by compensating research results 
with monetary rewards or medals (MacLeod, 1971; Brunt et al., 2008). Prizes may have 
also been decisive to develop early innovations such as the marine chronometer and 
induce the initial development of the aviation industry in the 20th century. One of the 
most popular aviation prizes was, for example, the Orteig Prize for the first aviator to fly 
nonstop from New York to Paris (won in 1927 by Charles Lindbergh) (Davis & Davis, 
2004; Maryniak, 2005; Mokyr, 2009). More recently, policy-makers, philanthropists, 
companies, and the media have become increasingly interested in prizes due to their 
potential to induce path-breaking technological innovations or achieve related goals such 
as economic recovery, technology diffusion, and the creation of innovation communities. 
 This research investigates prizes and the means by which they induce innovation 
or other effects related to technological development. The focus is on four main aspects 
of prizes: the motivations of prize entrants, the organization of prize R&D activities, the 
prize technologies, and the overall effect of prizes on technological innovation. This 
research uses an empirical, multiple case-study methodology and multiple types of data 
sources to investigate three cases of recent aerospace technology prizes: a main case 
study, the Google Lunar X Prize (GLXP) for robotic Moon exploration; and two pilot 
cases, the Ansari X Prize (AXP) for the first private reusable manned spacecraft and the 




 During the last fifty years, prizes proliferated in different formats and in many 
sectors as a widespread social process (Best, 2008). However, it is since the 1990s that a 
handful of successful global technology prizes have revitalized the interest in this topic. 
These competitions include the cases studied by this research and others such the  $10 
million Progressive Insurance Automotive X-Prize to create a car that radically reduces 
oil consumption and harmful emissions, the $1 million Netflix Prize to improve Netflix, 
Inc.‘s movie recommendation system, and the $3.5 million DARPA Urban Challenge to 
develop autonomous robotic vehicles. Prizes have also attracted the attention of U.S. 
policy makers and sparked further discussion between a number of government 
stakeholders (NAE, 1999; NRC, 2007; Stine, 2009) to the extent that new legislation has 
been enacted to authorize federal agencies to use prizes widely. Moreover, prizes have 
received extensive media coverage which has attracted even more attention to this type of 
incentives (see for example Boyle, 2004a; Richtel, 2007; Harford, 2008; King, 2008; 
Taylor, 2008). 
 Despite their long history, recent popularity, and notable potential, academic 
research has barely investigated these prizes and their effects on technological 
innovation. The prize literature has developed mostly theoretical, economic approaches 
(see, for example, Wright, 1983; de Laat, 1997; Shavell & van Ypersele, 1999; Newell & 
Wilson, 2005; Brunt et al., 2008) and, to a lesser extent, empirical case studies (see, for 
example, Davis & Davis, 2004; Saar, 2006). Most of the scholarly works have focused on 
comparing prizes with other incentive mechanisms and not on probing the real features 
and ultimate effects of prizes on technological innovation. The increasing interest in the 
use of prizes to attain diverse goals related to technological development calls for further 
empirical research to close significant knowledge gaps and inform increasing policy-
making activities in this area. 
 This work draws upon prize literature insights and more general innovation 
literature to address four main questions that are not only deemed relevant from the 
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viewpoint of scientific inquiry but also considered to have significant implications for 
policy-making for the design of effective and more efficient technology prize 
competitions: (1) How do different types of incentives weigh in the overall motivation of 
different types of prize entrants? (2) What are the characteristics of prize R&D activities 
and how do they differ from traditional industry‘s R&D activities? (3) What are the 
characteristics of the prize technology outputs and how do they relate to the 
characteristics of prize entrants and their R&D activities? (4) Do prizes spur innovation 
over and above what would have occurred anyway? 
 To address those questions and probe corresponding propositions, this research 
introduces an innovation model that focuses on the prize competition as unit of analysis 
and articulates internal and external factors that can potentially explain the effect of 
prizes on innovation. To the author‘s knowledge, no framework or model of this kind has 
been offered by the academic literature to study the effect of prizes on innovation. This 
model is built upon six main dimensions identified in the prize literature, namely: prize 
design, motivation of prize entrants, R&D activities, technology outputs, characteristics 
of entrants, and the interplay between prize and its context or technology sector. The 
model is used to pursue an iterative approach to empirical case study research. First, the 
model is tested and improved with two case studies of finished prizes, the AXP and 
NGLLC. Second, a refined version of the model is applied to investigate the main case 
study, the GLXP, and elaborate implications for theory and future research. 
 The GLXP is a $30 million multi-year global competition organized by the X 
Prize Foundation and sponsored by Google, Inc. It was announced on September 2007 
and has not found a winner yet. The GLXP requires participants to land a robot on the 
Moon, among other secondary goals, by December 2015. Thirty-five international teams 
entered the competition and participants from more than 40 countries have been involved. 
This prize has exceptional significance because (a) it is an opportunity to gather valuable 
real-time data from ongoing R&D activities in a high-tech competition; (b) it is 
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interrelated with the strategic U.S. aerospace and defense industry sectors; and, (c) it has 
global reach, which offers the opportunity to observe the broadest impact of prizes. The 
AXP is a $10 million prize offered in 1996 for the first non-government organization to 
launch a reusable manned spacecraft into space twice within two weeks. It engaged 26 
teams from seven countries. The U.S. firm Scaled Composites won this prize in 2004. 
The NGLLC, part of the NASA Centennial Challenges, is a $2 million multi-year prize 
offered for building and flying a rocket-powered vehicle that simulates the flight of a 
vehicle on the Moon. It involved 12 U.S. teams between 2006 and 2009. The U.S. firms 
Masten Space Systems and Armadillo Aerospace shared the prize money. 
 The analysis of these three case studies unveils their dynamics and contributes a 
better understanding of the potential effects of prizes on innovation. This investigation 
also highlights the advantages and weaknesses of prizes under certain circumstances and 
provides insights for effective prize design and implementation. Many instructive 
methodological considerations also emerge throughout the analysis to inform further 
empirical research on technology prizes. 
 This work is structured as follows. Section 2 describes recent prize developments, 
reviews the more general literature that compares prizes with other incentive 
mechanisms, describes the types of prizes, and discusses aspects related to the use of 
innovation prizes in government. Section 3 reviews the literature that is relevant to each 
of the four research questions and posits four corresponding hypothetical explanations. 
Section 4 discusses methodological aspects, introduces the innovation model to study 
prizes, and describes the data and data gathering process. Section 5 presents the analysis 
and findings of the AXP and NGLLC case studies, and presents considerations for model 
improvement and further research. Section 6 presents the analysis and findings of the 
GLXP case study. The findings are organized in subsections to address the six 
dimensions of the case study in three levels: the prize, the context, and the prize entrants. 
Section 7 discusses those findings and probes the anticipated effect of prizes. This section 
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also seeks to advance the analysis and connect findings from the three case studies with 
the prize literature and insights of the broader innovation literature. Section 8 seeks to 
contribute new building blocks for the development of prize theory and presents policy 
considerations based on the findings on the three case studies. Section 9 provides 
concluding remarks. This document also includes Appendix sections with relevant tables, 
figures, and data gathering summaries and instruments. At the end of the document, there 





INNOVATION AND PRIZES 
2.1 Prize renaissance 
 Recent reports account for a flurry of activity around prizes in the last 20 years 
(Table 2.1). For example, McKinsey & Co. estimates that that sector may be worth as 
much as $2 billion if rewards offered by all types of prizes are included. Inducement 
prizes (with a number of targets, including technology development) are those that have 
grown the most since 1991, offering rewards for about $236 million between 1991 and 
2007 (McKinsey & Company, 2009). Scholars also note that increasing activity in 
technology prizes, with at least 38 innovation inducement prizes since 1990 (KEI, 2008; 
Masters & Delbecq, 2008). That activity includes part of the early U.S. federally-funded 
prizes, with 14 competitions already organized by different federal agencies (Stine, 
2009). 
 Except for the list of federally-funded prizes (which is limited to U.S. government 
prizes) the other lists do not have extensive coverage and prizes are not systematically 
categorized. The top technology areas of prize implementation vary depending on the 
data source. Aviation/aerospace, climate/environment, and medicine are among the top 
areas. Other areas include transport (e.g. automotive,) energy, defense, 
computing/software, and chemistry. In spite of the variety of technology areas, a 
significant use of prizes in the aviation sector since the early 20
th
 century, and in 
aerospace since the 1990s, suggests that prizes may be more effective in particular areas. 
The size of prize rewards varies considerably as well. Within the datasets reported in 
Table 2.1, the smallest technology development prize—excluding other forms of 
awards—was offered by the Dutch Society for the Encouragement of Agriculture for 
―extracting sugar from native plants‖ in the 18
th
 century (less than $100,) and the largest 
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was offered by Bigelow Aerospace for ―transporting a 5-person crew into orbit for 60 
days, twice‖ ($53 million, never claimed.) 
 






























From $2.56 to 
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From $250,000 
to $10 million 
($51 million) 
Top technology 






















Notes: a. total estimate rewards comprise amounts for each edition of recurring prizes but do not include 
commitments to purchase inventions (values are estimates in U.S. dollars for year of publication of 
dataset); b. non-technology prizes (e.g. arts, literature, etc.) are excluded. 
Source: KEI (2008), Masters & Delbecq (2008), McKinsey & Company (2009), Stine (2009). 
 
 The context in which modern prizes are implemented is considerably different to 
the context of the early 18
th
 century‘s contests. Most importantly, recent successful prize 
competitions, including the X-prize series organized by the X Prize Foundation (XPF,) 
are organized by specialized organizations and have truly global participation enabled by 
the Internet and new communication means and virtual collaboration tools. The same 
technologies allow media coverage and increasing visibility for the competitions, the 
participants, and their sponsors. This has attracted both people interested in technical 
challenges and potential new sponsors (e.g. philanthropists, government agencies, 
corporate officials) interested in using prizes to meet diverse goals. 
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 In the U.S., several federally funded innovation prizes have been authorized since 
2003. These prizes have been aimed at inducing research, development, testing, 
demonstration, and deployment of technologies (Stine, 2009). For example, NASA‘s 
Centennial Challenges program has used prizes to attract new entrepreneurs to develop 
aerospace technologies commercially. The U.S. Department of Defense has used prizes to 
find innovative solutions in defense-related technologies, with, for example, the 
Wearable Power Prize to develop long-endurance, lightweight power packs for war 
fighters, and the DARPA Grand Challenges to develop autonomous ground robotic 
vehicles. The U.S. Department of Energy implemented the Bright Light Tomorrow Prize 
(L-Prize) competition to spur the development of ultra-efficient solid-state lighting 
products to replace the common light bulb. The U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services has implemented prizes as well. Most of these prizes have offered cash rewards 
between $250,000 and $10 million to solve challenges broadly related to the agencies‘ 
missions. 
 Private companies also use prizes to improve their businesses or create prize-




 have created 
platforms where companies post prizes and communities of independent solvers work to 
find solutions and win cash rewards. Other examples are the $1 million Netflix Prize 
announced by Netflix, Inc. (the film rental website that offers recommendations based on 
what customers watch) in 2006 to improve its movie recommendation system; and the 
$250,000 Cisco I-Prize global innovation competition developed in 2010 to encourage 
collaboration among entrepreneurs and help in identifying new potential billion-dollar 
business ideas for Cisco. 
 Some private organizations have also been created specifically to administer 
prizes in the last 15-20 years. For example, the XPF is an educational, non-profit 
                                                          
1
 http://www.innocentive.com  
2
 http://www.ninesigma.com  
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corporation established in 1994 to inspire private, entrepreneurial advancements in space 
travel, and have sought to achieve such a mission by implementing prizes primarily with 
philanthropic support. This foundation organized the AXP with private, philanthropic 
sponsors, and NASA‘s NGLLC, both case studies of this research. Another non-
governmental organization that has organized prizes is, for example, CAFE Foundation, 
which seeks to create and advance the understanding of personal aircraft technologies. 
Lately, this foundation has implemented the $1.65 million NASA-funded CAFE Green 
Flight Challenge for the development of quiet, practical, and green aircraft. CAFE 
Foundation has also organized some of NASA's Centennial Challenges prizes. 
 Reports and other works have attributed a variety of effects and technological 
impacts to prizes. For example, the DARPA Grand Challenge 2005 for the development 
of autonomous vehicles led to many technical accomplishments and remarkable 
improvement in several technologies related with autonomous driving (DARPA, 2006). 
NASA‘s Astronaut Glove Challenge 2007 for the development of spacesuit gloves 
induced technology commercialization when the winner started a company and gained a 
contract to provide gloves to a spacesuits manufacturer (Stine, 2009). The AXP for the 
development of a suborbital spacecraft induced a total R&D investment by all prize 
participants of about $100 million, which is ten times the cash purse (Newell & Wilson, 
2005). The $1 million Netflix Prize announced by Netflix, Inc. formed a problem-solving 
community of more than 34,000 developers worldwide (McKinsey & Company, 2009). 
The Cisco I-Prize engaged 2,900 participants from 156 countries and received more than 




2.2 Types and structure of prizes 
 There are two types of prizes according to the achievement rewarded by prize 
sponsors. Targeted prizes reward the achievement of challenges in the form of 
performance standards that must be met to claim the prize. These prizes have discrete 
success, since there is (or there is not) achievement of the prescribed challenge and the 
characteristics of the achievement are more or less pre-specified by the prize rules. For 
example, in the recent AXP, the first participant to launch a reusable manned spacecraft 
into space twice within two weeks was declared winner of the prize. On the other hand, 
blue-sky prizes (usually referred to as awards) are open-ended prizes that reward 
achievements that were not identified in advance. In this case, achievement is a matter of 
opinion, since judges are allowed to know the winning achievement ―when they see it.‖ 
The Nobel Prize is a well-known example of these awards (Scotchmer, 2005; Masters & 
Delbecq, 2008). 
 This work focuses on targeted prizes that reward achievements associated with 
technological development (hereafter, ―technology prizes‖) and their effects on 
innovation. Technology prizes are generally organized as competitions in which 
participants are asked to attain a prize challenge (PC.) The PC is defined in terms of the 
technological problem to be solved, the deadline to find the solution or prize expiration 
date, and, sometimes, the means to be used to solve the problem. The prize sponsor 
defines the PC according to its interest in meeting certain goals and offers what is 
generally a cash reward to the first participant to achieve that challenge. Modern 
technology prizes generally have sponsors that contribute the cash purse and organizers 
that manage the competition. They may be individuals, private organizations, government 
agencies, or groups thereof. The sponsor and the organizer are the same entity in some 
cases. Otherwise indicated, this research refers to both indistinctively. The PC also links 
the prize competition with certain technological fields and/or market segments and 
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represents a technological gap that has to be reduced or closed by the participants. If no 
entrant achieves the PC, the prize expires and the sponsor does not have to pay the 
reward. Prize entrants or participants are generally organized as teams of diverse 
composition and may include companies, universities, entrepreneurs, or simply 
individuals attracted by the prize. 
 Technology prizes can be structured and classified according to different criteria. 
This research refers to the classifications based on the following criteria: 
 Required technological output: 
o Prizes for technology demonstration that explicitly require building and 
demonstrating capabilities of a technology (e.g. NGLLC, AXP) 
o Prizes for technology-based achievements that involve using unspecified 
methods to accomplish a feat or perform certain functions (e.g. GLXP.) 
 Way to find the winner: 
o First-to-achieve prizes that define the challenge as a concrete 
technological goal that entrants have to achieve before the deadline to be 
eligible to claim the cash purse. The first entrant to achieve the challenge 
is considered the winner. 
o Best-in-class prizes that define the challenge as a set of minimum 
standards of performance that entrants have to attain to be eligible to claim 
the cash purse. In this case, the winner is the entrant that performs the best 
according to those standards. In best-in-class prizes, there is typically a 
―race‖ in which all participants come together to compete for the cash 
purse. In this case, the PC may also be defined as a set of intermediate 
milestones or qualifying rounds to guide the effort of the participants and 
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allow only the most qualified entries to be selected for a final round. If no 
participant achieves the minimum standards required by the sponsor in 
that final event, the prize is considered expired. 
 Number of awards: 
o Winner-takes-all prizes that award all the prize money to the winner of the 
competition. 
o Multi-prize competitions that offer rewards not only for the winner but 






2.3 Prizes and other incentives for innovation 
 Prizes are only one of the approaches used to stimulate technological innovation. 
Other much more widely utilized incentives include the patent system, research grants, 
and R&D contracts. Indeed, most of our understanding of prizes is based on intuitive 
comparisons of prizes with those instruments and theoretical analyses to find what the 
optimal incentives are under certain circumstances. Little empirical evidence and some 
anecdotal accounts from recent prize experiences have also contributed to our 
understanding on this topic. 
 Much emphasis of the literature has been on the debate patents versus prize 
rewards because the latter, theoretically, may be able to solve one of the main defects of 
the patent system. The patent system grants inventors exclusive intellectual property (IP) 
rights on their inventions and makes them monopolists. The problem with the monopoly 
pricing is the deadweight loss that occurs when patent owners set prices above the 
marginal cost and produce less than the socially desirable output (Polanyi, 1944; 
Abramowicz, 2003; Scotchmer, 2005). In theory, prizes can reduce or eliminate that 
deadweight loss by, instead of granting rights, awarding innovators with an amount of 
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money equivalent to the social value of the innovation and requiring them to place their 
technologies in the public domain. This suggests that prizes may be more effective in 
areas where the social losses due to intellectual property rights are likely to be high (such 
as in the development of pharmaceuticals, computer software, and recorded music and 
visual products) (Shavell & van Ypersele, 1999) or where patents are expected to 
substantively distort cumulative innovation (Williams, 2010). 
 Both prizes and patents reward innovators for their research outputs, yet present 
four important differences in their practical application (Davis, 2002). First, prizes 
encourage the development of specific technologies that satisfy the requirements of the 
sponsor and innovators bear the initial costs and risks of R&D. Patents, contrarily, 
incentivize innovation indirectly as innovators decide what to invest in according to their 
private information and assessments, being punished by markets if they do not invest in 
the most valued technologies (Wright, 1983; Gallini & Scotchmer, 2001). Second, prizes 
give innovators limited development lead times when the sponsor sets a specific prize 
deadline to find a technical solution to the prize challenge. In the patent system, 
companies control the lead times of their R&D activities and strategically advance or 
postpone deadlines if necessary. Third, the prize reward is a fixed amount of money 
generally awarded to the winner of the competition and its value is linked to the goals of 
the sponsor and not necessarily to the market value of the technology. The winning entry 
does not need to be the best available technical solution or the most affordable. On the 
contrary, the value of patents is linked to the commercial merit of the technology and the 
ability of the inventor to introduce the new technology in the market. In other words, the 
test of the new technology is performed in the market and not by the sponsor according to 
its requirements. Fourth, the role of prizes is limited to incentivizing the development of 
technologies chosen by the sponsors. The patent system is a more complex, decentralized 
decision-making system in which inventors decide based on their private information and 
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a coordination mechanism that signals the location of competences, eases technology 
trading, and helps inter-firm collaborations (Penin, 2005). 
 There are also important differences between prizes and research grants. First, 
while prizes reward innovators for their research outputs, grants pay for research inputs. 
Prize sponsors pay only for research results in the technological field of their choice (i.e. 
the prize originates with a specific need,) independently of the cost of R&D activities of 
inventors or researchers. Contrarily, the grants scheme operates as a self-selection system 
whereby researchers propose ideas to invest in and the funding agency decides whether to 
fund them. Second, prizes generally do not require the pursuit of any specific approach to 
achieve the prize challenge, which allows introducing novel approaches and 
technological solutions. Research grant administrators are required to choose between 
different methods for achieving a particular goal, even when that includes the possibility 
of excluding nontraditional approaches (Kalil, 2006). Moreover, grant proposals 
generally describe the expected output of the research whereas prizes do not anticipate 
what the ultimate characteristics of the winning entry are. Third, prize entrants are only 
paid upon the achievement of the challenge and, thus, bear the financial and R&D risks 
of their activities. Prize sponsors do not need, in principle, to monitor the activities of 
those that enter the competitions. Contrarily, grants provide researchers with upfront 
funding and the grant giver generally assumes the R&D risks. Moreover, there may be a 
moral hazard problem as grantees‘ effort cannot be costlessly monitored.
3
 Both grants 
and prizes are similar in the sense that non-monetary incentives operate behind both types 
of mechanisms. As science grows and professionalize, its reward system has become 
more elaborated and honorific rewards (including peer recognition and awards) have 
become increasingly important as well (Merton, 1973). Similarly, as discussed in the 
                                                          
3
 However, future grants are contingent on previous success and, therefore, grantees have to be honest 
about their ideas and perform as proposed (Gallini & Scotchmer, 2001). 
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following paragraphs, prizes offer non-monetary incentives such as reputation and 
publicity for their participants. 
 Prizes also work significantly different from R&D contracts. First, contracts 
establish ex-ante purchase conditions for the innovator that is chosen to procure R&D 
whereas prizes only offer a fixed cash reward to the winner. Second, while prizes make 
entrants to bear R&D risks, contracts typically stipulate terms that promote risk sharing 
between buyer and contractor. That risk depends upon the uncertainty that each project 
faces, which gives origin to different types of contracts (Samuelson, 1986).
4
 Third, 
ideally, contracts require the buyer to be able to monitor R&D costs or innovation efforts 
which is costly in practice. Moreover, when external monitoring is difficult, there are 
fewer incentives for cost control by researchers (Wright, 1983; Rogerson, 1994). This 
gives advantage to other more decentralized incentives such as prizes, in which the 
sponsor focuses on the achievement of the challenge and not on the method to achieve it. 
Defense procurement has traditionally been one of the main applications of R&D 
contracts. 
 Similarly to prizes, R&D contracts are competitive when they include an initial 
phase of prototype competition and/or pre-selection.
5
 However, competition in R&D 
contracts is sometimes limited to design proposals and, only depending on the program, 
competitors are asked to submit detailed studies or working prototypes (Rogerson, 1989). 
Contracts may not be efficient when it is difficult for the buyer to distinguish between 
high- and low-cost R&D performers on the basis of bids or costs submitted in the 
competitive phase. In this regard, prizes and contracts are similar as none of them 
guarantee that the superior idea, the most affordable product, or the technology with the 
largest commercial merit is actually chosen (Scotchmer, 2005). 
                                                          
4
 For example, cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts are more likely to be used when uncertainty is high, while 
fixed-price contracts are more likely to be used when uncertainty is low (Anton & Yao, 1990). 
5
 For example, there has been U.S. Air Force defense contracts organized in three-step processes 
comprising proposal (including bid for initial production,) pre-selection and prototype competition, and 
final selection and production (Rogerson, 1994). 
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 These incentive mechanisms for innovation are optimal only under certain 
conditions. Among the most notable works discussing this aspect are those by Wright 
(1983), de Laat (1997), Shavell & Ypersele (1999), Scotchmer (1999), and Newell & 
Wilson (2005). Wright (1983) maintains that it is only exclusively private information of 
researchers what affects the optimal choice between incentives and that the potential 
advantages of prizes—compared to patents and research contracts—can be better 
appreciated in areas where the supply of research is inelastic and there are intermediate 
success probabilities of research projects. de Laat (1997) arrives at a similar conclusion 
yet maintains that information asymmetries about markets can only be used to justify 
patents—rather than prizes—when the R&D process is sufficiently competitive. Shavell 
& Ypersele (1999) maintain that intellectual property rights do not possess a fundamental 
social advantage over reward systems and that an optional reward system under which 
innovators choose between rewards and intellectual property rights is superior to only 
intellectual property rights. Scotchmer (1999) argues that it is optimal to grant patents in 
exchange for a fee—rather than using prizes—when sponsors do not have complete 
information on the benefits of the innovation because, by that means, the value of the 
reward is linked to its potential market value. Finally, assuming complete information 
about costs, benefits, and probability of success, Newell & Wilson (2005) maintain that 
prizes, compared to other mechanisms, change the profits maximization function of firms 
and can induce different levels of research investment, offering an alternative option to 
policy-makers to produce the optimal amount of research. 
 There are multiple other developments that are generally ignored and can enhance 
that theoretical debate over the optimal choice of incentives under certain circumstances. 
For example, while at the core of the comparison of prizes with patents is the choice of 
the inventor based on private or public information, empirical research has found that 
firms commonly rely on secrecy—and not patents—to protect their technologies (Levin 
et al., 1987; Cohen et al., 2000). In those cases, factors other than the information on 
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markets and research costs would have to explain the decision to enter prize 
competitions. Moreover, there are recent works that challenge the mainstream prizes-
patents comparison that assumes that firms use the patent system only in order to be 
granted a short-term commercial monopoly rent. For example, Penin (2005) argues that 
in many industries most firms also use patents as strategic devices to trade technologies 
and to ease R&D collaborations, which suggests additional considerations in the patent-
prizes debate. 
 In addition, scholars and commentators have suggested intuitively a number of 
factors that can make prizes more effective tools to promote innovation. For example, 
Mowery et al. (2010) argues that prize competitions must specify precise output or 
performance targets to be effective and fair, and that the ability of entries in any 
competition to meet these targets must be readily verifiable, which may not be possible in 
some technology fields with diverse technologies and applications. Masters & Delbecq 
(2008) suggest that timing is key to the impact of prizes as technological progress 
changes achievable possibilities, and socioeconomic conditions influence the desirability 
of those possibilities. Kalil (2006) suggests that prizes have to posit achievable yet 
difficult goals to be able to induce innovation. Newell and Wilson (2005) maintain that 
successful prizes have to offer a clear measure of success or target in a field where 
achievement is desirable but measurement had been lacking. 
 
2.4 Prizes and S&T and innovation policy 
 Lately, there was much increased interest in the use of prizes by governments, to 
promote innovation or pursue other related goals. A number of studies have addressed the 
use of prizes in the U.S. government since the late 1990s, such as those by the National 
Academy of Engineering (NAE, 1999), the National Research Council (NRC, 2007), the 
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Congressional Research Service (Stine, 2009), and the author of this research (Kay, 
2011). Academic research has also contributed some theoretical insights in this regard. 
 There are certain advantages of prizes that attract policy makers and prize 
advocates. First, theoretically, the financial risk of the R&D activity in prizes rests with 
the competitors and their financiers as the monetary reward is only paid if there is a 
winner that achieves the proposed target. In conventional instruments such as R&D 
contracts and grants, that financial risk rests largely with the taxpayers when the R&D 
activity is publicly funded. Second, prizes can reduce the bureaucratic and accounting 
barriers to entry that accompany the grant and contracting processes and allow smaller 
players to enter the R&D arena (Newell & Wilson, 2005). That can be a great advantage 
for the introduction of novel methods and R&D approaches because smaller participants 
are likely to be less risk-averse than institutionalized competitors and pursue more 
technologically radical concepts (Nalebuff & Stiglitz, 1983). Third, prizes may prevent 
distortions in R&D spending caused by, for example, lobbyists in R&D contracts if they 
are properly implemented and result in fair and transparent competitions (Cohen & Noll, 
1991). Fourth, prizes might be effective to target a full range of scientific and 
technological goals, including research, development, testing, demonstration, and 
deployment (Stine, 2009). Fifth, prizes may also target broader social and economic goals 
beyond technological development (NAE, 1999; NRC, 2007). For example, prizes may 
engage different social groups, including underrepresented groups, for training within a 
competitive environment. Competitions may also advance technologies while having 
significant economic development impact by creating jobs and new businesses. 
 There are other considerations that suggest a word of caution about the use of 
prizes in government. Most importantly, governments may lack information on the 
benefits or feasibility of inventions before they have been invented, which makes difficult 
the crafting of prize challenges and the calculation of monetary rewards (Kremer, 1998). 
This increases the risk of program failure because the more difficult to describe or 
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measure objectively the innovation to identify the reward recipient, the more difficult to 
enforce the prize (Che & Gale, 2003; Newell & Wilson, 2005). A very instructive 
historical example is the Longitude Prize, implemented by the British Parliament in 1714 
for the development of a method to measure longitude at sea. The inventor that built a 
technical solution was ultimately awarded the prize, yet the scientific committee created 
to evaluate the innovation failed to judge it opportunely and objectively and, therefore, 
the reward was paid late and only partially (Sobel, 1996). Moreover, this uncertainty on 
whether the prize will ultimately be awarded—for reasons such as bureaucracy, budget 
cuts, or changes in administration—may weaken, if not eliminate, the incentives to 
compete (Macauley, 2005). This may also limit the scope of technological targets of 
government prizes as prizes with longer lead times are likely to introduce more 
uncertainty. On the other hand, while R&D grants and contracts provide funding up-front 
to support early stages of technology development, prizes only reward the innovator upon 
the achievement of the prize challenge and, hence, create a barrier for small teams willing 
to participate. Finally, the most efficient use of funding has to be considered in prize 
programs. The administration of prize programs may cost several times the amount of the 
cash purse. For example, the total funding available for the DARPA Urban Challenge 
2007 was $24 million: $12 million for the competition (including $3.5 million in prizes) 
and $12 million in seed funding to support a few qualified teams. Excessive budgets to 
fund experimental prize programs may lead to their termination. Potential solutions to 
this include alternative cost-bearing structures to alleviate the burden of costly programs. 
For example, agencies may partner with other organizations to have their prize programs 
administered at no cost, which is the case of NASA‘s NGLLC. Moreover, recent 
legislation authorizes government agencies to accept external funds for cash prizes from 
other agencies or private organizations (Kay, 2011). 
 The lack of empirical evidence and the short experience with government-
sponsored prizes emphasizes the need for further research to inform the decision of using 
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prizes versus other incentives and the implementation of more efficient prize programs. 
To date, government prizes represent only a small share of the government‘s efforts to 
promote R&D and innovation. In the U.S., federally-funded technology prizes represent 
only about 0.05 percent of the federal R&D spending and about 0.5 percent of the federal 
tax preferences granted for R&D (Figure 2.1).
6
 Compared to industry‘s R&D 
expenditures, the amount of rewards in government prizes is insignificant as well. Sill, 
these government prizes represent about 20 percent of the total prize rewards offered 
since 2000. 
 In the U.S., the federal government enacted new legislation in 2010 to support the 
use of prizes by federal agencies and launched the Challenge.gov online platform with 
prizes offered by more than 20 departments and agencies of the federal government. As 
of January 2011, there were over 55 announced competitions on that platform, with prize 
rewards that range from relatively small amounts of money ($200) to large amounts of 
money ($15 million) (see Table 2.2 with examples.) The America COMPETES Act has 
provided all U.S. federal agencies with broad authority to conduct prize competitions and 
includes provisions for different aspects of prize design, implementation, and oversight. 
This Act authorizes the use of prizes for one or more of the following: find solutions to 
well-defined problems; identify and promote broad ideas and practices and attract 
attention to them; promote participation to change the behavior of contestants or develop 
their skills; and, stimulate innovations with the potential to advance agencies‘ missions. 
The legislation also allows agencies to enter into agreements with private, nonprofit 
entities to administer a prize competition, and requires reporting prize activity for each 
fiscal year. 
 
                                                          
6
 The research and experimentation tax credit provides an incentive to undertake new research by giving 
firms a credit for expenses related to those new activities against the taxes they owe. In addition, R&D 
expenses that are not covered by the credit can be fully deducted from income as a business expense when 




Notes: industry and federal R&D spending as of 2006; federal tax preferences for R&D are an estimate of 
forgone revenues for 2006 (CBO, 2007); total rewards of federally funded prizes is an estimate shown as 
benchmark, for all prizes of this type since 2003 until today (Stine, 2009), and do include competitions that 
offer procurement contracts as reward; McKinsey & Co. database of prizes is available in McKinsey & 
Company (2009). 
Sources: NSF Science and Engineering Indicators 2008, otherwise indicated. 
 
Figure 2.1: Amount of U.S. federally-funded prize rewards compared to U.S. R&D 









































Table 2.2: Recent prize competitions posted on Challenge.gov (selected examples) 
 
• The Bright Tomorrow Lighting Prize ($15 million): Sponsored by the U.S. 
Department of Energy, the L Prize competition is aimed to substantially 
accelerate America‘s shift from inefficient, dated lighting products to 
innovative, high-performance products. The L Prize is the first government-
sponsored technology competition designed to spur lighting manufacturers to 
develop high-quality, high-efficiency solid-state lighting products to replace 
the common light bulb.  
• The Progressive Automotive X Prize ($10 million): The U.S. Department of 
Energy, Progressive Insurance, and the X Prize Foundation partnered to 
sponsor this prize, which was awarded in 2010. The goal of the prize was to 
inspire a new generation of viable, super-efficient vehicles that help break our 
addiction to oil and stem the effects of climate change. A project of the X 
Prize Foundation, the Progressive Automotive X Prize was an independent, 
technology neutral challenge for teams from around the world to compete in a 
multi-stage competition to produce clean, production-capable vehicles that 
exceed 100 miles-per-gallon energy equivalent (MPGe).  
• The Strong Tether Challenge ($2 million): NASA sponsors this challenge in 
materials engineering as part of its Centennial Challenges. The tether 
developed by each team is subjected to a pull test and, in order to win the $2 
million prize, the tether must exceed the strength of the best available 
commercial tether by 50 percent with no increase in mass. A tether that can 
win this challenge would be a major step forward in materials technology. 
Such improved materials would have a wide range of applications in space 
and on Earth.  
• The Nano-Satellite Launch Challenge ($2 million): Another NASA 
Centennial Challenges prize competition is to deliver two small satellites to 
Earth orbit in one week. Objectives of the competition include: a) safe, low-
cost, small payload delivery system for frequent access to Earth orbit; b) 
innovations in propulsion and other technologies as well as operations and 
management for broader applications in future launch systems; c) a 
commercial capability for dedicated launches of small satellites at a cost 






RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
3.1 Incentives and motivations of prize entrants 
 The discussions on the motivations to participate in prizes are generally focused 
on the incentive provided by the monetary reward. In the scholarly literature, the 
calculation of a usually unique, appropriate reward has generally risen to the forefront. 
The analyses suggest that there is no accurate formula or algorithm to translate the 
theoretical concepts of private and social value of research and innovation into monetary 
amounts to determine prize rewards (Wright, 1983; Kremer, 1998; Shavell & van 
Ypersele, 1999; Abramowicz, 2003; Maurer & Scotchmer, 2004; Scotchmer, 2005; Wei, 
2007). 
 Theoretically, rewards should reflect the social value of the invention. Prize 
sponsors would prefer to pay only up to that amount if R&D costs were observable, but it 
is generally difficult for sponsors to observe and/or determine both the social value and 
the costs of R&D (not only for prizes but for other incentives as well.) Moreover, 
government and philanthropic sponsors are less likely to have information about the 
value of research and innovations than researchers and companies. Governments might 
have a better estimate of the social value only in certain cases that make prizes preferable 
to patents (e.g. when the social benefits of new medicines are known.) Non-optimal prize 
rewards have various effects. If the reward is lower than the social surplus created by the 
invention, the incentive to invest in R&D would be inadequate and inventors would not 
be willing to compete for the prize. A very low reward may not even cover the costs of 
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R&D. If the reward is equal to or exceeds the social surplus, the excessive incentive to 
invest in R&D would lead to inefficient duplication of investment.
7
 
 The literature has also discussed alternative rewarding schemes to address those 
issues related with information asymmetries in the use of prize incentives. To find 
optimal types of incentives, scholars have suggested, for example, schemes whereby the 
winner chooses between a monetary reward or a patent (Shavell & van Ypersele, 1999), a 
patent buy-out mechanism to harness private information on the market value of 
inventions (Kremer, 1998), and a prize reward conditional on a verifiable performance 
standard of the invention (Scotchmer, 2005). Some of these solutions had positive effects 
on innovation when implemented in the past. For example, Kremer (1998) mentions the 
case of the Daguerrotype patent, purchased and placed in the public domain by the 
French government in 1839. This led to a worldwide adoption and innumerable technical 
improvements on that photography system. Other economic works have investigated 
what the optimal rewarding schemes are to make prizes efficient. For example, in 
competitions with elimination stages, Rosen (1986) maintains that a distinguishable, large 
first-place prize is required in competitions with elimination stages to induce competitors 
to aspire to higher goals independent of past achievements. In multi-prize contests (i.e. 
with first- and second-place prizes,) Moldovanu & Sela (2001) argue that the optimal-
prize structure depends on the cost function of the prize entrants and that the right 
proportion between prize values depends on the number of entries, the distribution of 
abilities in the population, and the curvature of the cost function of entrants as well. 
 Lately, a number of works—a few of them empirical—examined and brought the 
attention to non-monetary incentives offered by prizes. For instance, in the empirical 
examination of the Royal Agricultural Society of England (RASE) prizes offered 
between 1839 and 1939, Brunt et al. (2008) found that a prestigious gold medal had 
                                                          
7
 Overinvestment in innovation from the social welfare point of view may exist with other incentives as 
well, when for example competing firms try to get ahead of one another‘s innovation programs (Dasgupta 
& Stiglitz, 1980). 
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greater entrant effect than cash rewards and that competitors viewed annual exhibitions of 
inventions as a powerful form of advertising. The same study found that cash rewards 
covered only around one-third of the total cost of the inventions exhibited by successful 
prize entrants, reinforcing the idea of the presence of other motivations. On the contrary, 
in his investigation of the Royal Medals of the Royal Society of the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 
centuries, MacLeod (1971) concludes that the medals induced competition yet, rather 
than encouraging fresh scientific discovery within British science as originally planned, 
became a highly subjective means of personal recognition and legitimization of scientific 
paradigms. Moreover, MacLeod also concludes that medals had to be combined with 
financial stipends if they were to be successful incentives for scientific discoveries. From 
their case studies of 20
th
 century prizes, Davis & Davis (2004) conclude that reputation, 
credibility, and visibility alone can provide the economic justification for a sponsor to 
design the contest and for contestants to enter. They also suggest that learning through 
technology spillovers and best practices diffusion is another potential motivation to 
participate in prizes. Also Davis & Davis (2004) and Saar (2006) found that the potential 





 century technology prizes. Several other scholars also suggest the 
existence of those non-monetary incentives (Maurer & Scotchmer, 2004; Schroeder, 
2004; Kalil, 2006; Anastas & Zimmerman, 2007; Culver et al., 2007). In addition, other 
works suggest that prizes can reduce bureaucratic and accounting barriers that 
accompany typical grant and contracting processes and thus attract smaller firms or 
independent researchers, for example. Most importantly, some argue, the openness of the 
prize process may allow the participation of unconventional innovators, i.e. individuals 
and organizations that are not generally involved with the development of the prize 
technologies and use non-traditional approaches to pursue the prize challenge (see, for 
example, Schroeder, 2004; Newell & Wilson, 2005; Culver et al., 2007). Finally, in 
concordance with the literature, direct observation of recent prize competitions have 
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allowed program managers to identify cases in which the costs of development by prize 
entrants exceeded the cash purse considerably (see, for example, Davidian, 2007), calling 
into question the importance of the monetary reward and suggesting the presence of other 
types of incentives. 
 Certainly, there may be cases in which prize entrants are not aware of the 
theoretical private/social benefit concepts addressed by economists in the study of 
incentive mechanisms. For instance, scientists or engineers that participate in prizes are 
unlikely to make their decisions about participation based on those terms and, instead, 
possibly focus their evaluation on other personal or professional aspects such as 
professional career, personal finances, and/or other personal achievements. Even the 
exclusive consideration of monetary incentives may be misguiding in the interpretation of 
the primary motivations of entrants. For example, Paul MacCready, aeronautical 
engineer, decided to compete in (and ultimately won) the Kremer Prize of 1977 because 
he owed money for exactly the reward amount. In a later account, he explained: 
―I did recall, with no special emphasis, this £50,000 prize that Henry 
Kremer had put up 17 years earlier. And then, one day I happened to 
notice that at that time the pound was worth just two dollars. Suddenly, 
this great light bulb just glowed over my head: the prize was $100,000, my 
debt was $100,000. There just may be some interesting connection 
between these two. So my interest in human-powered flight zoomed up to 
high level, and I fussed away at it, and eventually it worked.” (Academy 
of Achievement, 1991) 
 This research investigates the types of incentives offered by prizes and seeks to 
understand how different types of incentives weigh in the overall motivation of different 
types of prize entrants. A better understanding of these topics may have at least three 
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important implications. First, new evidence on the perception of incentives would allow a 
better understanding of prizes as a phenomenon that may include features that cannot be 
analyzed in economic terms. Second, empirically-based understanding on the actual 
incentives perceived by entrants would be able to inform more precisely the process of 
implementation of prize competitions and, particularly, the process of calculation of the 
monetary and the design of non-monetary rewards. Third, a better understanding of how 
different types of entrants respond to different types of incentives would shed light on 
what types of prizes are better at attracting specific groups of individuals and 
organizations or creating problem-solving communities. 
 
Question 1: How do different types of incentives weigh in the overall 
motivation of different types of prize entrants? 
 
 This research introduces two assumptions that include general classifications of 
incentives and entrants to be able to respond Question 1 (Q1.) The first assumption is that 
there are at least two types of incentives: a) prize incentives (PIs) defined as those that are 
offered exclusively by the competition and would not exist if the prize was not 
announced; and b) technology incentives (TIs) defined as those that are linked to the 
value of the prize technologies. By definition, PIs can be set by the sponsor with certain 
precision to produce the desired effects. They include, for example, monetary incentives 
(e.g. cash prizes or bonuses) or non-monetary incentives (e.g. prestige, publicity, or 
reputation for prize entrants.) Technology incentives are linked to the market value of the 
prize technologies and/or the benefits for the entrants of introducing the prize 
technologies for own use. These include, for example, potential revenues from 
commercialization of the technologies or cost savings obtained by the exploitation of the 
technologies in own performance improvement. This research considers that the prize 
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announcement does not affect the market value that the prize technologies may have. The 
second assumption is that there is a group of entrants not generally involved with the 
development of the prize technologies and can be classified as unconventional. The 
opposite group, conventional entrants, comprises those individuals and organizations 
generally involved with the development of prize technologies. In this research, the 
attribute that defines such involvement is the industry experience that individuals and 
organizations have with the prize technologies. In the case studies examined by this 
research, groups of individuals with significant experience working for space 
industry/agencies are considered conventional entrants. The rest of the prize entrants are 
considered unconventional. 
 There are at least two main potential explanations for the relationship between 
types of incentives and type of entrants. In the first explanation, prize entrants factor out 
only the cash purse offered by the prize to decide their participation. This alternative—
which resembles a simplified version of economic modeling—assumes that would-be 
entrants evaluate the prize money and the risks of prize participation, compare them with 
alternative strategies based on their private information, and only enter the competition if 
they foresee a profit. In the examination of how different incentives weigh in the 
decisions to compete, this alternative represents a null hypothesis as only one type of 
incentive is perceived and no variation would be measured. The second explanation—a 
richer elaboration that includes other insights from the literature—posits that would-be 
entrants have unique characteristics that affect their perception of both monetary and non-
monetary incentives. For example, individuals not generally involved in technology 
development may perceive in prizes the opportunity to participate and learn, an 
opportunity that they would not otherwise have access to. Other individuals and 
organizations already involved in technology development may perceive in prizes the 
opportunity to create synergies with their ongoing activities and use their expertise to win 
29 
 
the prize simultaneously with the development of valuable technologies for their own 
projects. 
 Hypothesis 1 (H1) adopts the perspective of the second explanation and posits 
that there exists a relationship between types of incentives and types of entrants. It 
anticipates that, for any given technological field and its general context, more significant 
prize incentives are more likely to attract unconventional entrants and more significant 
technology incentives are more likely to attract traditional entrants. 
 
Hypothesis 1: For any fixed technological field and its general context, 
more significant prize incentives (PIs) are more likely to induce the 
participation of unconventional entrants and more significant technology 
incentives (TIs) are more likely to induce the participation of conventional 
entrants. 
 
3.2 Prize R&D activities 
 In technology prizes, entrants have to perform some type of R&D activities to 
achieve the challenge before the prize expiration date. Our understanding of the 
organization of those activities is mostly intuitive and limited to very general—though 
still instructive—characteristics of R&D. Prizes are not only instances of competition but 
also cases of collaboration and communication. Awards in general—not only technology 
prizes—may serve the function of what economists call ―communication,‖ as they bring 
disparate players into informed contact with one another so that mutually beneficial 
transactions occur among them (English, 2005). Simultaneous competition and 
collaborations between problem solvers have been also found to be key for individual 
innovators to succeed in recently launched virtual online prize platforms (Bullinger et al., 
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2010; Hutter et al., 2011). This phenomenon of competition and formation of research 
communities to advance specific technologies and solve concrete technical problems has 
been also observed in recent competitions such as the DARPA Challenges and the Netflix 
Prize (DARPA, 2006, 2008; McKinsey & Company, 2009). These prize communities 
may benefit from the participation of unconventional entrants and small players that are 
less risk-averse and more likely to pursue technologically radical concepts than 
institutionalized competitors which generally compete for grants and contracts (Nalebuff 
& Stiglitz, 1983). The open environment provided by prizes for innovation may be also 
able to encourage unconventional partnerships between entrants and other entities and 
contribute new ways to organize R&D (Culver et al., 2007). 
 On the other hand, much was discussed about the ability of prizes to induce R&D 
effort and leverage investment. Theoretically, larger prize rewards may lead to more 
vigorous R&D races and shorter achievement times for technology development 
considering that performers start from similar position (Grishagin et al., 2001). Some 
argue that ex-ante fixed rewards, deadlines, and technology specifications have the 
potential to induce very focused R&D efforts (Newell & Wilson, 2005). The flip-side of 
the increasing activities is the potential duplication of R&D when prizes engage large 
numbers of participants because there tends to be only a finite number of innovative ideas 
for any given technology problem at a given time (Maurer & Scotchmer, 2004; Newell & 
Wilson, 2005). In the same vein, some maintain that free entry to competitions is not 
optimal and that entrants have to be taxed with an entry fee. Otherwise, the individual 
R&D effort of prize entrants would weaken when there is an increasing number of 
competitors as entrants perceive fewer chances to win the prize (Taylor, 1995; Fullerton 
& McAfee, 1999). There is also some empirical evidence of the ability of prizes to 
leverage funding. For example, Brunt et al. (2008) found that monetary rewards only 
offset one-third of the costs of technology development in RASE prizes. Schroeder 
(2004) estimates that the AXP induced an investment from entrants 40 times the size of 
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the cash purse, and that the DARPA Challenges induced investments up to 50 times the 
size of the cash purse. Recent prize experiences such as the NGLLC may have also 
shown that prize entrants spend several times the cash purse to achieve the prize 
challenge (see for example Davidian, 2007). 
 The interest in the organization of R&D activities in prizes has been raised by the 
exceptional performance of entrants in recent prize competitions. These entrants have had 
significant technological achievements with low budgets and, sometimes, no previous 
experience in the field. For example, there is Armadillo Aerospace, from Mesquite, 
Texas. This team was created in 2000 by a small group of mostly IT professionals to 
enter the AXP to develop a suborbital spacecraft. The team also entered the NGLLC in 
2006 to develop vertically take-off and landing rocket vehicles. The team spent at least 
$3.5 million in its R&D program—much less than similar space programs—and won two 
prizes for $850,000 (Armadillo Aerospace, 2008). In those competitions, the team 
introduced sophisticated computer controls for its vehicles and contributed to establish 
new standards of reusability, operation, speed of development and efficiency (NASA, 
2009b). 
 To the author‘s knowledge, the unique characteristics of those prize R&D 
activities and the extent to which they differ from traditional industry practices have not 
been investigated. There are at least three basic characteristics of prizes that can be 
examined to gain insights into this topic. First and foremost, prizes generally do not 
provide up-front funding to perform R&D. That might create conditions that differ from 
R&D undertaken in procurement contracts, research grants, or even corporate new 
product development, which generally do have some (or all) funding up front to perform 
R&D. This should be particularly relevant for some technological challenges that require 
significant funding and access to expensive facilities or equipment for their achievement. 
Yet, on the other hand, prize entrants are likely to focus their effort on a single and 
discrete goal instead of having to pursue a continuous activity with multiple projects or 
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customers and maintain a considerable industry-like infrastructure, which ultimately may 
allow implementing less costly R&D organizations. 
 Prizes also pose strict deadlines to come up with a technological solution. 
Deadlines and shorter lead times are not an exclusive feature of prizes since time is 
generally considered a key resource for R&D teams working in all competitive 
environments (Waller et al., 2001). However, deadlines may be interpreted in two 
different ways: as the available time to achieve a specific goal, or as part of the overall 
goal that team members must work toward to achieve (Locke & Latham, 1990; Karau & 
Kelly, 1992). In prizes, by definition, the deadline is part of the prize challenge and, thus, 
is defined by the sponsor at once for all entrants. In other words, to win the prize, entrants 
have to organize their activities to produce the technical solution within the given 
timeframe. In other contexts (e.g. commercial product development, procurement 
contracts) the R&D performer sets or negotiates deadlines and maybe even able to 
postpone based on its own strategies and/or available resources. 
 Last but not least, the often cited ability of prizes to induce R&D effort from 
unconventional entrants is also intriguing. These entrants comprise individuals and 
organizations that are generally not involved with the prize technologies and may bring 
unorthodox approaches and fresh ideas to the competition. 
 This research builds upon those basic features of prizes and literature insights to 
investigate the characteristics of prize R&D activities and their differences with 
traditional industry practices. New evidence on the nature of prize R&D activities can 
contribute significantly to better understand the ability of prizes to induce new, creative 
problem solving methods. Findings can also inform the process of implementation of 
prize competitions and, particularly, the process of calculation of rewards and definition 
of development lead times/expiration dates. For example, program managers may pose 
challenges that demand significant R&D effort yet, at the same time, allow longer 
development lead times to find more affordable solutions. Moreover, the understanding 
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of how prize R&D is performed would shed light on what types of rules are the most 
adequate to induce, for example, certain technological outputs or approaches to produce 
them. Particularly interesting are the rules that regulate the use of public funding or allow 
hybrid approaches that include monetary rewards and seed funding to support entrants‘ 
R&D activities, both used in recent competitions (see, for example, DARPA, 2008). 
 
Question 2: What are the characteristics of prize R&D activities and how 
do they differ from traditional industry’s R&D activities? 
 
 The earlier discussion suggests that the lack of up-front funding—or, its 
counterpart, the R&D funding requirements—and the prize deadline may affect the 
peculiar characteristics of the prize R&D activities. While the deadline is inflexible and 
explicitly stated by the PC definition, the funding requirements are indirectly set by the 
PC and relate to the costs to provide a technical solution to the given problem. Therefore, 
both deadlines and funding requirements are parameters that sponsors may ultimately 
adjust when defining the PC to induce certain effects. Due to the lack of previous 
research, this research focuses intuitively on the impact that those parameters may have 
on three potentially unique characteristics of prize R&D activities: the designs introduced 
by entrants, the extent to which entrants draw upon existing technologies, and the overall 
organization of R&D collaborations. This focus is fairly generic to allow comparisons 
with other instances of R&D activity but also reasonably specific to allow 
operationalization and hypothesis probing. 
 Considerably short development lead times and the lack of up-front funding may 
become significant constraints in the competitive context of prize competitions. It is 
possible that entrants do not face such constraints and, therefore, these factors do not 
introduce significant differences between prize R&D and activities performed in other 
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contexts such as corporate and government R&D. Yet, it is also plausible that these 
factors do affect prize R&D by different means. For example, the need for faster 
achievement times and the lack of funding may push entrants to introduce simpler 
technologies to be able to come up with solutions faster and at a lower cost. Furthermore, 
whenever is possible, entrants may shorten lead times and reduce costs by drawing 
upon/combining existing technologies rather than developing new technologies to 
achieve the prize challenge. If entrants cannot respond to time and funding constraints 
with alternative design criteria or using existing technologies, they may engage in 
increasing collaborative efforts that help in accomplishing the prize challenge. 
 Hypothesis 2 (H2) posits that there is that kind of relationship between 
time/funding requirements and the characteristics of prize R&D activities. It anticipates 
that shorter lead times and more significant funding requirements lead to simpler 
technological designs, more significant reliance upon existing technologies, and more 
collaborative R&D efforts. In this context, the definition of simplicity is associated with 
the number of parts and their interconnectedness in a technological system, i.e. simpler 
designs have fewer and less interconnected parts than complex designs. Existing 
technologies are those considered readily available, commercially or by other means. 
More collaborative efforts are those that involve an increasing number of actors 
(individuals and/or organizations) and relationships between them and the prize entrants. 
 
Hypothesis 2: For any fixed technological field, shorter lead times and 
more significant funding requirements posed by the prize lead to simpler 
technological designs, more significant reliance upon existing or standard 




3.3 Prize technology outputs 
 Not much has been written about the quality of the Prize technology outputs 
(PTOs.) These are the technologies that entrants produce during the competition to 
achieve the PC. Entrants may start producing these outputs as soon as they enter the 
competition (or earlier if they have already ongoing projects) and in diverse forms such 
as designs, models, prototypes, and actual products or services. They may also use those 
technologies in their own projects or introduce them into new or existing markets. The 
winning entry is generally the most visible output of this type of prizes yet runner-ups 
and other participants may also contribute significant technological developments. 
 The advantages of prizes to advance technologies are also, in some cases, 
weaknesses of this type of instrument. Prizes may offer greater scope for unexpected 
solutions and for solutions arising from unexpected sources compared with conventional 
innovation policy instruments (Kalil, 2006). Some argue that that is the result of the 
participation of unconventional prize entrants which are more likely to introduce novel 
technologies and methods. Still, prizes may not be efficient to induce certain quality of 
technological outputs. That is, prizes cannot guarantee that entrants with the best ideas 
are motivated to participate or, if that happens, that the best idea is selected or 
implemented at the minimum cost. Moreover, strict technical specifications for the prize 
challenge may not tap all the creativity that is widely dispersed in the population 
(Scotchmer, 2005). In the same vein, there is the idea whereby prizes can be tailored to 
induce research effort but are often ineffective because it is difficult to anticipate in 
advance exactly what combination of ideas will be required to address a particular 
problem (Gans & Stern, 2010). 
 Prizes may also fail to produce technological results in certain circumstances. For 
example, strict technical specifications for the PC may prevent some significant—yet not 
up to the prize exact requirements—innovations to be rewarded, for which the sponsor 
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may be still interested in paying, for example, a partial reward (Kremer, 1998; Masters & 
Delbecq, 2008). It may also occur that, in certain technological field, current-day 
capabilities, R&D costs, or both are not yet up to the requirements of the PC, in which 
case a prize may fail to find a winner (Macauley, 2005). On the other hand, given the 
sequential and cumulative nature of innovation, prizes may fail to induce subsequent 
superior inventions if the proper incentives are not offered (Gallini & Scotchmer, 2001). 
That relates with the ability of prizes to induce commercialization of technologies. Prizes 
may provide adequate incentives to make an invention occur, yet the invention may still 
never be applied or reach the market for commercialization if prize entrants only target 
the prize challenge and lack sufficient incentives to develop the invention commercially 
(Kieff, 2001; Wei, 2007). 
 The empirical evidence in this regard is also little. An early examination of prizes 
awarded by RASE in 1851 suggests that only two out of 170 awarded medals rewarded 
extraordinary novelty or utility (Sidney, 1862). A more recent study of prizes awarded by 
RASE between 1839 and 1939 found that prizes were correlated with patenting activity 
and had a large effect on the quality of the invention measured through patent renewal 
fees (Brunt et al., 2008). Case studies of prizes implemented during the 20
th
 century show 
that competitions motivated inventors and stimulated innovations to achieve increasing 
performance goals in fields related with the prize technologies. Even when there was no 
immediate commercial gain, prizes were valuable to achieve the most efficient innovation 
outcome, improving designs that were not entirely new (Davis & Davis, 2004). Sponsors 
and commentators have also attributed positive effects of prizes on technology 
development. For example, the DARPA Grand Challenge 2005 for autonomous vehicles 
led to many technical accomplishments and remarkable improvement in several 
technologies related to the prize challenge (DARPA, 2006). The NGLLC has also 
induced the development of sophisticated instruments and the achievement of new 
standards of reusability, operation, speed of development and efficiency (NASA, 2009b). 
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 This research investigates the characteristics of PTOs and their relationship with 
the characteristics of prize entrants and their R&D activities. A better understanding of 
this topic would help in understanding how innovation occurs in unconventional 
organizational settings—such as prizes—and as a response to diverse types of incentives. 
Moreover, concrete knowledge on the quality of the technological outputs induced by 
prizes, and the contribution of different types of entrants, would inform the process of 
prize design to implement competitions that are able to focus R&D processes to induce 
specific outputs or even commercialization. For example, program managers may target 
or restrict prize eligibility to specific research communities to induce specific outputs 
rather than having wide-open entry processes that motivates more entrants yet also 
increase the costs of operation of the prize program. 
 
Question 3: What are the characteristics of the prize technology outputs 
and how do they relate to the characteristics of prize entrants and their 
R&D activities? 
 
 PTOs are technologies in different stages of development that result from the 
activity of prize entrants during the competition, ranging from ideas and concepts to 
successfully implemented devices or technological systems. A number of factors may 
affect the characteristics of the PTOs, including the attributes of the prize entrants and the 
resources available to them. The possibility of attracting unconventional entrants that 
may introduce fresh ideas and creative approaches to technology development makes the 
relationship between the quality of the PTOs and types of entrants relevant for this 
inquiry. This research maintains the assumption of the existence of a group of 
unconventional prize entrants to probe the contribution of individuals and organizations 
generally not involved with the development of the prize technologies. 
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 To study the relationship between features of R&D activities and ultimate 
technological outputs, this research focuses on the design criteria and the relationship of 
the PTOs with current-day technologies. The degree of novelty and the actual 
implementation of the technologies are particularly interesting as both contribute to 
innovation. Innovation is defined as the creation and implementation of new or improved 
products, processes, or organizations (OECD/Eurostat, 1997). This research considers the 
degree of novelty to be relative to industry‘s current-day products, processes, and 
organizations, and it is measured in a scale that comprises current-day, 
derivative/improved, and breakthrough technologies. Using standard definitions, 
derivative/improved technologies are those more efficient or affordable versions of 
current-day technologies, while technological breakthroughs are those able to generate a 
paradigm shift in the science and technology and/or market structure of the industry 
sector (Garcia & Calantone, 2002). Implementation refers to commercialization of 
technologies—or services based on them—and use of the technology for own 
performance improvement (e.g. intent to win the prize.) 
 The concepts of novelty and technology implementation can be also linked to 
different Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) in engineering projects (Table 3.1). TRL 
levels are a systematic metric for technology maturity that allows the consistent 
comparison between different types of technologies (Mankins, 1995). Novel ideas and 
concepts are linked to research activities (―pure research‖) at low TRL levels; proof-of-
concepts, tests, and capability demonstrations are linked to medium TRL levels; and the 
advancement of technologies for their actual deployment or commercialization are linked 
to higher TRL levels. Government agencies—including NASA—and major private 
companies use this measure to assess the maturity of evolving technologies such as 
materials, components, and devices prior to incorporating them into a system or 
subsystem (e.g. in space projects, TRL levels indicate the maturity of the technology in 
relation to being acceptable for launch or ―mission-ready‖.) At the same time, TRL levels 
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indicate the risk and/or uncertainty that the use of the technology involves (i.e. the lower 
the TRL, the greater the risk/uncertainty.) TRL levels do not correlate to any specific 
project management principle or guideline (Sauser et al., 2005). This research uses TRL 
levels as a reference to assess the contribution of PTOs to advances in the technological 
field. 
 








Actual system ―flight proven‖ through successful 







Actual system completed and ―flight qualified‖ 
through test and demonstration (ground or space) 
7 
System prototype demonstration in a space 








System/subsystem model or prototype 
demonstration in a relevant environment (ground 
or space) 
5 





Component and/or breadboard validation in 
laboratory environment 
3 
Analytical and experimental critical function 







2 Technology concept and/or application formulated 
1 Basic principles observed and reported 
Source: based on Mankins (1995) 
 
 In the consideration of the factors that may affect the degree of novelty and the 
actual implementation of the prize technologies, there is the appealing notion by which 
unconventional or new-to-industry entrants are more likely to introduce novel ideas and 
approaches as they draw upon knowledge, skills, and networks that are atypical for the 
prize technological field. Likewise, conventional entrants have access to knowledge, 
skills, and networks relevant to the prize technologies and may take advantage of those 
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resources to improve technologies they are already familiar with and seek their 
implementation or commercialization through well developed industry networks. These 
potential explanations of the relationship between types of entrants and PTOs are only 
speculation as the literature does not provide further insights in this regard. A null 
relationship is also possible. For instance, unconventional entrants may come up with 
novel ideas yet also lack the skills or resources to further develop and introduce them. 
Moreover, those novel contributions may lack commercial merit if they are very 
unorthodox and represent a radical departure from traditional technology and business 
models. It is also possible that commercialization is not the main motivation of more 
conventional entrants to participate in prizes. 
 Hypothesis 3 (H3) explores that relationship between the characteristics of PTOs 
and the types of entrants. It anticipates that unconventional entrants are more likely to 
introduce more novel technologies and conventional entrants are more likely to advance 
more mature technologies for commercialization. 
 
Hypothesis 3: For any fixed prize challenge (PC) definition, 
unconventional entrants are more likely to introduce novel technologies 
and conventional entrants are more likely to advance more mature 
technologies for commercialization. 
 
3.4 The overall effect of prizes on innovation 
 There is much said about the virtues of prizes to induce multiple effects including 
technological innovation yet no significant empirical evidence has been contributed about 
their real effects. Most importantly, the literature is not precise on the nature of those 
effects and what their causal factors are. 
41 
 
 In one of the earliest references of the academic literature to the potential of prizes 
to induce innovation, Michael Polanyi suggested that prizes may increase the amount of 
industrial research that is published (since industrial laboratories may become eager to 
claim potential rewards) and eventually contribute to some important technical 
innovation (Polanyi, 1944). It was only recently that scholars—and many 
commentators—started to elaborate on the potential of prizes to accelerate innovation or 
speed up development in certain technological fields (see, for example, Anastas & 
Zimmerman, 2007; Culver et al., 2007; Masters & Delbecq, 2008; McKinsey & 
Company, 2009). Today‘s mainstream discussion refers to the ability of prizes to 
mobilize participants, attract capital, induce focused R&D activities, raise industry and 
public awareness, and, remarkably, spur innovation. Others have suggested that prizes 
can also change the direction of the innovation pathway or ―focus innovative efforts on 
problems for which solutions otherwise do not seem to be forthcoming‖ (Davis & Davis, 
2004). Prizes may be also able to motivate the last effort to come up with a technical 
solution that was are already under development (Saar, 2006), be efficient instruments to 
induce technological breakthroughs (Mowery et al., 2010), and serve as an innovation 
catalyst by lowering entry barriers to markets and thus enabling the participation of a 
much more diverse range of players (Culver et al., 2007). The mere announcement of 
some historical prizes had induced considerable activity to find technical solutions to the 
prize challenge (see, for example, Sobel, 1996; Kessner, 2010). 
 Other sources maintain that the potential technology accomplishments induced by 
prizes may include new inventions, new applications, performance improvements, and 
technology diffusion (NAE, 1999). The effect of prizes may include both incremental and 
radical innovations. Some datasets of technology prizes suggest both improvements and 
technology breakthroughs in diverse technological fields, ranging from the creation of 
methods to preserve food in early prizes to the recent Ansari X Prize achievement linked 
to private commercial spaceflight, yet with more notable activity in the development of 
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aviation/aircrafts (see, for example, Masters & Delbecq, 2008; McKinsey & Company, 
2009). Based on its experience with prize organization, the XPF recommends that short-
term prize competitions with relatively small rewards can be aimed at inducing 
incremental technological changes, and that medium- to long-term competitions with 
more significant cash purses can be aimed at inducing revolutionary changes and 
breakthroughs (Pomerantz, 2006). 
 The literature‘s discussion on the ability of prizes to spur innovation has 
developed much faster than the contribution of empirical evidence. Among the most 
notable empirical works is the work by Brunt et al. (2008) on the Royal Agricultural 
Society of England‘s prizes for the development of tools and implements for agriculture 
between 1839 and 1939. These authors found that those prizes influenced positively the 
direction of technological effort and its quality, as indicated by the increasing patenting 
activity for the prize technologies. Also Davis & Davis (Davis & Davis, 2004) found that 
prizes had an important role in the development of motorized flight, human-powered 
flight, and energy efficient refrigerators during the 20
th
 century. Though in some cases 
prizes did not produce technologies with immediate commercial merit, they stimulated 
innovation in related technologies and contributed to the development of aviation-related 




 century prizes, Saar 
(2006) found that non-traditional, unexpected technical solutions were a common feature 
of those prizes and, in some cases, the winning entries were possibly under development 
when the prizes were announced. Interestingly, a very early account by Sidney (1862) 
points out that the Royal Agricultural Society‘s prizes studied by Brunt et al. (2008) did 
not have more effect than the traditional exhibitions and industry competitions and, 
generally speaking, prizes only misdirected the effort of people. 
 This research investigates the effect of prizes on technological innovation and 
seeks to understand how different causal factors weigh in such effect. This is the most 
relevant aspect of the study of prizes for at least two reasons. First, there has been much 
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discussion about the virtues of prizes to advance technologies and spur innovation, yet 
there is almost no empirical evidence in this regard. Second, there is an increasing 
interest to make a more widespread use of this type of instruments to promote innovation 
and achieve other related goals. A better understanding of prizes and their technological 
effects based on empirical evidence and systematic examination can inform the decision 
to implement prizes in alternative circumstances and the design of more efficient prize 
competitions. 
 
Question 4: Do prizes spur innovation over and above what would have 
occurred anyway? 
 
 While the use of counterfactuals has been generally criticized due to their alleged 
ambiguity, determinism, and problematic implementation, counterfactual conditionals 
contain causal implications and are always implicit or explicit components of the analysis 
of causality (Roese & Olson, 1995; Broda-Bahm, 1996). In practice, addressing a 
counterfactual question can yield a more enlightening debate and be effective to guide 
research inquiry aimed at uncovering the real potential of prizes to induce innovation. 
Undoubtedly, prizes do induce some type of R&D activity and may help in advancing 
technologies. The question is whether the same outcomes would be observed if the prize 
was not announced and only more traditional incentive mechanisms were used for 
technological development. 
 For analysts and commentators, the winning entry has traditionally been the 
demonstration of the ability of prize to induce innovation. This research maintains that 
the investigation of the effect of prizes on innovation has to examine not only the more 
visible outputs but also other developments of the competition, and consider them 
relative to their context. From this perspective, the winning entry in competitions speaks 
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more about the winner‘s ability than about the real effect of prizes. Certainly, 
distinguishing what effects are truly induced by the prize or other contextual factors is an 
intricate task due to the specificity of each prize given by certain context or technological 
field, competition design, and prize participants. Our ability to gain a better 
understanding on the effect of prizes would be limited if no examination of both the 
dynamics of the competition and its context is performed. 
 This research anticipates that prizes do induce innovation over and above what 
would have occurred anyway. Though this may occur through diverse means, this 
research is interested in those effects that prize organizers are able to produce 
systematically by designing a prize competition with the expectation to produce certain 
outputs. In particular, this research focuses on two key parameters that sponsors are 
totally free to choose: the prize reward (or other prize incentives) and the definition of the 
prize challenge. The literature offers some insights that may explain a positive effect of 
those parameters on innovation. In principle, larger prize incentives are likely to attract 
more entrants and induce more intense competitions. Larger rewards also increase the 
chances of engaging unconventional individuals and organizations that introduce novel 
ideas if the definition of the prize challenge is sufficiently open-ended to allow 
alternative approaches to solve technological problems. Depending on the characteristics 
of the technological field, prize technologies may also be introduced in markets or used 
for alternative applications. On the other hand, though intuition suggests a role for those 
parameters, it may also be the case that there is no relationship between the prize 
incentives/challenge definition and innovation. For example, the incentive to innovate 
may be in the market value of the prize technologies and, therefore, prize participants 
enter the competitions to be able to realize such value, independently of the design of the 
competition. 
 Hypothesis 4 (H4) anticipates that prize innovation is the result of particular 
combinations of prize incentives and degrees of openness of prize challenge definitions. 
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This relationship is likely to vary between technological fields and conditions of the 
general context. This hypothetical relationship also assumes that the announcement of the 
prize does not have any effect on the market value of the prize technologies and, 
therefore, technology incentives remain constant. 
 
Hypothesis 4: For any fixed technological field and its general 
context, more significant prize incentives and more open-ended 





METHODS AND DATA 
4.1 Methodological approach 
 This research pursues a field-based, mixed methods case study strategy combined 
with an iterative process to build explanations about the phenomenon and generate 
grounded theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003). This iterative process introduces an 
innovation model to investigate prizes, tests and revises the model with pilot case studies, 
analyzes the main case study, probes hypotheses and revises theory, and draw final 
conclusions (Figure 4.1). This research draws upon different methods of data gathering 
such as direct observation, on-site interviews, application of questionnaires, and 
document analysis. The analysis strategy is based on the triangulation of data sources 
during the interpretation of data with equal weighting for data gathered through different 
methods (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007). 
 This research maintains that a better understanding of prizes can be only achieved 
by investigating not only the prize competition as the unit of analysis but also its entrants 
and broader technological context. Therefore, this approach seeks to a) learn about the 
prize by looking at how entrants respond to incentives, perform R&D activities, and 
advance technologies, and b) disentangle the effect of the prize competition from ongoing 
R&D activities and broader industry and technological trends. This highlights the 








Source: own design based on Yin (2003). 
 



















































 To organize the inquiry, this research follows an embedded multiple-case study 
design (Yin, 2003) combining multiple-units of analysis in two stages (Figure 4.2). There 
is a first stage with two mini-case studies to test the model and a second stage with a 
main case study with embedded units of analysis (prize entrants.) The first stage reduces 
the risk of focusing on a single case study and serves other purposes as well. It allows 
defining more precisely the constructs involved in the model, determining the plausibility 
of the hypotheses, testing data sources, improving data gathering instruments, and 
contributing insights for the main case study. Multiple embedded units of analysis in both 




Source: own design based on Yin (2003). 
 
Figure 4.2: Case study design and implementation 
 
 The analysis of data follows an interactive approach involving data reduction, 
displaying, and conclusions (Miles & Huberman, 1994). This approach involved follow-
ups, further data gathering, and re-coding when there were missing or ambiguous data. 
NVivo data coding and qualitative analysis software by QSR International was used in 
this analysis. Case study data include documents, responded questionnaires, transcribed 



































 This research sets out to increase the external validity of the investigation of the 
main case study by considering the counter-factual ―Would innovation occur anyway if 
the prize did not exist?‖ and the insights from the two pilot cases. Moreover, two 
additional aspects are considered: (a) the potential alternative strategies that prize entrants 
might have been pursued if there was no prize announcement or if prize entrants did not 
join the competition; and, (b) the industry sector/technological field developments that 
might have occurred if the prize was not announced. For example, prize entrants are 
asked about their goals and relationship between the prize and their previous projects to 
understand their potential alternative strategies if the prize was not announced. Experts 
are also asked to assess these aspects from the industry context analysis standpoint. 
 
4.2 A model of innovation applied to prizes 
4.2.1 Prior work 
 To the author‘s knowledge, no framework or model has been offered by the 
academic literature for case study research on the effect of prizes on innovation. The 
academic literature has mostly contributed economic models in which a prize sponsor 
offers a unique monetary reward—the cash purse—to induce increasing R&D activity in 
a specific technological field or the production of a single innovation. These models have 
generally assumed that the innovation is ultimately placed in the public domain and thus 
the prize winner cannot reap the benefits of monopoly pricing. 
 The work by Wright (1983) is among the earliest applications of formal modeling 
techniques to compare incentive mechanisms, including prizes. Wright explores the 
optimal application of patents, prizes, and direct research contracting to induce 
innovative activity from the standpoint of a social welfare-maximizing administrator and 
with many researchers targeting the same innovation. In his work, the optimal choice 
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between those mechanisms is based on terms of the probability of success of the research 
projects and the elasticity of supply of research. 
 Several other works have built upon Wright‘s research to compare the 
effectiveness of alternative incentive schemes. For example, de Laat (1997) investigates 
whether the results of Wright‘s model hold under less competitive R&D processes by 
looking at the case of one innovator which is a technological leader and focused on the 
comparison between prizes and patents. Shavell & Ypersele (1999) compare the patent 
system—in which the innovator‘s incentives are the monopoly profits—with a rewards 
system—in which the incentive to invest in research is a monetary reward. They use a 
model of a single potential innovator with private information about the demand for the 
innovation and government with knowledge about the probability distribution of demand 
curves. Newell & Wilson (2005) analyze the use of prizes to induce innovations for 
climate change mitigation and use a simplified model that assumes that prize entrants and 
the sponsor share information about each other‘s costs, benefits, and probability of 
success. 
 Formal economic modeling of prizes has been also applied to the examination of 
optimal designs. For example, Taylor (1995) introduces a model in which identical risk-
neutral research firms, with no capital constraint and private information about the value 
of the innovations, decide whether to pay an entry fee to participate in a contest to 
produce an innovation of the highest value for the sponsor and win the prize money. 
Moldovanu & Sela (2001) use a model of multi-prize contests where risk-neutral players 
have private information about their abilities and the number and cost functions of the 
contestants affect the configuration and size of the prize values that maximize the 
expected sum of efforts. 
 The number of empirical works that investigate prizes is even smaller. A notable 
example is the study of Brunt et al. (2008) which looks at prizes awarded by the Royal 
Agricultural Society of England (RASE) between 1839 and 1939 to determine whether 
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prizes induce innovation. For that analysis the authors used econometric models (negative 
binomial regressions) that look at the entry effect of prizes and correlated patent activity, 
using datasets with prize entrants, rewards, and patents data for the time period of 98 
RASE exhibition shows. Interestingly, their models incorporate the type of reward (i.e. 
monetary and others) as an independent variable. 
 Davis & Davis (2004) follow a case study approach to investigate the role and 
incentive effects of prizes in three 20
th
 century innovations—motorized flight, human-
powered flight, and energy efficient refrigerators—where prizes were considered to play 
a significant role in technology development. These authors examine qualitative, 
historical evidence to determine how prize designs affected contest outcomes. Though 
there is not a formal model, their analysis is guided by five issues addressed by the 
literature: the size of the prize reward, duplication of R&D effort, spillovers and 
reputational gains, sequential innovations, and the co-existence of prizes with patents and 
the firm strategic choice. 
 Finally, Saar (2006)—also with a case study approach yet from a different 
perspective—investigates the reasons why prizes are rarely used as innovation 
mechanisms by addressing, among other aspects, the effect of prizes on technological 
innovation. He studied five prizes offered since the 18
th
 century, including the Longitude 
Prize, the Alkali Prize, the Orteig Prize, Ansari X Prize, and the Windows-on-a-Mac 
prize. Saar‘s analysis is structured to answer ten questions that look at diverse aspects, 
namely: prize purpose, prize sponsor, prize financing, entry rules, type of prize, related 
markets, prize offer length, funding of R&D activities, characteristics of the winning 
solution, publicity of the prize, and co-existing prizes. Saar notes that among the most 
important limitations to pursue this type of case studies are the lack of reliable data, 
particularly for prizes offered long ago. 
 Those works suggest a number of considerations for further research. First of all, 
the number and importance of the conditions under which prizes demonstrate to be 
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effective—at least theoretically—suggest that prizes can only complement—and not 
substitute—patents, contracts, grants, and other incentives to promote innovation and, 
thus, exclusive strategic choices such as patents or prizes need to be relaxed to examine 
the decision of prize participation under more real conditions. These real conditions have 
to consider the diversity of potential prize entrants, motivations, and perception of risks 
in the decision to enter innovation prizes. Moreover, this decision may be based on 
information on the costs, benefits, and probability of success of research projects that 
differs in quantity and quality between innovators and prize sponsors, or on assessments 
that consider incentives other than monetary rewards. Further research has to consider 
also factors that may be a) internal to the competition, such as the attributes of the 
innovators, or b) part of its context, such as the characteristics and dynamics of the 
technological field in which the competition is held. Finally, prize research has to 
consider the sequential and cumulative nature of innovation and examine ongoing 
industry R&D efforts and the ―after-market‖ value of the innovations achieved in 
competitions. 
 On the other hand, from a methodological standpoint, the lack of systematic 
documentation of a number of aspects related with prize competitions—such as the 
perception of incentives by prize entrants, R&D activities, and/or technology 
achievements—demands research models that allow empirical investigation based on 
mixed data sources. In particular, further research requires introducing measures of the 
quality of prize outputs to be able to examine and compare different types of prize 
implementations. 
4.2.2 The model 
 This research proposes a model of innovation applied to prizes that considers the 
prize competition as the unit of analysis and includes factors that are either internal or 
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external to the competition to better understand the phenomenon. This model draws 
primarily upon the prize literature and seeks to include all the factors that possibly 
determine the innovation effect of prizes. The model departs from the typical 
econometric approaches and aims at guiding and facilitating prize research following an 
approach to theory building based on case study research and multiple types of data 
sources (Eisenhardt, 1989). This model assumes that, at the core of the any prize 
competition, there is a pattern that encompasses motivations, R&D activities, and 
technology outputs and is influenced by the characteristics of the prize entrants and 
dynamics and structure of the prize context (Figure 4.3). In this model, it is this pattern 
that renders prizes as unique instances of innovation processes. 
 The process to create this model encompasses four major steps. First, there is the 
identification of dimensions of the study of prizes. For this, the author analyzed other 
scholarly works, accounts of historic prizes, and analyses and reports by prize advocates 
and commentators in addition to the literature cited in the previous section. In total, 40 
different knowledge sources published between 1862 and 2009 were analyzed, including 
13 scholarly journal publications and 14 working/conference papers.
8
 Six dimensions of 
the study of prizes were identified to outline the model and group concepts and 
relationships. These dimensions are prize announcement, motivations of entrants, prize 
R&D activities, prize technology outputs, characteristics of entrants, and the 
context/technology sector. Second, there is the identification of themes and topics by 
literature coding. For this, the author applied a descriptive approach to data coding 
(Saldaña, 2009) to the selected literature. This research used Nvivo data coding and 
qualitative analysis software by QSR International for the task. Third, there is the re-
contextualization of topics into categories. Coded topics were re-contextualized from 
their contiguity-based context into conceptual- or causal-based context based on both 
prize and more general innovation literature and preventing the creation of ―analytic 
                                                          
8
 All references to this literature are cited in this section. 
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blinders‖ that may impede observing connecting relationships in the data (Maxwell & 
Miller, 2008). That yielded a number of categories that follow either a variable-oriented 
approach in which categories are concepts linked by relationships (e.g. entrant‘s 
characteristics that relate to decisions to enter the competition) or a process-oriented 
approach in which categories are events or conditions that lead to successive events or 
conditions in the context of one case (e.g. prize design‘s features that lead to certain 
technology outputs.) (Miles & Huberman, 1994) Fourth, there is the operationalization of 
research categories or variables. The categories were defined to be operationally specific 
(i.e. categories are defined in terms of its measurement) and present no measurement 
issues (i.e. be reliable when measuring the phenomenon using different data sources and 
collection methods.) (Bacharach, 1989) Table 4.1 shows the complete set of dimensions, 





Source: own development based on the literature cited in text. 




Table 4.1: Dimensions, identified topics, literature references, and proposed categories for a model to study prizes 
Dimen-
sions 




 Definition of prize target (Shavell & van Ypersele, 1999; 
Kremer, 2000; Masters, 2003; Macauley, 2005; Newell & 
Wilson, 2005; Kalil, 2006; Mervis, 2006; Stallbaumer, 
2006; NRC, 2007) 
Prize 
challenge 
Definition of prize challenge 
 Size of monetary reward (Shavell & van Ypersele, 1999; 
Abramowicz, 2003; Maurer & Scotchmer, 2004; 
Schroeder, 2004; Wei, 2007) 
Prize reward Reward (i.e. cash purse, bonuses, or others) 
 Other prize benefits (e.g. public exposure, prestige) (Brunt 
et al., 2008) 
Prize benefits Benefits associated with mere participation due to 
sponsor‘s or competition‘s characteristics (e.g. 
public exposure, prestige) 
 Validity of the invention (Sobel, 1996; Che & Gale, 2003) Prize rules Regulation, limits, or special requirements 
Motiva-
tions 
 Prizes vs. other incentives (Wright, 1983; Shavell & van 
Ypersele, 1999; Scotchmer, 2005) 
 Non-monetary incentives (Davidian, 2007; Brunt et al., 
2008) 
 Reputation and credibility (Maurer & Scotchmer, 2004; 
Kalil, 2006; Culver et al., 2007; Brunt et al., 2008) 
 Promotion, publicity (Maurer & Scotchmer, 2004; 
Schroeder, 2004; Brunt et al., 2008) 




Incentives perceived by entrants, e.g., prize 
incentives (i.e. incentives that would not exist 
without the existence of the prize itself, such as 
reward or other prize benefits) or technology-
related incentives (i.e. those that vary with the prize 
technology, like potential commercialization or 
exploitation in own processes or products) 
 Risk (Nalebuff & Stiglitz, 1983; Macauley, 2005) Perceived risk Perception of risk of prize participation by the team 
(e.g. risk resulting from: overall competition, 
technology development, or not being paid by the 
sponsor if the prize challenge is achieved) 




Table 4.1: Dimensions, identified topics, literature references, and proposed categories for a model to study prizes (Contd.) 
Dimen-
sions 
Identified topics and literature references Categories Operationalization 
R&D 
activities 
 New/diverse R&D approaches (Byko, 2004; Kalil, 2006; 
Culver et al., 2007) 
 Unconventional partnerships (Culver et al., 2007) 
Design criteria Design criteria in prize technologies (e.g. project 
cost, novelty, simplicity, reliability, environmental 
impact, market value, standardization). 
Design 
sources 
Sources of inspiration for prize designs (i.e., 
relation to industry developments) 
Technology 
sources 
Technology sources in prize R&D (e.g., 
subcontracting, commercial off-the-shelf) 
R&D or-
ganization 
Organizational arrangement of R&D activities: 
physical organization (e.g. decentralization); 
collaborations / interactions; processes / 
approaches (e.g. trial and error). 
 Strength of R&D activity (Grishagin et al., 2001), 
innovation effort (Davis & Davis, 2004) 
R&D effort Resources available to entrants and applied to 
R&D 
Constraints Perception of constraints in competition (e.g. time 




 Quality of invention, novelty (Scotchmer, 2005; Kalil, 
2006) 
 Commercialization of invention (Kieff, 2001; Wei, 2007) 
 Sequential innovations (Davis & Davis, 2004) 
Technology 
outputs 
Technology outputs of entrants (concepts; designs; 
models; prototypes; crafts) 
 Technology development acceleration (Anastas & 
Zimmerman, 2007; Culver et al., 2007; Masters & 
Delbecq, 2008) 
 Redirection of innovation (Davis & Davis, 2004) 
 Incremental vs. breakthroughs (Pomerantz, 2006) 
Effect on 
innovation 
Emerging research finding and reference to the 
concept of innovation (OECD/Eurostat, 1997) 




Table 4.1: Dimensions, identified topics, literature references, and proposed categories for a model to study prizes (Contd.) 
Dimen-
sions 





 Unconventional innovators (Schroeder, 2004) Type of entrant Classification of entrants into: conventional 
entrants and unconventional entrants 
 Experience/background (Byko, 2004) 
 Previous participation in prizes (McKinsey & Company, 
2009) 
 
Experience /  
Background 
Entrant experience with prize technologies and 
professional background 
Strategy / goals Explicit or implicit goals of the entrant and 




 Stage of sector/technology development (Davis & Davis, 
2004) 








Gap between current-day technologies and 
technologies required to win the competition 
 Market size/opportunities (Sidney, 1862; Diamandis, 




Perception of the value of the prize technologies 




Structure of prize technological field (e.g. actors, 
relationships, regulations) 




 The final version of the model resulted from several iterations of topics-coding 
and display-building. The author sought to balance the number of research categories and 
the comprehensiveness and broader scope of the model. Connections between categories 
imply correlational or directional relationships that are subject to further probing. In this 
case, the connecting strategy was simply based on identifying key relationships suggested 
in the prize literature and more broadly discussed in the innovation literature. Subsets of 
categories can be linked to more abstract constructs (e.g. ―motivation‖) for analytic 
purposes. The research categories were tested with the study of pilot cases. When 
possible, the triangulation of data sources was used to test validity (i.e. appropriateness of 
operationalization) and reliability (i.e. measurement issues) in categories and to adjust 
their definitions. The application to pilot case studies was also aimed at probing the 
utility or descriptive power of the model. Purposely, the scope of the model allows 
addressing different specific research questions at different levels of analysis (Table 4.2).  
 










How do prizes 
induce 
innovation? 
How do different prize designs lead 
to different technology outputs? 
Prize design Prize 





How do prize R&D activities differ 





What are the characteristics of the 




How do the characteristics of 
entrants influence the technological 













 Further research may expand this research model to operationalize other concepts 
and relationships and address more specific questions. 
 
4.3 Case studies 
 This research investigates three cases of recent technology prizes in the aerospace 
sector (Table 4.3). The main case study is the Google Lunar X Prize (GLXP) for robotic 
exploration of the Moon. The two pilot case studies are the Ansari X Prize (AXP) for 
suborbital manned flight and the Northrop Grumman Lunar Lander Challenge (NGLLC) 
for the development of vertical take-off/landing vehicles. 
 The GLXP
9
 is a $30 million multi-year global competition organized by X Prize 
Foundation and sponsored by Google, Inc. It was announced on September 2007 and has 
not found a winner yet. The GLXP requires participants to land a robot on the Moon, 
among other secondary goals, by December 2015. Thirty-five international teams entered 
the competition and more than 40 countries have been involved. This research 
investigates the competition as unit of analysis, the space sector as its context, and 17 
teams as embedded case studies. The author selected this main case study for four 
reasons. First, the GLXP is an ongoing competition, which allows gathering real-time 
data and observing R&D activities and other aspects of the participation of prize entrants. 
Second, this is the most documented prize competition in history. Diverse and multiple 
data sources are available. Third, the GLXP prize challenge involves technology 
development in strategic areas for the U.S. S&T and innovation policy. Fourth, the GLXP 
is a global competition, which allows observing more variation in embedded cases. The 
embedded units of analysis comprise those teams that responded a questionnaire applied 
to all GLXP teams. To perform a more in-depth examination of prize entrants, the author 
selected interview teams based on their willingness to share information about their prize 
                                                          
9
 Google Lunar X Prize‘s official website: http://www.googlelunarxprize.org/  
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activities; their availability for in-person or phone interviews; the authorization given to 
observe their activities and facilities; and, a more efficient use of the funding available 
for this research (e.g. travel proximity.) The author also sought to increase the diversity 
of respondents by including both U.S. and foreign teams and different types of entities 
and organizational forms. 
 The AXP
10
 is a $10 million prize offered in 1996 to the first non-government 
organization to launch a reusable manned spacecraft into space twice within two weeks to 
a minimum altitude of 100 km. It engaged 26 teams from seven countries. The U.S. 
aircraft design company Scaled Composites won this prize in 2004. This prize was 
privately funded and inspired by the early 20
th
 century Orteig Prize for the first nonstop 
transatlantic flight between New York and Paris. This was the first prize program 
administered by the X Prize Foundation, an educational, non-profit corporation 
established in 1994 to inspire private, entrepreneurial advancements in space travel. 
 The NGLLC
11
 is a multi-year competition held between 2006 and 2009 as part of 
NASA‘s Centennial Challenges program, which comprises about a dozen different prizes. 
Twelve independent, small U.S. teams participated in four years of competition. The 
NGLLC offered a total of $2 million in cash prizes for the first and second best-
performing teams. To win, the teams had to build and fly a vertical take-off and landing 
rocket-powered aircraft within minimum, pre-specified standards of efficiency, and under 
conditions that simulate the same flight on the moon. This program had two competition 
levels with different degrees of difficulty (I and II, II being the most difficult.) The prize 
money rolled over to the next year when no entries qualified. Masten Space Systems and 
Armadillo Aerospace, two aerospace startups, won different levels of this prize in 2008 
and 2009 and shared the total prize money. 
                                                          
10
 Ansari X Prize‘s official website: http://space.xprize.org/ansari-x-prize  
11




 The criteria to select the AXP and the NGLLC and a number of their entrants 
were the availability of secondary data and the similitude of industry sector with the main 
case, which facilitates the observation of teams that participated in more than one prize, 
the simplification of the research by studying only one context without affecting the 
results of the project, and the elaboration of conclusions specific to the use of prizes in 
the strategic U.S. aerospace sector. 
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Table 4.3: Summary of information for prizes investigated in this research 
 Ansari X Prize 
(1996-2004) 
Northrop Grumman Lunar Lander 
Challenge (2006-2009) 




First non-governmental organization to 
build and launch a reusable manned 
spacecraft into space twice within two 
weeks  
Build and fly a reusable, rocket-powered 
vehicle simulating a flight on the moon 
within pre-specified timeframe and 
performance, and in a designated 
location  
First to land a spacecraft on the Moon, 
traverse 500 meters, and send back 
high-definition video footage 
Prize type  First-to-achieve, winner-takes-all, 
medium- or long-term competition  
Best-in-class, multi-prize, multi-year 
competition with purse rollover  
First-to-achieve, multi-prize, medium- 
or long-term competition 
Prize purse  $10 million  Level I: $350,000 for first place, 
$150,000 for second place  
Level II: $1 million for first place, 
$500,000 for second place  
Grand prize: $20 million 
2
nd
 place prize: $5 million 
Bonus prizes: $5 million 
Sponsor / 
manager  
X Prize Foundation (sponsor and 
manager) with funding from the Ansari 
family  
NASA and Northrop Grumman Corp. 
(sponsors) / X Prize Foundation 
(manager)  








Scaled Composites, from Mojave, 
California ($10 million)  
NGLLC 2006 and 2007:  
No winners  
NGLLC 2008:  
Armadillo Aerospace from Rockwall, 
Texas: Level I (first place) for $350,000  
Masten Space Systems from Mojave, 
California: Level I (second place) for 
$150,000  
NGLLC 2009:  
Masten Space Systems from Mojave, 
California: Level II (first place) for $1 
million (2009)  
Armadillo Aerospace from Rockwall, 
Texas: Level II (second place) for 
$500,000 (2009)  
No winner yet 
Source: diverse sources described in the following sections. 
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4.4 Data and data gathering 
4.4.1 Pilot case studies 
 The investigation of the AXP and the NGLLC draws mainly upon the analysis of 
documentary sources (Table 4.4). Seven embedded cases (out of 26 prize entrants) are 
examined for the AXP and five embedded cases (out of 12 prize entrants) are examined 
for the NGLLC. Eighty-seven primary and secondary data sources (McDowell, 2002; 
Danto, 2008) have been codified to gather the case studies data, including research 
articles, books, web sites, and other online content. This research used Nvivo data coding 
and qualitative analysis software by QSR International for this task. Both competitions 
already ended and required the researcher to disentangle all the historical and special 
interest factors that may affect the objectivity of the documentary sources. Data sources 
were checked for external validity (i.e. authenticity) and internal reliability (i.e. 
credibility and biases) (Danto, 2008). Comparing and contrasting data sources were very 
important to tease out common components and attributes, interpret, and reconstruct the 
story of the prize competitions and the participation of teams. The triangulation of data 
sources also helps to increase the internal validity of the research. Primary data sources 
provide data directly from prize entrants in the form of team profiles, blog posts, forum 
comments, and other online content created by team members. Secondary data sources 
comprise all other sources, including but not limited to the prize sponsor‘s reports and 
media coverage. Both competitions were held in a time period that coincides with the 
widespread growth of the Internet, which contributed significantly to the publication of 
information about the competitions and participant teams. Online tools such as the 
Wayback Machine also allow gathering data from web pages that existed only when 
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these competitions were in progress.
12
 Moreover, prize sponsors have been interested in 
disseminating information and progress updates on these competitions to attract the 
attention of the general public, which increased the amount of available data. 
 

















Ansari X Prize 
      
 Sources 3 20 28 19 23 7 
 References 6 48 108 49 80 11 
NGLLC 
      
 Sources 6 14 23 16 26 7 
 References 9 19 40 29 61 9 
Total 
      
 Sources 9 34 51 35 49 14 
 References 15 67 148 78 141 20 
Note: cells indicate number of sources and coded references. 
 
 Further data on the AXP and the NGLLC were gathered in unstructured, open-
ended interviews with prize experts. Mr. Gregg Maryniak (Vice President of Aerospace 
Science, St. Louis Science Center and X Prize Foundation‘s Advisor) managed diverse 
aspects of the X Prize Foundation in the 1990s and was interviewed by phone to learn 
more about the AXP. Mr. Ken Davidian (Director of Research at the FAA Office of 
Commercial Space Transportation—AST) is former NASA‘s manager for the Centennial 
Challenges program and was interviewed in-person to learn more about the NGLLC. The 
knowledge and expertise of these interviewees also allowed learning more about other 
prize cases, including the GLXP. 
  
                                                          
12
 The Wayback Machine web site can be accessed at: http://www.archive.org/web/web.php  
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4.4.2 Main case study 
 The study of the GLXP draws upon data specifically collected at the team-, prize-, 
and context-levels (Table 4.5). Team-level data were gathered using questionnaires, 
interviews with team leaders and members, site visits, and documentary sources. The 
latter include team profiles published on the official GLXP website and team websites. 
Prize- and context-level data were gathered using interviews with prize and industry 
experts and documentary sources. In this case, documentary sources also include journal 
articles, industry reports, official GLXP press releases, and media articles. 
 To study the GLXP prize entrants, questionnaires were applied to leaders of 23 
GLXP teams between February 2010 and September 2010.
13
 A total of N = 17 teams 
responded the questionnaire within that time frame. This response rate allowed gathering 
data from both U.S. and foreign teams, in proportions similar to the overall participation 
of U.S. and foreign teams throughout the competition. One of the participating teams was 
already withdrawn when responding the questionnaire (a special version of the 
questionnaire was mailed with similar questions.) As of January 2011, i.e. after the data 
gathering process finished, three other participating teams withdrew the competition. The 
rest of the teams are still in competition. 
 Six teams that were active during the February 2010-to-September 2010 time 
frame either did not respond to the request to fill out the questionnaire or responded they 
were too busy to participate in the study. For these teams and those that entered the 
competition after that time period, the author was only able to gather data from 
documentary sources, which includes team websites, profiles on the official GLXP 
website, and other online media content. 
 
 
                                                          
13
 Only one team whose leaders had legal problems at that moment was not surveyed. 
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Table 4.5: Summary of data gathering to investigate the GLXP 
Level Data sources 
Team  Questionnaires to teams (N=17 teams) 
 Interview with team leaders and members (N=7 teams, including six team 
leaders and eight team members) 
 Site visits (N=5 teams visited; eight different facilities) 
 Documentary sources (e.g. team profiles posted on official GLXP website, 
team websites) 
Prize  Interview with GLXP prize manager 
 Documentary sources (e.g. official GLXP website, official press releases) 
Context  Interview with industry experts (N=3 experts) 
 Documentary sources (e.g. journal articles, industry reports, media 
articles) 
 
 The analysis of questionnaire data might suffer from nonresponse bias. 
Nonresponse bias results from individuals or organizations who respond to questionnaires 
being different from individuals or organizations who did not respond, in a way relevant 
to the study (Dillman, 2000). There may be different sources of nonresponse. Refusal and 
unlocated can be applied to this type of research (Daniel, 1975; Hawkins, 1975). Refusals 
to respond may depend on researcher-subject rapport, the quality of the questionnaire, 
and the nature of the inquiry (e.g. confidential or sensitive information.) Unlocated may 
occur when no contact data are available. To handle nonresponse, the questionnaire was 
pre-tested for question comprehension, ability to answer questions without error, 
selection of responses, and reactions to sensitive questions to improve the questionnaire‘s 
clarity and acceptability. This pre-test was performed with help of three anonymous 
colleagues and four graduate students from the Satellite Communication and Navigation 
Systems class of Fall 2007 at the Georgia Institute of Technology (these students were 
familiar with the GLXP as they produced class projects aimed at designing a spacecraft 
for the GLXP that was just announced.) To guarantee an appropriate delivery of 
questionnaires, the researcher had collaboration from the XPF to deliver envelopes with 
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questionnaire/letter packages to team leaders at the 3
rd
 annual GLXP Summit. The XPF 
also provided contact data of teams for follow-ups when team leaders authorized that. To 
increase the response rates, the researcher also used the personalization technique in 
follow-ups by e-mail, which involves giving the researcher‘s attention to individual team 
leaders (Dillman, 2000). 
 The questionnaire (included in the Appendix) was organized in five sections and 
asked team leaders about the motivation, R&D activities, technology outputs, and 
members of their teams (the questionnaire is included in the Appendix.) Most of the 
creativity and innovation literature draws upon self-reporting methods when studying 
team process variables (Hulsheger et al., 2009). However, innovation research based on 
self-report data, such as questionnaires, may suffer the problems of susceptibility of 
response biases and potential overestimation of effect sizes. The researcher has sought to 
overcome such potential problems in questionnaires with further data gathering from 
other sources and triangulation in the analysis. 
 The interviews with team leaders and other members addressed most of the topics 
of the questionnaire. They allowed discussing specific aspects more in-depth and 
obtaining clarification of responses given in questionnaires. These interviews were semi-
structured and open-ended and conducted in-person at the team workplaces in most of the 
cases. Nine questions were used to guide these interviews (see Appendix.) N = 7 teams 
accepted interviews with their team leaders and, in some cases, with some of the team 
members. Only one interview was conducted by phone and another one by mailing 
questions and receiving responses by e-mail. When given the proper authorization, the 
researcher visited the workplaces of the teams to observe how the teams organize their 
activities. N=5 teams were visited including eight different facilities/workplaces. 
 The analysis of team-level data does not seek to compare teams based on their 
performance, yet to discover patterns that help to better understand how motivations, 
R&D efforts, and technology development occur in the context of prizes. Since the 
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GLXP is an ongoing competition, the data that may reveal competitive positions or 
strategies of teams were anonymized or deliberately excluded from this analysis. The 
perception of motivations and the self-assessment of the outputs of the teams and their 
innovativeness date to the moment in which each questionnaire was responded. The 
author sought to consider the external factors that may affect perceptions and assessments 
during the time period in which the questionnaires were responded. 
 To investigate the prize-level of the main case study, this research used an 
unstructured, open-ended interview, attended a GLXP summit, and analyzed 
documentary data sources. The researcher interviewed Mr. William Pomerantz, the 
XPF‘s Director for Space prizes, in-person. The researcher also attended the 4
th
 annual 
GLXP Summit held in the Isle of Man (U.K.) in October 2010. At this event, 
representatives of 13 teams presented updates on their projects and discussed different 
aspects of organization of the competition with the organizers. This opportunity was used 
to observe the interaction between team members and between the teams and the prize 
sponsors, and to speak informally with some team members to gather general impressions 
about the Summit and the competition. This research also draws upon documentary 
sources that include the official website of the GLXP, the websites of the teams, and 
diverse content published online by the specialized media. 
 To investigate the GLXP context, this research includes insights from industry 
experts and literature analysis. The researcher conducted unstructured, open-ended 
interviews with three industry experts by phone (Table 4.6). These experts contributed 
opinions and points of view in relation to four main aspects of the context of the GLXP: 
expected sector scenarios, technology gaps to achieve prize targets, industry structure, 
and technology-related incentives linked to the GLXP. The contribution of the experts in 
each of these aspects varies. Interview questions were difficult to respond without further 
analysis on the experts‘ part, particularly the questions regarding the expected scenarios. 
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Still, these experts provided significant insights that allow a better understanding of the 
context in which the GLXP is held. 
 This research complied with the requirements of the Georgia Institute of 
Technology‘s Institutional Review Board (IRB) to apply questionnaires, conduct 




Table 4.6: Industry experts participating in interviews 
 Interviewed industry experts 
Dennis Stone Jeff Greason G. Thomas Marsh 













Crew & Cargo Program 
at the Johnson Space 




Founder and President 
of XCOR Aerospace, 
founder of the 
Commercial Spaceflight 
Federation. 
Retired from Lockheed 
Martin Space Systems 




20 years in NASA's 
Space Station Program 
in a variety of positions, 
including Chief System 
Engineer of the Assured 
Crew Return Vehicle, 
Manager of Avionics 
Integration, and Co-
chair of the ISS 
Commercialization 
Working Group. Prior to 
NASA, he worked for 
McDonnell Douglas, 
Ford Aerospace, and 
Rockwell. 
Was team lead at Rotary 
Rocket (another new 
space company) for 
engine development, 
and previously worked 
at Intel. 
In May 2009, Greason 
was named a member of 
the Review of United 
States Human Space 
Flight Plans Committee, 
an independent review 
requested by the Office 
of Science and 
Technology Policy 
(OSTP). 
From 1969 until 1995, 
worked at Martin 
Marietta Corporation, 
most recently as 
President, Manned 
Space Systems. After 
1995, various positions 
within Lockheed Martin 
Corporation, including 
President and General 
Manager of the Missiles 
and Space Operations 
business unit from 2002. 
Appointed Executive 
Vice President of 
Lockheed Martin Space 
Systems in 2003. 
Educa-
tion 
Bachelor degrees in 
Physics and Electrical 
Engineering from the 
University of Hawaii. 
Graduated with honors 
from California Institute 














A FIRST APPROACH: THE ANSARI X PRIZE AND THE NGLLC 
5.1 The Ansari X Prize 
5.1.1 The prize 
 The AXP was announced by the X Prize Foundation (XPF) in 1996. It offered a 
$10 million cash purse for the first non-governmental organization to build and launch a 
reusable manned spacecraft into space twice within two weeks, by January 1, 2005. This 
prize was privately funded and inspired by the early 20th century Orteig Prize for the first 
nonstop transatlantic flight between New York and Paris. Twenty-six teams from seven 
different countries entered this prize. The competition was won in 2004 by Scaled 
Composites, a U.S. aircraft design company. The winning flights are considered the first 
privately funded human spaceflights in history. 
 This was the first prize program administered by the XPF, an educational, non-
profit corporation established in 1994 to inspire private, entrepreneurial advancements in 
space travel. Its purpose was to demonstrate the feasibility of private space flight, change 
existing public opinion about private industry‘s capabilities, and generate concrete 
business opportunities for commercial space tourism (Maryniak, 2010). To accomplish 
that, the XPF posed a challenge that involved building and flying a manned vehicle to a 
minimum altitude to be considered a space flight (100 km) and having mostly—90 
percent or more—privately funded projects. Though the idea of space tourism was not 
new at that time, the AXP defined the private space flight problem in concrete terms. In 
particular, the rules required for the vehicle to be built: a) crew capability: be able to 
carry the pilot plus equivalent capacity for two passengers; b) re-flight: the same vehicle 
had to complete two flights within two weeks; and, c) reusability: no more than 10 
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percent of the vehicle's first-flight non-propellant mass could be replaced between the 
two flights. The teams were allowed to use any technology and approach to accomplish 
this feat (e.g. the rules mention tow vehicles, balloons, descent ballutes, among other 
examples.) The prize rules allowed teams to retain all the IP and commercial rights 
related to their technologies, vehicles, and services. 
 Otherwise indicated, the analysis and findings reported in this section are based 
on seven embedded cases or teams: Scaled Composites (U.S.,) Armadillo Aerospace 
(U.S.,) Advent Launch Services (U.S.,) ARCA (Romania,) Da Vinci Project (Canada,) 
PanAero (U.S.,) and Starchaser Industries (England.) Table 5.1 shows a data summary 
for these seven embedded cases and Appendix Table A.1 shows the complete list of 




                                                          
14
 The classification of prize entrants is based on their industry experience (i.e. space agency/industry 
experience.) Due to a lack of primary data on the experience of the team members, the pilot cases use a 













































Created 1982 2000 1996 1999 N/A 1997 1998 
# members 135 6 12 (~100 
volunteers) 
8 14 (~500 
volunteers) 
9 35 















Notes: N/A indicates data not available. 
Source: own analysis based on data described in the text. 
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5.1.2 The context 
 Space tourism was not a new idea when the AXP was announced. Suborbital 
pleasure trips began to receive serious consideration in the mid-1980s, yet the main 
barrier was still the cost of space travel (Collins & Ashford, 1986). The potential size of 
this market was appreciated only 10 years ago. In 2001, Dennis Tito became the first 
paying space tourist when flying to the International Space Station for a $20 million price 
tag and demonstrating the possibilities for private space travel. A few other wealthy 
tourists have repeated such trips and many others have been willing to, at least to the 
suborbital space. In 2002, a study by Zogby International found that 19 percent of those 
surveyed in the U.S. were willing to pay $100,000 for a 15-minute trip into suborbital 
space (Byko, 2004). 
 There was no established provider of suborbital space flights as of 1996. Large 
companies in the aerospace and aviation business (e.g. Lockheed Martin and Boeing) 
demonstrated no interest in this competition when it was announced, something that the 
XPF sought purposely with its prize design (Diamandis, 2004; Maryniak, 2010). A few 
other small companies were also pursuing similar suborbital flight targets. For example, 
XCOR is a U.S. private rocket engine and spaceflight development company founded in 
1999. Although the company had similar projects, it did not enter the competition 
because the prize was perceived to reward speed of development rather than the 
commercial merit of the spacecraft (Greason, 2010). 
 The competition received extensive media coverage due to its implications for 
space exploration (XPF, 2007). At the time it was won, this competition received more 
than five billion media impressions and was telecast and webcast to a global audience 
with the support of NASA, America Online, the Discovery Channel and other media 
outlets (Maryniak, 2005). As of 2010, commercial tourism space flights are not more 
frequent than those initial experiences ten years ago. Industry experts suggest this market 
76 
 
may be sizable yet only more affordable and secure solutions are likely to have 
commercial merit (Marsh, 2011). 
5.1.3 Prize entrants 
 The prize was open to any private team (including international teams) with the 
condition that its vehicle had to be privately financed and built. Ultimately, 26 official 
teams from seven countries participated, but the sponsors received many more inquiries 
from potential entrants interested in participating (Maryniak, 2010). The data suggests 
that at least 18 out of 26 prize entrants were unconventional to the space sector, including 
pre-existing companies that re-directed their activities, new startups, and independent 
R&D groups. They were referred to as ―people that would never look at a government 
contract.‖ (Diamandis, 2004) Scaled Composites, the winner, is a U.S. aviation company 
that builds innovative aircrafts since 1982 (Byko, 2004). Northrop Grumman Corp. had a 
40 percent-stake in this company when it won the AXP. Most of the other teams were 
created after the year of the prize announcement. There were very small teams (i.e. about 
10 people or fewer) and sometimes with significant volunteer efforts as well (e.g. Advent 
Launch Services and Da Vinci Project enrolled up to 100 and 500 volunteers, 
respectively.) Scaled Composites had about 50 full-time equivalent people working in the 
AXP project (XPF, 2008c). Some kind of engineering experience was a feature of all 
teams, and at least four teams recruited members with extensive experience from NASA 
or the private aerospace industry. For example, Advent Launch Services was founded by 
a group of NASA retirees. 
 Three out of seven teams analyzed here entered the competition in 1996/1997 and 
four entered after 2000. Scaled Composites entered the competition officially in 2001 
when it partnered with Vulcan, Inc. (owned by Paul Allen, cofounder of Microsoft) to 
create Mojave Space Ventures and started the effective development of the winning entry 
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(Discovery Channel, 2005; Linehan, 2008). While the literature points out that this 
company had its own ongoing ―secret space program‖ since 1993 (Byko, 2004; Linehan, 
2008) experts contribute different opinions on whether the technologies under 
development were useful to win this prize (Greason, 2010; Maryniak, 2010; Marsh, 
2011). 
5.1.4 Motivations 
 The AXP offered a $10 million cash purse to accomplish a challenge aligned with 
a sizable potential market. Some teams considered the cash purse as potential funding to 
pursue related projects or start new companies. Though the XPF needed until 2002 to 
secure the money necessary to pay the reward, only one team commented about the risk 
of not being paid the reward if it achieved the prize challenge. The teams also perceived 
the opportunity to publicize their activities, accomplish organizational and personal goals, 
learn, and pursue a challenging goal. There is no evidence that these teams considered 
entering the competition as an additional risk to the risk implicit in technology 
development. This is interesting considering that there existed an important regulatory 
risk related with the fact that no permit had been ever given by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) for private human spaceflight before the winning attempts of 
2004. Prize entrants retained the IP rights on their technologies and services and were not 
required to place their inventions in the public domain. 
5.1.5 R&D activities 
 The teams focused on providing simple and low cost solutions to the prize 
challenge using existing technologies and, in some cases, novel conceptual designs. Most 
importantly, teams had to consider the re-usability requirement in their designs. Only a 
few teams had reliability as a design criterion. The designs of Scaled Composites were 
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influenced by the X-15 rocket-powered aircraft project (a U.S. USAAF/NACA program) 
and sought to shorten development lead times (Discovery Channel, 2005). A few teams 
performed the major part of the R&D activity in this competition. Only two teams 
scheduled an attempt to win the prize (Scaled Composites and Da Vinci Project) and only 
three teams actually tested spacecrafts or scaled-down versions of them (Scaled 
Composites, Da Vinci Project, and Starchaser Industries) (Linehan, 2008). Scaled 
Composites exerted the greatest R&D effort, estimated at $30 million (Linehan, 2008). 
The effective development of the winning entry (final design and construction) started in 
2001 (Discovery Channel, 2005). Other R&D efforts were more modest. For example, 
Armadillo Aerospace invested about $1 million and American Astronautics Corp. 
invested $2.5 million (Byko, 2004; Culver et al., 2007). Overall, all the 26 teams spent 
more than $100 million in their attempts to win the prize (XPF, 2004). 
 These seven teams manufactured, subcontracted, and procured commercial off-
the-shelf technologies to different extent. They also applied diverse R&D approaches. 
For instance, Scaled Composites applied a fast prototyping approach in which an 
interchangeable group of engineers and technicians can rapidly define a technical or 
mathematical problem and apply their expertise quickly to solve it, even on the business 
side (Kemp, 2007). The activities of the teams presented different forms of organization 
that can be characterized as entrepreneurial, traditional corporate, volunteer, or joint 
venture partnership. Some teams drew upon knowledge and advice provided by 
consultants (e.g. Da Vinci Project) or even family and friends (e.g. Advent Launch 
Services.) In general, the main obstacle for the teams was the lack of funding, while only 
two teams (of those analyzed here) reported the lack of aerospace engineering experience 
and skills. Regulatory requirements were a barrier common to all teams. No team 




5.1.6 Technology outputs 
 Though the AXP did not specify the characteristics of the technology to be 
developed, winning the prize required a creative approach to building and operating a 
space vehicle with a relatively low budget and contemplating minimum design criteria 
related with human transportation. Scaled Composites introduced significant innovations 
with its winning entry, comprising a hybrid spacecraft with a pivoting-wing system, a 
patented hybrid rocket motor configuration, and an air-launch system for piloted 
spaceflight (Boyle, 2004b). Other teams presented novel designs as well, yet only a 
handful of them moved into development and testing stages. Other innovations include, 
for example, sophisticated computer controls for rockets and a composite materials 
reusable rocket that Armadillo Aerospace and ARCA introduced, respectively. In spite of 
the direct connection between the prize challenge and the emerging space tourism 
market, only three teams (out of seven) revealed such market as their main target when 
entering the competition. Other three teams explicitly excluded commercialization of 
technologies as the purpose of their participation. 
 Figure 5.1 shows a picture of the White Knight turbojet aircraft with the 
SpaceShipOne spacecraft attached below, both built by Scaled Composites to win this 
competition. Figure 5.2 summarizes the analysis of the AXP in terms of different 





Source: Scaled Composites. 
 
Figure 5.1: Scaled Composites’ White Knight turbojet aircraft with SpaceShipOne 




Ansari X Prize 
 
Motivations R&D activities Technology outputs 
 
 Prize challenge: be the 
first non-gov. org. to 
launch a reusable manned 
spacecraft into suborbital 
space twice within two 
weeks.  
 Monetary reward: $10 
million. 
 Prize benefits: global 
exposure due to extensive 
media coverage. 
 Prize rules: open-ended 
and conducive set of 
technical specifications; 
targeted space tourism; 















 Perceived incentives: very diverse 
motivations; prize money is secondary. 
The competition offered significant 
exposure and publicity to teams. Sizable 
market opportunities were perceived yet 
directly targeted by only a few teams. 
 Risk: prize participation did not imply 
additional risk for teams. In general, 
teams interested in prize money only 
entered the competition when sponsor 
guaranteed prize money. 
 Design criteria: simplicity and low cost 
were main criteria; re-usability was 
required by prize rules; reliability and 
safety were criteria as well. 
 Design sources: teams drew upon existing 
technologies and new conceptual designs. 
 Technology sources: in-house 
manufacturing, subcontracting, and off-
the-shelf procurement. 
 R&D effort: more than $100 million 
invested in R&D, external funding 
attracted. Volunteer effort. 
 R&D organization: diverse R&D 
approaches; only a more dynamic and 
entrepreneurial approach succeeded; only 
a few teams reached stage of 
development. 
 Constraints: Lack of funding. 
 Technology outputs: winning entry was 
a hybrid spacecraft design with 
innovative configuration, use of new 
materials. Other innovative concepts 
were introduced by all teams. Scaled 
tests introduced new features and 
materials as well. Hardware outputs 
concentrated in a few most active teams. 
 Commercialization: potential 
commercialization was a key driver in 
design and development and was implicit 
in prize rules. 
 Effect on innovation: accelerated 
ongoing R&D activity, attracted new 
innovative players, and induced 
conceptual and operational innovations 
as well. 
     
Characteristics of teams 
 
 Type of teams: mostly unconventional 
teams, incl. pre-existing companies that 
redirected activities or new startups. 
Multiple types of partnerships emerged to 
raise funding. Significant volunteer effort 
in some cases. 
 Experience / Skills: all teams attracted 
individuals with aerospace experience 
which influenced designs. Overall 
engineering experience was present in all 
cases. No team had experience in past 
competitions or suborbital space flight. 
 Strategy/goals: comm. of tech. and 
opportunity to enter the new space 
tourism market was the initial goal of a 
few teams. Some independent teams 
sought to accomplish personal and other 
organizational goals. 






Suborbital manned space flight 
sector 
 Technology scenario: technologies 
likely to have demand if they are 
affordable and safe. First space tourism 
experience not seen until 2001, after 
prize announcement. 
 Technology-related incentives: sizable 
market opportunities in space tourism 
market through suborbital flights. 
 Technology gap: though tech. already 
existed, significant breakthrough was 
needed to make spaceflights more 
affordable and safe. 
 Sector structure: sector that emerged 
along with the competition; comprises 
new players, mostly small companies 
that re-directed activities or were just 
created. Regulatory framework required 
modifications to allow flights. 
 
Source: own analysis based on secondary data described in the text and model introduced in previous sections. 
Figure 5.2: Summary of analysis of the Ansari X Prize 
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5.2 The Northrop Grumman Lunar Lander Challenge 
5.2.1 The prize 
 The NGLLC was a multi-year competition held between 2006 and 2009 as part of 
NASA‘s Centennial Challenges program, which comprises about a dozen different prize 
competitors. Twelve independent, small U.S. teams participated in four years of com-
petition and up to 45 would-be entrants demonstrated interest in this competition in 2006 
(Pomerantz, 2006). The NGLLC offered a total of $2 million in cash prizes for the first 
and second best-performing teams. To win, teams had to build and fly a vertical take-off 
and landing (VTOL) rocket-powered vehicle within minimum, pre-specified standards of 
efficiency, and under conditions that simulate the same flight on the moon. The goal of 
the NGLLC was to accelerate commercial technological developments that would have 
direct application to NASA‘s space exploration goals (including the development of a 
new generation of Lunar Landers) and the commercial launch procurement market (XPF, 
2008a). NASA, Northrop Grumman Corp., and the XPF partnered to offer this prize. The 
XPF managed the competitions at no cost to NASA. NASA contributed the cash purse 
and Northrop Grumman Corp. funded part of the costs of operation of the program. 
 This program had two competition levels with different degrees of difficulty, I 
and II, being the latter the most difficult. The prize money rolled over to the next year 
when no entries qualified. In 2006 and 2007, the prize-winning attempts of all the teams 
took place at a sponsor-organized public event. The same format was used in 2008 but 
the event was not open to the public. In 2009, the teams were allowed to designate their 
preferred site and date to attempt their flights. Masten Space Systems and Armadillo 
Aerospace, two aerospace startups, shared the prize money for Level I in 2008 and Level 
II in 2009. In 2008, Armadillo Aerospace won the 1
st
 place ($350,000) and Masten Space 
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Systems won the 2
nd
 place ($150,000.) In 2009, Masten Space Systems won the 1
st
 place 
($1 million) and Armadillo Aerospace won the 2
nd
 place ($500,000.) 
 Otherwise indicated, the analysis and findings presented in this section are based 
on five embedded cases or teams: Armadillo Aerospace, Masten Space Systems, 
BonNova, High Expectations Rocketry, and Unreasonable Rocket. Table 5.2 shows a 
data summary for these five embedded cases. Table A.3 and Table A.4 in the Appendix 



























Father and son 
amateur team 





2006, 2007, 2008 (1
st
 
place Level I), 2009 
(2
nd
 place Level II) 
2006, 2007, 2008 
(2
nd
 place Level I), 
2009 (1
st
 place Level 
II) 
2007, 2008, 2009 
(withdrawn) 
2008 2007, 2008, 2009 
#  members 8 5 6 4 4 
Location Mesquite, TX Mojave, CA Tarzana, CA Moscow, ID Solana Beach, CA 
Notes: N/A indicates data not available. 
Source: own analysis based on data described in the text. 
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5.2.2 The context 
 The first R&D activities specifically aimed at building lunar landers were 
performed in the 1960s when NASA procured technologies that were ultimately used in 
the Apollo missions. This technology sector has been primarily driven by programs of 
NASA and other U.S. and foreign government agencies. Large corporations have 
dominated most of the private space technology market until the recent emergence of 
new aerospace development startups in the 1990s. For instance, Northrop Grumman is a 
$30 billion global defense and technology corporation that has been NASA‘s prime 
contractor in the development of several technologies linked to lunar programs since the 
1960s when it designed and produced the Apollo lunar modules. The company has also 
sought to support NASA on the development of Altair, a lunar lander that is expected to 
place four astronauts on the Moon by 2020 (Northrop Grumman, 2007; XPF, 2009a). 
 No significant technological developments were made in this field until some 
years before the prize announcement. The $60 million program to develop the Delta 
Clipper experimental vehicle in the 1990s (first led by the U.S. Department of Defense 
and then by NASA, with participation of McDonnell Douglas Corp.) was a recent 
antecedent in the development of VTOL vehicles (Pomerantz, 2007). Interestingly, 
Scaled Composites, the winner of the AXP, contributed technologies to such program. 
5.2.3 Prize entrants 
 Only U.S. teams were eligible to enter this competition. U.S. government 
organizations, organizations principally or substantially funded by the federal 
government were eligible, and government employees were not eligible. The NGLLC 
ultimately enrolled 12 unique teams, but several of them participated more than once in 
the four years of competition. The number of participating teams by year was: four in 
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2006, eight in 2007, nine in 2008, and three in 2009. Most of the prize entrants were 
ultimately unconventional teams organized as independent R&D groups that were born to 
compete in this or previous prizes. For instance, Armadillo Aerospace entered the AXP a 
few years earlier and consolidated as an aerospace startup by the time it entered the 
NGLLC. This team did not have paid employees when entered this competition and 
worked only two days a week on the project (Pomerantz, 2006). BonNova‘s team leader 
participated in the development of the winning entry of the AXP as well. Masten Space 
Systems was organized as a small startup, rocketry and propulsion company with six full 
time employees in 2006. Experts suggest that both Armadillo Aerospace and Masten 
Space Systems were considered favorite teams at that time (Greason, 2010). 
 In general, they were very small (between five and nine people) self-funded teams 
with some kind of (and diverse) engineering experience, including some team members 
with amateur or professional rocketry experience. Three of the teams analyzed here were 
based in California. 
5.2.4 Motivations 
 The NGLLC was offered by potential technology customers (NASA and Northrop 
Grumman) yet it did not represent any commitment to acquire technologies. A narrowly 
defined technology target and detailed technical specifications resembled standard 
procurement requirements and the idea of potential contracts to procure technologies 
could not be discarded. Prize entrants retained the IP rights for their technologies, yet 
they were required to negotiate in good faith to provide non-exclusive licenses if NASA 
is eventually interested in that. The cash purse was very small compared to the cost of 
similar technology development programs. The competition attracted NASA‘s and other 
corporate officials in addition to the general public (XPF, 2007). Some of the teams 
(three out of five analyzed here) sought to build a good reputation and gain the respect of 
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those observers and declared primary interest in the prize money. A similar number of 
teams were driven by the challenging goal and the opportunity to accomplish personal 
goals as well. The teams referred to the risk of participation in different terms, including 
the probability of not being paid the cash purse, destruction of profitable equipment, or 
excessive personal commitment. 
5.2.5 R&D activities 
 These five teams focused on delivering simple and low cost solutions in addition 
to introducing other unconventional design criteria such as modularization and 
programmability. The teams drew upon existing designs, own know-how, competitors‘ 
experience, or even science fiction design ideas. The teams sought to develop and 
manufacture most of their technologies in-house. They also contributed knowledge and 
approaches to R&D from industries such as software. Terms such as ―fast prototyping‖, 
―learning-by-testing‖, or ―incremental test production‖ had been used by the two winning 
teams to describe their approaches. Overall, an estimate of $20 million and about 100,000 
person-hours were invested in R&D in four years of competition by all teams (Courtland, 
2009). Masten Space Systems spent about $2.5 million to win the $1 million prize 
(Morring, 2009) and Armadillo Aerospace spent at least $3.5 million in its whole 
development program (Armadillo Aerospace, 2008). Within this group of five teams, 
only Armadillo Aerospace was successful in raising money from corporate sponsors. The 
short development time frames required by the competition represented a constraint in 
some cases (e.g teams had only 168 days to build their spacecrafts between the prize 
announcement and the competition day in 2006.) (Pomerantz, 2006) The process to 
obtain experimental permits from the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration was a 
constraint for all teams. An interesting feature of the prize R&D activities was the degree 
of openness of the teams with each other and with the public (Davidian, 2010). The teams 
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used extensively online tools to share their experiences and advances and, most 
interestingly, may have relied on each other to analyze technical problems and suggest 
solutions (Pomerantz, 2010b). For example, the team Unreasonable Rocket shared its 
experimental flight permit application with the team TrueZer0, which also made its own 
permit application publicly available (along with many technology details in the same 
document.) (TrueZer0, 2008) 
5.2.6 Technology outputs 
 Some prize assessments consider that the NGLLC induced several innovations in 
the form of new components, subsystems, and new standards of reusability, operation, 
speed of development and efficiency (Pomerantz, 2007; NASA, 2009b). There is more 
concrete evidence. For example, Armadillo Aerospace introduced sophisticated computer 
controls for its vehicles and BonNova developed new patent-pending rocket engine 
components. According to experts, technology development occurred at medium-to-high 
TRL levels (i.e. TRL 6 or higher) (Davidian, 2010). The 12 participating teams 
developed and tested some technology in these four years of competition. Seven teams 
participated more than once in the NGLLC. Five teams participated at least three times 
(including the two winners) and introduced incremental innovations that improved the 
precision of their flight tests. Throughout the four years of competition, the technical 
solutions contributed by the teams may have converged to similar designs (Pomerantz, 
2010a), possibly as the result of mutual learning and imitation. Still, program managers 
suggest that there was no significant duplication of R&D efforts as teams tested different 
solutions to specific problems (Davidian, 2010). Some teams had a commercial 
orientation that was incorporated into their designs (e.g. using modularity as a design 
criterion) and resulted in patent applications. Other teams considered commercialization 
possible yet not a priority. 
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 Figure 5.3 shows a picture of the MOD vehicle built by Armadillo Aerospace to 
participate in the NGLLC 2007. Figure 5.4 summarizes the analysis of the NGLLC prize 
in terms of different dimensions and categories. 
 
 
Source: Armadillo Aerospace. 
 





Motivations R&D activities Technology outputs 
 
 Prize challenge: build and 
fly VTOL vehicle that 
simulates the flight of a 
vehicle on the Moon.  
 Monetary reward: $2 
million divided into two 
levels and 1st and 2nd place. 
 Prize benefits: exposure to 
lots of general public and 
NASA and corporate 
officials at competition 
site. 
 Prize rules: narrowly 
defined technology target; 
detailed technical 















 Perceived incentives: prize money, 
potential reputation (which may lead to 
commercialization,) and self-fulfillment are 
drivers of engagement and R&D effort. 
 Risk: teams internalize risk of participation 
and balance with risk of technology 
development since prizes are a mean to 
accomplish their goals. 
 Design criteria: simplicity and low cost 
were main criteria; diverse set of 
approaches led to unconventional criteria 
as well (e.g. modularity.) 
 Design sources: teams contributed non-
space knowledge and approaches to 
R&D. 
 Technology sources: in-house 
manufacturing predominated. 
 R&D effort: teams invested $20 million 
and 100,000 person-hours in pursuit of 
the prize purse. 
 R&D organization: very small, flexible 
teams with informal yet novel approaches 
to organize R&D and learn during the 
process. 
 Constraints: short development time 
frames. 
 Technology outputs: new 
components and subsystems, new 
standards of reusability, speed of 
development, and efficiency. 
 Commercialization: in some cases, 
technology outputs had commercial 
orientation since design stage. 
 Effect on innovation: triggered 
new R&D activity in a narrowly 
defined technology sector with no 
active developments. 
 
     
Characteristics of teams 
 
 Type of teams: mostly unconventional 
teams created as independent, volunteer 
R&D teams to join the competition. A 
number of them participated in several 
instances of the competition (―prize teams‖) 
 Experience / Skills: in general, diverse 
engineering experience, aerospace 
experience only in a handful of cases. 
Importance of learning-by-doing during 
the competition. Participation in past 
competitions had influence. 
 Strategy/goals: pursuit of a 
challenging goal related to personal 
interests in most of the teams. A few 
teams used the competition to 
promote activities and, eventually, 
commercialize technologies. 






Space exploration research and 
procurement sector, VTOL vehicles 
 Technology scenario: opportunities to 
produce and comm. affordable and 
productive Moon exploration and 
suborbital flight technology in the medium- 
or long-term. 
 Technology gap: existing yet not 
efficient/affordable tech.; dev. of more 
precise, effective, and affordable vehicles. 
 Technology-related incentives: Moon 
exploration is a target of space agencies; 
subcontracting by them (e.g. NASA) or 
large corporations (e.g. Northrop 
Grumman) are a direct comm. 
opportunity; other scientific and 
corporate applications exist for related 
services and tech. 
 Sector structure: space agencies, 
few large corporate players, and 
large contracts have traditionally 
dominated this sector (e.g. Northrop 
Grumman, which has been linked to 
lunar programs since the 1960s.) 
Source: own analysis based on data described in the text and model introduced in previous sections. 




 The data show that the motivation of teams goes beyond the monetary cost-
benefit analysis suggested by most of the literature. Moreover, the relationship between 
types of incentives and types of entrants is not straightforward and needs more in-depth 
research. Prize incentives had been more likely to attract unconventional teams. 
Technology incentives were not the primary driver of conventional entrants. Two 
alternative explanations exist for the latter: a) technology incentives may have not been 
as significant or certainly signaled by the competitions as it was described and, therefore, 
no traditional industry players were interested in engaging in these challenges; or, b) 
other factors, such as risk of participation or the structure of the technology sector, may 
have played a role. In relation to a), the fact that technological targets were defined for a 
relatively early point along the commercialization timeline may have reduced the 
attractiveness of both competitions for conventional entrants (suggested in part by Kieff, 
2001). In relation to b), there may be other sources of risk not considered a priori by this 
research, such as the risk of ruining one‘s business reputation if, for example, an 
experienced company is outperformed by unconventional teams (something suggested 
by, for example, LeVine, 2008). More generally, the fact that no conventional entrants 
engaged in spite of potential markets for the prize technologies suggests that 
unconventional entrants may be more optimistic in their forecasts or less risk-averse than 
established industry players (as suggested by Nalebuff & Stiglitz, 1983). On the other 
hand, the participation of conventional entrants may ultimately depend on the structure of 
the technology sector. This explanation fits particularly well in the AXP, which was 
linked to an emerging market with no established, specialized companies. In the case of 
the NGLLC, there existed large corporations or specialized firms, yet only 12 mostly 
unconventional teams were engaged in this four-year competition, which also suggests 
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significant high-risk perceptions or entry barriers such as lack of knowledge, skills, or 
funding. 
 The data also show that teams of both competitions performed diverse R&D 
activities and faced a number of constraints. These findings suggest that the investigation 
of the effect of time/budget constraints also requires more in-depth investigation and 
richer data. The effect of each constraint should be explored in more detail to discover 
prize-specific relationships. For example, simplicity and low cost designs are likely to 
relate to lack of upfront funding. The use of existing technologies is likely to correspond 
with shorter development timeframes. In-house manufacturing may be the response to the 
need to control technology development and prevent unexpected events. Novel R&D 
approaches may result primarily from engaging unconventional entrants. It should be 
noted in that regard that, though the diversity of R&D approaches can be linked to the 
heterogeneity of professional backgrounds and industry experience in team members, the 
aerospace industry has always been characterized as multidisciplinary since its 
emergence. Still, these competitions allow the full deployment of capabilities due to the 
lack of restrictions compared to, for example, instances of conventional technology 
procurement and interactions between NASA and pre-existing industry players 
(Bromberg, 2000). For example, the rules of the AXP were characterized as open-ended 
and conducive to develop the prize technologies (Linehan, 2008). In the case of the 
NGLLC, for instance, Armadillo Aerospace was observed to bring ―the dynamism of 
software development to aerospace projects‖ as its members had mostly IT industry 
background (SpaceRef.com, 2008). 
 These prizes leveraged significant R&D investment and induced the development 
of new technologies. Some outputs considered innovations would have not occurred by 
the prize deadlines if these competitions did not exist. The caveat is that prizes were 
linked to significant technology incentives and, fundamentally, ongoing R&D processes. 
Experts and scholars also consider that these prizes ―provided a focus for efforts that 
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people already had under way‖ (Greason, 2010) or simply motivated the last effort to 
come up with the final solution (Saar, 2006). Certainly, while a significant achievement 
or feasibility demonstration was observed in the AXP, the winning entry may have been 
already under development before the prize announcement. This is not a negative 
assessment of the potential of prizes, yet suggests that prizes may be more efficient in 
some circumstances. Moreover, it was less likely for the rest of the AXP teams to 
produce a similar prize outcome by 2004 as there was only another team—Da Vinci 
Project—with a scheduled attempt to win the competition. 
 Nevertheless, a handful of other unconventional teams (such as Da Vinci Project 
and ARCA) also had achievements that, in principle, would not have existed at that point 
without this prize (since those teams were created to compete for this prize or the 
competition was among their most important goals.) In the case of the NGLLC, Masten 
Space Systems and Armadillo Aerospace had pursued related R&D before the prize 
announcement, yet their specific innovations responded to the definition of the prize 
target. The rest of the teams were mostly new-to-industry, volunteer teams performing 
new R&D activities. In the end, the main contribution of these competitions may have 
been the introduction of a concrete definition of the characteristics of the innovations to 
be achieved and, hence, the focus of R&D efforts.  
 Most of the cited innovations were achieved in progress toward the prize target 
and commercialization was achieved after the prize deadlines. For example, in 2004, an 
agreement between Scaled Composites and Virgin Galactic resulted in a $250 million 
contract to deliver a fleet of 7 spacecrafts to offer suborbital travel services (Linehan, 
2008). Moreover, both Armadillo Aerospace and Masten Space Systems were awarded 
$475,000 to perform test flights of their experimental vehicles under NASA's 
Commercial Reusable Suborbital Research Program (CRuSR) (NASA, 2010e). These 
contracts demonstrate how significant the potential technology incentives linked to prizes 
may be, and suggest that prize winners are the most likely to realize those commercial 
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opportunities to full extent. Patent-pending developments by other teams, for example, 
also suggest other potential future commercialization activities. 
 
5.4 Lessons for next steps 
 These case studies contribute some evidence for a better understanding of how 
prizes induce innovation and highlight several factors to be considered in further 
research. First, prize entrants do perceive varied types of incentives. Some of these 
incentives can be ―adjusted‖ with different prize designs and others relate to the prize 
technologies. PIs (those that would not exist without the competition) have a significant 
effect on unconventional entrants, i.e. individuals or organizations typically not involved 
with the prize technologies. TIs may not have an effect on conventional entrants 
(including traditional industry players) if the market value of the prize technologies is 
uncertain, if entrants are more risk averse, and/or the structure of the technology sector 
has certain features (e.g. a few players dominate the sector.) Second, there are a number 
of possible constraints faced by prize entrants such as time, funding requirements, and 
sector regulations. The real effect of these constraints on the organization of R&D 
activities can be only understood with further research. Still, novel R&D approaches can 
be associated with the presence of unconventional entrants. Third, these prizes induced 
innovations over and above would have occurred anyway, with the caveat that these 
prizes were linked to significant technology incentives and, more importantly, ongoing 
R&D processes. The main contribution of these competitions may have been the 
definition of the characteristics of the innovations to be achieved and, hence, the focus of 
R&D efforts. 
 The findings also suggest other methodological considerations. First, the 
classification of prize entrants based on their industry experience (i.e. space 
agency/industry experience) is appropriate for the study of prizes (a proxy was used in 
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these pilot cases; entrants were classified based on the author‘s assessment of the 
relationship between previous activities and the prize technologies.) Further research may 
uncover other factors that define even better the motivations, R&D activities, and 
technology outputs of prize entrants. Second, the characterization of technological 
outputs requires more accuracy as data sources refer to them inconsistently. Third, these 
case studies support the idea that the investigation of prizes requires a better 
understanding of the characteristics of both prize entrants and technology sector. The 
investigation of the context and team levels is important and enhances our understanding 
of the phenomenon. In particular, further research has to examine whether there are 
ongoing technological developments when the prize is announced and what the 
significance of the TIs is. Fourth, the operationalization of categories is appropriate for 
the analysis of the main case. Categories might need re-definitions if more in-depth 
studies suggest that. Fifth, triangulation of documentary and other data sources is very 
important, particularly to investigate past prizes. More in depth analysis is required to 
better understand specific aspects of prizes, which also requires drawing upon primary 
data sources using methods such as questionnaires or interviews. Sixth, the examination 
of the overall effect of prizes on innovation might require consideration of additional 
factors. PIs, TIs, technology gaps, and challenge definitions do not act as simple ―yes/no‖ 
determinants of innovation. These factors are more likely to blend together to influence 
the nature of the prize technology outputs in a continuum that goes from use of current-
day technologies to technological breakthroughs, passing through incremental and other 





A CLOSER LOOK: THE GOOGLE LUNAR X PRIZE 
6.1 The GLXP prize 
 The GLXP is a $30 million competition that started in September 13, 2007. It is 
organized by the XPF and sponsored by Google Inc. The competition requires prize 
entrants to land a robot on the surface of the Moon, among other secondary goals, by 
December 31, 2015. According to the XPF, this is the largest prize competition in terms 
of cash purse and it is designed to ―accelerate technology developments supporting the 
commercial creation of multiple systems capable of reaching the lunar surface and 
performing operations over an extended period of time.‖ More broadly, the purpose of 
the competition is: educate the global public about the benefits of opening up space and 
exploring the Moon; inspire and excite the world about science, technology, math, and 
engineering; enable and qualify a new generation of engineers and entrepreneurial 
companies able to design, build, deliver, and operate space hardware; and, open the space 
frontier to new ideas and new participants by lowering costs by a factor of thirty. The 
XPF has sought to design a competition that has multiple back-end business markets that 
can be supported by the technologies developed in pursuit of the prize (Pomerantz, 
2010a). The XPF also expects this competition to have a sociological impact since half of 
today's world population was not alive at the moment the last NASA Apollo mission 
visited the Moon. The advancements made by the GLXP teams would allow NASA and 
other space agencies to save money and expand the capabilities of future robotic and 
human missions to the Moon (XPF, 2008d). 
 There was not a specific strategy to launch this competition and the XPF 
announced the prize as soon as its design was ready. The GLXP was announced at the 
annual Wired Magazine‘s NextFest event of 2007. The XPF considered that that event 
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would make the GLXP visible to the ―right kind of people‖ or ―nontraditional 
competitors,‖ which includes, for example, ―dot com billionaires, open source people, 
and a million different other kind of people who might see this as interesting enough to 
get involved.‖ The XPF has also had the ability to reach out the ―classical aerospace 
community,‖ as they were in contact with industry players to organize other competitions 
and attend the same type of meetings (e.g. conferences.) (Pomerantz, 2010a) The 
announcement of the GLXP almost coincided with the launch of Kaguya, a Japanese 
lunar orbiter by the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA.) 
6.1.1 The challenge 
 The challenge posed by this prize requires launching a spacecraft from Earth to 
Moon, landing on the Moon, deploying a rover (or equivalent unit) to traverse 500 
meters, and collecting and sending back to the Earth high-definition video footage. The 
competition requires prize entrants to accomplish such mission by December 31, 2015 to 
be able to claim the cash purse. 
 The cash purse is divided into a Grand Prize, Second Place Prize, and other Bonus 
Prizes. The Grand Prize is valued at $20 million (if a government-funded mission 
launched after January 1, 2010 performs similar mission, the Gran Prize is reduced to $15 
million.) The second place prize is valued at $5 million. The Bonus Prizes are valued at 
$4 million. The Grand Prize will be awarded to the first team to complete all of the 
mission requirements. The Second Place Prize will be awarded to the second team to 
complete the mission requirements. At sole discretion of the XPF, this prize may be also 
awarded (as a ―consolation prize‖) to a team that accomplishes most of the requirements 
to win the Grand Prize but, due to unforeseen reasons such as mechanical difficulties, 
ultimately fails to meet all the mission requirements (in which case the Grand Prize 
would be still available.) The Second Place Prize may not be won by the Grand Prize 
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winner. The Bonus Prizes will be awarded to the team or teams that successfully 
complete the bonus requirements and the Grand Prize or Second Place Prize mission 
requirements. 
 The following GLXP mission requirements have to be met to be able to claim the 
Grand Prize: 
1. LANDING: the team must land its craft on the surface of the Moon. 
2. MOBILITY: the craft or a single secondary vehicle carried by the craft 
must move a distance of at least 500 meters along the surface of the Moon 
in a deliberate manner (on, above, or below the lunar surface, yet with 
straight line displacement capability for that distance.) 
3. MOONCAST TRANSMISSION: the craft or a secondary vehicle must 
transmit from the surface of the Moon two ―Mooncasts:‖ an ―Arrival 
Mooncast‖ and a ―Mission Complete Mooncast‖ (eight minutes of High-
Definition video each; both exclusively produced for the XPF or its 
partners.) 
4. DATA UPLINK: the team must transmit to the craft or secondary vehicle 
while on the surface of the Moon as much as 100 kilobytes of data 
provided by the XPF for later transmission back to Earth. 
5. PAYLOAD: the craft or secondary vehicle must carry a XPF‘s payload of 
about one percent of the craft or secondary vehicle's dry mass, with a 
minimum mass of 100 grams and maximum mass of 500 grams. 
 The GLXP‘s Bonus Prizes are: the Apollo Heritage Bonus Prize ($4 million) to 
the first team that takes a mooncast that includes imagery and video of an Apollo site 
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including footage of a historical artifact associated with the Apollo mission; the Heritage 
Bonus Prize ($1 million) to the first team that takes a mooncast that includes imagery and 
video of a historical site of interest including footage of an artifact associated with a 
previous mission to the Moon other than the Apollo missions; the Range Bonus Prize ($2 
million) to the first team that moves its craft or a secondary vehicle along the surface of 
the Moon for no less than five kilometers; the Survival Bonus Prize ($2 million) to the 
first team that successfully operates its craft or a secondary vehicle on two separate lunar 
days (second day with mission requirements;) and the Water Detection Bonus Prize ($4 
million) to the first team that provides scientifically conclusive proof of the presence of 
water. The actual amount paid for each Bonus Prizes will depend on whether other Bonus 
Prizes were already paid (the total will be $4 million.) The GLXP also offers a Diversity 
Award ($1 million) to the team that, in the opinion of a panel of experts, has made the 
greatest attempts to promote diversity in the fields of science, technology, engineering, 
and mathematics (there is no need to claim other prizes to receive this award.) 
 The GLXP‘s rules include some considerations regarding the use of public 
funding and other resources. The government funding of the team may not exceed ten 
percent of the funds used to compete (including support received as cash and the cash-
equivalency of in-kind support.) Teams are not allowed to purchase preexisting hardware 
from sources such as museums, space agencies, or defunct companies, unless equivalent 
or superior replacement products are commercially available. Teams are allowed to use 
governmental facilities, personnel, hardware, or information previously developed by a 
government organization, if access is available to other teams as well. Government 
personnel are allowed to work for a team so long as they are working outside of the scope 
of their government employment. Teams are permitted to use other government resources 
yet those resources will be considered public funding and will count against the 
maximum ten percent for public financing. 
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 There are two types of documents containing the prize rules. There is a document 
that contains the prize guidelines which focus more on the technical requirements and are 
more informally written to be understood by regular people, specifically engineers and 
entrepreneurs. Another document is the Master Team Agreement (MTA) that contains the 
guidelines and legal provisions to regulate different aspects of the competition. The MTA 
is a binding contract that every team has to sign to participate in the GLXP. The initial 
MTA 1.0 was made public during the first year of competition to have feedback from the 
teams and the public. The version 2.0 (August 2010) and the final version 3.0 (January 
2011) were produced with inputs from the GLXP teams. During this process, also the 
original deadline of the GLXP changed (it was December 31, 2012.) The XPF extended 
such deadline because the process of finalizing the prize rules took longer than expected 
and the economic conditions had not helped the participating teams to raise funding for 
their projects. 
 To be able to enter the GLXP, teams had to register between September 2007 and 
December 2010 and submit an application package with diverse information about the 
team and its members, finances, and mission plan. From the time the XPF opened the 
registration through the end of the calendar year 2008, there was a registration fee of 
$10,000. For calendar years 2009 and 2010, the fee was raised to $30,000 and $50,000, 
respectively. Teams could obtain a temporary extension of the $10,000 and $30,000 rates 
by filing a Letter of Intent to Compete, but no such extensions were possible at the end of 
2010. 
 In the GLXP, the teams own all the intellectual property associated with the 






 The original idea of a competition for lunar exploration emerged from NASA 
(Pomerantz, 2010a). In 2006, NASA requested Paragon Space Development Corporation 
and the XPF a study on the impact of an incentive prize for robotic lunar exploration. 
Paragon's study was a parametric analysis of the cost of the cheapest possible lunar 
surface mission which would suggest how big a prize purse would need to be to 
incentivize someone to actually go out and pursue that mission. XPF‘s study approached 
the topic from an opposite angle. The approach was to find out what is the most the 
agency can get out of the part of the community that might pursue it. Although the results 
of both studies were not alike, both suggested a prize purse of about $20 million for that 
kind of challenge but restricted only to a minimum of U.S. teams and to land on the lunar 
surface and take pictures, but not move. In 2006, the Constellation program for returning 
humans to the Moon was still a priority for NASA, and a prize like the GLXP would 
contribute significant data for that program. In spite of that interest, it was difficult for 
NASA to organize this competition, particularly considering the amount of the cash purse 
(which requires the proper authorization) and the fact that the competition would have 
been restricted by law to U.S. teams only. Further conversations between the XPF and 
experts were followed by Google's interest to support this type of competition. However, 
this time, incentivizing some kind of surface mobility was important as well and was 
expected to be the enabling technology that really makes a big difference. Half a 
kilometer was considered enough as it would demonstrate control and ability to move in 
any direction. 
6.1.3 Organizer, sponsors, and partners 
 The organizer of the GLXP is the X Prize Foundation. This foundation is an 
educational, non-profit corporation established in 1994 to inspire private, entrepreneurial 
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advancements in space travel. This is the largest single international prize ever offered by 
the Foundation but not the only one. The XPF also organized the AXP and NGLLC and 
has several other prizes in concept development process in areas such Energy and 
Environment, Life Sciences, and Education and Global Development (XPF, 2011b). 
Google, Inc. is the sponsor of the GLXP. This company seeks ―to organize the world's 
information and make it universally accessible and useful.‖ Google has been a long time 
supporter of the XPF and the ―approach of using competition to stimulate the private 
sector to achieve important goals more quickly and affordably than previously possible.‖ 
This competition is not related to Google‘s core business yet the company expects to 
contribute to start what they call ―Moon 2.0‖ or a new era of lunar exploration that will 
be more participatory and more sustainable than the first Moon race that ultimately led to 
the Apollo missions (XPF, 2008b). 
 The XPF has also partnered with other organizations that sponsor this competition 
and offer products and services to participant teams. They are considered ―preferred‖ 
partners and relate to different technology aspects of a moon exploration mission. For 
example, Space Exploration Technologies (launch), will return 10 percent of the launch 
costs for all launches on their Falcon 1, Falcon 1e, and Falcon 9 rocket vehicles; the SETI 
Institute (communications,) offers free use of the Allen Telescope Array for receiving 
data from the surface of the Moon for the first seven Earth days of operations on the lunar 
surface; the Universal Space Network (communications,) offers a 50 percent discount on 
communication services for the spacecraft while in transit to the Moon and for 30 Earth 
days of operations on the lunar surface; Space Florida (launch site,) an Independent 
Special District of the State of Florida charged by the Florida Legislature with promoting 
and developing Florida's aerospace industry, offers a Bonus Prize of $2 million to the 
winner of the competition if they launch from Florida; and AGI (software) provides one 
license of its STK package for complex mission planning from launch to landing, valued 
at $150,000 each, to all registered GLXP teams free of charge. 
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 NASA has not officially endorsed or supported the GLXP yet congratulated the 
initiative of the XPF, particularly with regard to the efforts of the Foundation to engage 
the youth and inspire students to pursue careers in science, engineering, and other fields 
related to space exploration (Griffin, 2007). Also JAXA, the Japanese Aerospace 
Exploration Agency, congratulated the XPF for the GLXP (Tachikawa, 2007). 
 
6.2 The context of the competition15 
6.2.1 Planetary robotic exploration 
 The proximity of the Moon has made it an obvious target for planetary 
exploration and a possible intermediate point to reach farther destinations. The natural 
resources of the Moon and their potential for the development of economic and scientific 
activities offer many possibilities (Schrunk et al., 2008). Robotic exploration will allow 
setting the initial stepping-stone for the exploitation of those resources or the 
development of future human settlements. Though for limited time and surface range, 
that robotic exploration started about five decades ago. In 1966, the Luna 9 unmanned 
spacecraft, part of the Soviet Union's Luna program, become the first spacecraft to 
achieve a soft landing on the Moon (and on any planetary body other than Earth) and 
send photographic data back to Earth. Several unmanned missions were conducted since 
then, by the Soviet Union and the U.S. The last successful U.S. lunar lander was 
Surveyor 7, the fifth and final spacecraft of the Surveyor series sent to perform a lunar 
soft landing in 1968. The last spacecraft to land on the Moon was the Soviet Luna 24, in 
1976. Since the first robotic exploration of the Moon in 1966, agencies from the Soviet 
                                                          
15
 This section looks at the context of the GLXP and focuses on the technology-related factors that are more 
directly interrelated with the prize, as discussed in the description of the model to study prizes. Certainly, 
the accomplishment of missions with goals similar to the GLXP may have non-technological implications 
that are not analyzed here, such as those related to geopolitical matters. 
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Union, U.S., European, and Japanese governments have accomplished more than 50 
missions to the lunar surface or its orbit, most of them considered successful (Schrunk et 
al., 2008). 
 To gain a better understanding of the technical implications of a GLXP-like 
mission, it is instructive the examination of past space missions and some of their basic 
statistics. Table 6.1 shows a data summary for selected NASA‘s Moon and Mars robotic 
programs. Despite their different planetary target, they have represented similar means to 
carry on planetary exploration (except for the Ranger missions that used hard landings.) 
The goals of these programs included both exploration and scientific components. The 
scientific component was generally related with measuring and analyzing surface and 
environmental features and included capturing video and images of the visited bodies. 
The exploration goals of most recent missions were related with landing in certain areas 
of interest and inspect the surface using rovers to search for targets of scientific interest 
(e.g. rocks.) Though this means of exploration is considered limited, in most of the cases 
implies several kilometers of surface traverse. 
 These programs had budgets between $170 million and $850 million if the costs 
to build, launch, land, and operate the spacecrafts are considered (rovers may operate 
longer than originally planned and then generate further operational costs.) Programs 
such as Mars Pathfinder had capped costs. In other cases, costs had grown significantly. 
For example, the Mars Exploration Rovers (MER) were developed in exceptionally short 
periods, yet at the cost of significant budget increments (Dornheim, 2003). Development 
lead times have approximately been between 32 and 60 months. Robotic planetary 
missions have had development times shorter than typical Earth-orbiting missions due to 
constrained launch windows, yet they have failed twice as often (Bitten, 2008). 
 Over the coming decade, several countries or space agencies are planning lunar 
landings, including the European Space Agency (ESA,) the Russian Federal Space 
Agency (Roscosmos,) and the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO.) For example, 
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ISRO and Roscosmos have partnered for the mission Chandrayaan-2, which includes 
landing a spacecraft and deploying a rover by 2013 (ISRO, 2010). Two additional 
missions from China and Japan follow in 2013 and 2015 (Brown, 2010). NASA also 
considers a GLXP-like mission which comprises landing on the Moon with a robot that 
can be tele-operated from Earth and can transmit near-live video. Robotic precursor 




Table 6.1: Selected robotic planetary exploration programs 
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Luna 17 1970 Lander and Lunokhod 
1 wheeled rover 
90 days 900 11 km 
(speed 1-2 
km/hr) 
N/A N/A N/A TV cameras and other 
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explore the surface and 
return pictures Luna 21 1973 Lander and Lunokhod 
2 wheeled rover 
56 days 840 37 km 
(speed 1-2 
km/hr) 
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Note: a. Program years; b. Duration of planetary exploration; c. Spacecraft mass (including lander and rover); d. Distance traversed in Moon/Mars 





6.2.2 Sector structure 
 Historically, government-led efforts have driven global R&D in space 
technologies through government agencies‘ programs, with emphasis in the U.S., the 
Soviet Union/Russia, Europe, and Japan. Lately, other countries such as China and India 
have expanded their space activities and gained a share of the space market. 
 In the U.S., agencies such as NASA and the Department of Defense have been the 
main drivers for civil and military space development, respectively. As of today, the U.S. 
government is still the largest single customer for technologies and services such as 
launch vehicles. Large corporations such as Northrop Grumman, McDonnell Douglas, 
and Boeing have been involved since the early days of spaceflight as agencies‘ prime 
contractors. NASA has also involved other companies and universities through grants, 
contracts, and cooperative agreements. 
 Since their creation in the 1950s and 1960s, government space agencies have 
generally grown in size and budget and become centralized, bureaucratic, and less 
productive organizations with substantial fixed-costs. Years of experience have allowed 
both agencies and large contractors to build strong in-house capabilities, extensive 
control systems to manage large and multiple projects, and complex hierarchical 
structures with division of labor between multiple R&D centers (McCurdy, 1994; 
Bromberg, 2000; Cucit et al., 2004; Petroni et al., 2009). Moreover, corporate structures 
and practices have been significantly influenced through subcontracting and supervision 
policies of government agencies (Bromberg, 2000). 
 Over time, the space industry has consolidated into a few large players and new 
entrepreneurial companies have entered the space sector offering more affordable 
solutions for commercial space development (Gump, 1990; Cucit et al., 2004). Three 
factors explain the emergence of those new aerospace companies. First, a global, constant 
need to advance technology in diverse areas linked to aerospace has pulled an increasing 
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number of new small companies that can provide technological capabilities the 
marketplace demands. For example, software programs and algorithms have become 
major elements in aerospace over time. Other relevant technologies include 
microbiology, energy, and power systems. This, however, more than a new trend, is the 
very advancement of technology as the industry moves forward and generates needs for 
different capabilities that new companies can fill in (Marsh, 2011). 
 Second, particularly in the U.S., there has been a great deal of new companies 
started by executives from non-aerospace businesses over the last 10 or 15 years. The 
origin of this is in, for example, feasibility demonstration projects such as Delta Clipper 
DC-X,
16
 which in the 1990s led many people to revise what the conventional wisdom 
said about what and what is not possible in aerospace development (Greason, 2010). 
Since then, new ways of doing business, new ways of managing companies, and new 
ways of structuring programs have been brought into the aerospace industry from outside. 
Recently launched, startup-like companies such as Blue Origin, XCOR, Armadillo 
Aerospace, Masten Space Systems, and SpaceX are examples of that. 
 Third, there may also be a generational factor for the case of the U.S. The 
executives of those new companies tend to cluster in a fairly small range of ages and they 
were either very young or not born yet when the Apollo program finished. These 
executives may have had a common sense that the potential and promise shown in the 
last days of the NASA space race had been unfulfilled and potentially unrealized. 
Therefore, in spite having careers in different industries, these executives had never lost 
interest in space and, at some point, they had realized that they can contribute to fulfill 
such promise and potential (Greason, 2010) 
 New U.S. policies and regulations with more commercial and entrepreneurial 
orientation to space activities have also contributed to the emerging new space sector and 
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 This is a technology demonstration project to develop vertical take-off and landing vehicles in the 1990s, 




new forms of organization of R&D (Culver et al., 2007). For example, NASA‘s programs 
have contributed significantly to develop this emerging commercial space sector by 
supporting companies such as SpaceX since 2002. During its first six years—which the 
company used to develop its first commercial launch rocket from scratch—this company 
has been backed almost entirely by NASA and its founder‘s own money (Homans, 2010). 
This research has discussed some examples too. For example, Armadillo Aerospace, 
winner of the NGLLC, was awarded $475,000 to perform test flights of its experimental 
vehicles under the NASA's Commercial Reusable Suborbital Research Program (CRuSR) 
(NASA, 2010e). 
 The space sector is also marked by the particular characteristics of space 
developments. In general, these developments have been characterized by their 
technological complexity and excessive cost to the point that no one organization or 
company can afford to tackle space exploration projects alone (Bugos & Boyd, 2008). 
Large scale, long duration, and one-of-a-kind space projects integrate diverse 
technologies, multi-disciplinary and multi-team structures, and multi-organization efforts. 
Market pressures have led large companies to involve suppliers and other partners in the 
development effort to source specialized competencies, technologies, and knowledge. 
Yet, generally, those companies have maintained the design authority, administered the 
development effort, and assembled, tested and marketed the products (see, for example, 
Baird et al., 2000; O'Sullivan, 2003). 
 Delays or cost over-runs are common in space programs. For example, in past 
robotic science missions, NASA had cost and schedule growths of 20 percent or more 
due to the inadequate definition of technical and management aspects, program funding 
instability (i.e. funding must be approved annually and priorities change,) program re-
designs, technical complexity, and budget constraints (Bitten, 2008). In general, there has 
been a trade-off between cost, schedule, and performance, with costs as a dependent 
variable (CBO, 2004). The relationship between cost and schedule is dictated by 
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excessive overhead costs, which results in very expensive technologies when there are 
long development cycles. For example, the preliminary planning for the Mars Sample 
Return (MSR) NASA/ESA program—aimed at collecting samples from Mars and 
returning them to Earth—has began in 2008 yet launch is expected by 2018-2022. The 
total expected cost of its multi-element, more complex mission is around $6-7 billion 
(iMARS, 2008; NASA, 2010c). When systems are finally built for this kind of long-term 
missions, other cheaper commercial solutions are likely to be readily available. 
 Space flight and exploration systems have increased their performance over time, 
yet they also have become more complex or ―tightly coupled.‖ This has significant 
impact on project risks. Simpler designs decrease the probability of facing technical 
problems because there are fewer parts and components and less complex interrelations 
between them, and the probability of detecting a problem before significant damages is 
much higher. The complexity of systems leads also to high task interdependency between 
development teams. Consequently, project management and communications have 
become critical factors to project success and led to more complex and bureaucratic R&D 
organizational forms. Also accidents in space projects have led agencies and companies 
to focus on risk management procedures, which in turn led to increasing bureaucracy and 
control to prevent failures (Kranz, 2000).  
 Lately, new approaches to project management have been introduced along with 
smaller missions. Small spacecraft missions can reduce costs significantly, speed up 
turnarounds, and allow many more actors to enter the sector, including companies, 
universities, and countries not traditionally involved with aerospace development. These 
missions generally use combinations of the latest technology with commercial off-the-
shelf (COTS) technologies (Table 6.2). The general miniaturization of COTS components 
has allowed increasing capabilities in smaller spacecrafts. The lower cost of COTS 
technologies has also allowed engineers to compensate for their lack of space heritage by 
engaging in much more rigorous testing at a much earlier stage in program development. 
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While spacecrafts have traditionally been based on older, heritage parts that are 
expensive and have long development lead times, new smaller missions are associated 
with aggressive and early prototyping and testing, rapid development schedules, and 
focused objectives which leads to faster turnarounds and cheaper missions (Marshall et 
al., 2007; Bonin, 2009). 
 The small mission concept has been increasingly adopted. Since the 1990s, 
NASA has introduced a series of small, fast-track implementation Discovery class 
missions at low (and sometimes capped) cost. The NEAR Near Earth Asteroid mission 
and the Mars Pathfinder mission are examples of that kind of approach. Large companies 
such as Hughes Communications, Inc. and Rockwell International had also worked on 
small landers development during the 1990s for Mars exploration programs (Spear, 1995; 
Vorder Bruegge, 1995). There is also an entire small satellite industry based on this 
approach to space exploration (Bonin, 2009). Small missions have also been the 
mainstream concept for the new space sector since the first private, commercial, and 
student-oriented initiatives of the 1990s (Ridenoure & Polk, 1999). 
 
Table 6.2: Main differences between traditional space programs and small missions 
 Traditional programs Small missions 
Cost Expensive Low cost 
Development 
lead times 
Long cycles (10+ years) Fast-track (12-36 months) 
Technologies Low TRL levels, development, 
and latest technologies 
Latest technologies combined 
with COTS (or other mature 
technologies) whenever 
possible, higher TRL levels 
Launching Conventional launchers Next generation launch vehicles 
Size/mass 
capabilities 
Larger spacecrafts and payloads Size and mass constraints 
Risk Reliability yet higher 
programmatic risk 
More frequent, smaller, higher-
risk missions, overall 
programmatic risk smaller 
Sources: Marshall et al. (2007) and own analysis. 
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 Recent examples illustrate the small mission concept very well. For instance, 
STRaND-1 is a small satellite containing a smartphone payload that will be launched into 
Earth orbit later 2011. This satellite is being developed by researchers at the University of 
Surrey and Surrey Satellite Technology Limited (SSTL) to demonstrate the advanced 
capabilities of a satellite built quickly using advanced COTS components (SSTL, 2011). 
There are also organizations such as Copenhagen Suborbitals, an open source, non-profit 
initiative with the goal of launching a human being into space. Based entirely on 
sponsors, private donors, and part time volunteer efforts (about 20 people,) this 
organization has performed more than 30 engine tests and is expecting to accomplish its 
first space flight by mid-2011 with a budget of less than $100,000 (Copenhagen 
Suborbitals, 2011). 
 Finally, certain regulations also define technological development activities in the 
space sector. In particular, U.S. citizens and organizations that develop certain aerospace 
and defense technologies are required to abide by the U.S. International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations (ITAR.) This regulation impedes U.S. companies to export technology that 
may be considered inherently military in nature or has ―double-use,‖ which has forced 
some foreign agencies and companies to introduce ―ITAR-free‖ designs in their 
spacecrafts (Hudson, 2008). Considering the GLXP, this regulation has two effects. First, 
ITAR impedes foreign teams to obtain some key technologies for their projects from U.S. 
companies, including propulsion, communications, and navigation and control systems. 
Teams without access to certain technologies must depend upon in-house capabilities or 
buy from alternative sources (when available.) Second, this regulation compromises the 
business plans of U.S. teams that seek to commercialize their technologies abroad. Multi-
national teams are also affected by ITAR, particularly those that are open-source and seek 
to engage both U.S. and international members. On the other hand, there are sensitive 
technologies that are only available to U.S. government-funded projects and are not 
available to any GLXP team (as the GLXP mission must be privately funded.) There are 
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also other aspects related with intellectual property protection that may eventually affect 
teams that successfully launch their missions and seek to commercialize services. Some 
maintain that ―common terrestrial legal practices‖ such as licensing terms may not be 
suitable for outer space operations (Hudgins, 2002; Kleiman, 2010). 
6.2.3 Technological capabilities/gaps 
 The GLXP challenge has a very open-ended definition in terms of certain soft-
landing, mobility, and communication capabilities. Moreover, there is no specification of 
the technologies or means to be used. In 2006, the XPF conducted an industry survey of 
CEO level individuals from industry, academia, and government to assess the feasibility 
of a GLXP-like mission (Pomerantz, 2006). Based on a hypothetic $20 million cash 
purse, 70 percent of the respondents assumed that a mission including a rover and video 
of an Apollo landing site was feasible without support from NASA. The mission 
achievement lead time since prize announcement was estimated at about 4 years in that 
survey. 
 When the GLXP was just announced, the XPF anticipated a series of challenges 
that teams would face (Table 6.3). Past government missions faced and sought to work 
out the same challenges, with exception of fundraising. Certainly, fundraising is a key 
component of the GLXP mission. Teams not only have to demonstrate their technical 
ability but also the commercial merits of their technologies if they are not backed by own 
funding or other sources. The fundraising effort may divert the development effort to win 
the prize. Thus, project management is very important as it requires a mix of technical 
and business skills that some teams may not have. 
 The key requirements of the GLXP mission comprise Earth-to-Moon launch, 
Moon landing, surface mobility, and Moon video broadcasting. Each of these broadly 
defined phases of the GLXP mission involves systems and technologies with diverse 
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levels of maturity and needs of further development. For reference only, Table 6.4 shows 
some examples of technologies/systems for robotic exploration and their maturity level 
based on assessments of NASA‘s projects. 
 
Table 6.3: Challenges faced by GLXP teams according to the X Prize Foundation 
Challenge Description 
Power on the Moon Vehicles/bots will likely be solar powered, taking advantage of the 
Lunar day, which is 14 Earth-Days long. Higher power 
requirements will require more mass for solar panels. 
Surviving Lunar 
Night 
The Lunar night lasts 14 Earth-Days and temperatures fall to -387 
degrees Fahrenheit (-233 Celsius) from a high of 253 F (123 C) 
during the day. These massive temperature swings cause thermal 
expansion and contraction that can destroy hardware. 
Bandwidth (Earth-
Moon-Earth) 
Bandwidth to and from the Moon is very limited by virtue of power 
limitations, aperture size, and access to Earth-bound deep-space 
networks (e.g. 1 Gbits may take 24 hours to be sent back to the 
Earth) 
Time-delay (2.5 
second round trip) 
Traveling at the speed of light, information –whether that is 
commands for a rover or video for the public—takes 2.5 seconds to 
make a one way journey between the Earth and the Moon (no team 
would use autonomous solutions, they are likely to drive the 
vehicles from Earth via RC). 
Landing Mass The bigger the mass of the rover/bot and the landing system, the 
bigger and more expensive the launch service. 
Landing Accuracy Cheap and lightweight systems for landing on the Moon (e.g. 
airbags) have fairly poor accuracy. More accurate positions are 
possible with more expensive and heavier systems. 
Fundraising Allowing teams to generate revenue 
Source: XPF (2008c). 
 
 Earth-to-Moon launch requires having capabilities to reach the Earth‘s orbit and 
then transfer the spacecraft to the Moon. Teams may build their own launch vehicles—
and even try unorthodox methods such as balloons or spaceplanes—or buy already 
proven commercially available solutions. SpaceX, partner of the XPF to offer discounted 
launch vehicles to the GLXP teams, is one of the top players in this market. Commercial 
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launch services are expensive and range, for example, between $10 million to $50 million 
in the case of the SpaceX‘s Falcon 1e and Falcon 9 rockets, respectively (the more mass 
the spacecraft has, the more expensive the launch rocket.) Launch vehicles with similar 
capabilities and relatively similar costs exist since at least the 1990s (Poniatowski & 
Osmolovsky, 1995). Teams may be able to launch their spacecrafts as secondary payload 
to share costs with other spacecrafts. Companies that accept secondary payloads, 
however, may be unwilling to accept the additional risk of carrying payloads that have 
their own propulsion systems, something needed to transfer the spacecraft from Earth‘s 
orbit to the Moon (Werner, 2010). 
 Interestingly, some of the GLXP team members attending the 4
th
 annual GLXP 
Summit suggested sharing the launcher and its costs between teams. Furthermore, the 
XPF also considered offering a smaller cash purse and providing a launch vehicle for the 
first few teams to be launch-ready, yet the idea was discarded to, among other reasons, 
allow a more open-ended definition of the challenge and, eventually, produce more 
innovations (in this case, innovation in mission approaches to launch the spacecrafts) 
(XPF, 2011a). 
 Moon landing is probably the most challenging part of the mission from the 
technical viewpoint. Since the Moon has no atmosphere, common atmospheric descent 
methods are not suitable (e.g. supersonic parachutes) and completely propulsive methods 
are needed. Moreover, this is the only part of the mission that cannot be tested prior to 
launch, because, on Earth, for example, it is not possible to neutralize the gravity and 
recreate the vacuum-effect that affects the performance of thrusters and engines that are 
used for the lander‘s descent. Industry experts point out that soft landing on the Moon 
was already achieved by the robotic missions mentioned earlier and even by humans with 
the NASA Apollo missions, and that is a very important precedent (Greason, 2010; 




 Surface mobility to traverse 500 meters is the next important requirement after 
lunar landing. For reference only, the Mars Exploration Rovers were designed to drive up 
to 40 meters per Earth-day, yet that goal was notably exceeded (NASA, 2009a). With that 
minimum daily driving, a GLXP rover might be able to cover the 500 meter distance 
during a lunar day (about 15 Earth-days long) without requiring more complex equipment 
for lunar night hibernation. Moreover, while the initial GLXP‘s MTA versions referred to 
wheeled rover-like capabilities, the final MTA 3.0 version allows using any type of 
system to traverse that distance. Mobility technologies have been available since the 
1970s with different levels of maturity. About a dozen missions to the surface of the 
Moon and Mars have used mobile robots and most of them used wheels as their mobility 
element for locomotion. Most of those mobility designs are spin-offs from terrestrial 
applications. Others are purely for space application such as hoppers and legged systems 
and their state of the art is generally low-to-medium TRL. Wheel-enabled systems are 
already in TRL levels 8-9, yet current systems for space missions are still quite 
mechanically complex (Seeni et al., 2010). Certain technical complexities are associated 
with extreme Moon surface conditions such as temperature and the presence of lunar 
dust. Low/high temperature mechanisms such as motors and robotic arms still need 
further development (Balint et al., 2008). More complex technological capabilities such 
as robot-robot interactions are not required by the GLXP, yet teams that use main and 
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 The GLXP challenge does not pose complex scientific goals as those seen in past 
robotic missions, yet it does include the requirement of broadcasting high-definition 
video. This requires the implementation of high-definition cameras according to 
specifications of the prize rules and a data-link for image/video data transmission. The 
prize rules do not specify the characteristics of this subsystem yet requires certain 
capabilities such as being able to capture full 360º views of the landing site. This kind of 
requirements may involve more complex technical solutions. For example, cameras have 
to include more mechanisms (such as motors) to be able to capture images and video 
from multiple views. Moreover, while high-definition video capabilities are well 
developed for Earth applications, this would be the first time that high-definition video is 
transmitted from the Moon. 
 At last, but not least important, experts suggest that pursuing an Apollo-like 
landing or similar type of projects under very different conditions may represent actually 
a significantly different problem if the commercial viability of the technologies is sought. 
An industry expert explains: “Cost matters. If what you are trying to do is develop a 
capability that might be commercially viable, figuring out how to do it 40 years later, a 
similar job, but for 1/100th of the prize, that’s a difference in price that’s so so large as 
to make the quantitative and qualitative difference in the problem.” (Greason, 2010)  
 Although more pressing cost/schedule conditions may actually pose a new 
problem if the commercial merit of the technologies has to be considered, there are no 
significant technology gaps to be closed to accomplish the GLXP mission. The most 
significant development efforts may be in fundraising and not in R&D. “A very large 
share of the cost of winning the prize is going to be a check that you write to a launch 
vehicle provider. And clearly there is no technology involved in that,” explains the same 
expert (Greason, 2010) Another expert also suggests that the conditions set by the GLXP 
challenge points to areas of potential innovation, which is more likely to occur in 
technologies used beyond the Earth low orbit. He explains that “the ride is going to be on 
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existing technology” yet there may be new or advanced technologies in payloads, for 
example (Marsh, 2011). 
 Certainly, many technologies needed to accomplish the GLXP are commercially 
readily available, including both space rated and less expensive non-space components. 
These technologies might require engineering effort to reduce the cost of achievement, 
which is an independent variable in this context. Significant knowledge from past 
experiences is also available. For example, NASA‘s Technical Reports Server (NTRS) is 
a rich, publicly available source of technical documentation (e.g. a quick search of the 
keyword ―lander‖ matches 9,362 documents.)
17
 On the downside, some technologies that 
allow higher performance and have been used in agencies‘ planetary missions are not 
likely to be available to teams as they require special government authorization. This is 
the case of, for example, energy subsystems such as Radioisotope Heater Units to 
maintain sensitive electronic equipment at normal operation temperature in deep space or 
other planetary environments. This technology was used in, for example, the Soviet 
Lunokhod moon rovers to hibernate through many nights, keeping the craft‘s interior 
sealed and warm. 
6.2.4 Technology scenarios 
 This research maintains that the assessment of the expected technology scenarios 
or forecasts is necessary to better understand the potential effect of prizes on innovation. 
To better understand the impact of the GLXP on technological innovation, this research 
should be able to identify a) capabilities required by the project that may require 
technology advancement over current-day technologies (i.e. the notion of prizes to 
accelerate technological development,) and/or b) breakthroughs or unexpected GLXP 
technology outputs from the point of view of capabilities anticipated in technology 
                                                          
17
 NASA‘s Technical Reports Server (NTRS) is available at: http://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp  
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forecasts (i.e. the notion of prizes to induce the development of technologies that 
otherwise do not seem to be forthcoming.) It is not the purpose of this research to forecast 
when or how technology breakthroughs will ultimately occur. 
 Some technological fields deserve special considerations. The GLXP is embedded 
in a space agency-led sector and, therefore, the technological development pathway is 
highly dependent on priorities given to different areas of space development or space 
programs. Agencies such as NASA prepare technology roadmaps that can be used as 
proxies of technology scenarios. These roadmaps do not determine what technologies 
will be ultimately developed yet put forward priorities that shall be addressed by agencies 
to accomplish programmed missions. The literature also provides some insights on the 
expected technological developments in this area. 
 Space technology scenarios can be developed at, at least, the programmatic and 
subsystem levels. The expected evolution of mission approaches can be assessed at the 
programmatic-level. Table 6.5 shows how robotic planetary exploration approaches will 
differ from past missions in the long-term. Improvements in technologies for robotic 
planetary exploration are expected in a number of aspects. New mission approaches are 
expected to provide higher scientific returns by deploying multiple units per mission and 
increasing the reliability of the programs. While the program costs may not decrease, the 
use of multiple agents reduces the costs and risks involved in catastrophic damage of 
single units. Mobility capabilities of robots are expected to expand due to the introduction 
of new mobility systems and more intelligent coordination and exploration of multiple 
sites per mission. It is also expected for future missions to reach beyond the limits of 
current-day missions to accomplish longer surface exploration distances in autonomous 
mode. Science capabilities are also expected to increase as new, on-site assistance for 
decision-making is added to the current-day features of scientific instruments. Overall, 
these expected capabilities for mobility and science operations will make possible 
significantly longer missions. 
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 The subsystem-level assessment of future technological scenarios provides further 
insights on how individual mission components are expected to evolve in the medium- or 
long-term. Table 6.6 shows selected examples of key subsystems relevant to a GLXP-like 
mission and their expected development by 2020 according to NASA‘s technology 
roadmaps. The purpose of this research is not the technical assessment of the state of the 
art of these subsystems, yet offer insights on the potential contribution of the GLXP to 
space developments. The general examination of these examples shows that the state of 
the art in some of these technologies refers to the capabilities seen in the Mars 
Exploration Rovers launched in 2003. This suggests development cycles of 10 years or 
more considering that no other mission deployed more advanced technologies lately. 
Moreover, these technologies—with a few exceptions in propulsion systems—are in low 
and medium TRL levels. NASA seeks to develop/test these technologies internally or 




Table 6.5: Comparison of past and future robotic planetary exploration capabilities 
 
Past robotic planetary exploration 
Future robotic planetary 
exploration 
Approach  Deployment of single-surface-
based, spatially constrained 
agent (e.g. lander or rover) 
 Expensive  (low-cost missions 
more likely to fail) 
 High reliability, high science 
return, low-cost missions 
 Hierarchical ―tier-scalable‖ 
autonomy; orbital-, airborne- 
and surface-based units (e.g. 
orbiters, balloons,a rovers) 
 Multiple low-cost and 
expendable deployed agents in 
surface 
Mobility  Dependency on remote Earth-
based human control 
 Surface-based agents with 
limited viewing range 
 Spatially constrained; locally 
optimal paths for exploration 
through limited areas 
 Short-distance mobility: e.g. 
MER distance between 
interventions = 40 meters 
 Terrain capabilities: gentle 
slopes, sparse obstacles, dense 
rocks 
 Mechanism: wheeled, surface-
based agents 
 Autonomous reconnaissance 
missions with manual override 
at all levels 
 Regional optimal paths for 
exploration 
 Multiple exploration sites 
 Long-distance mobility: 1+ km 
between uplinks 
 Terrain capabilities: hazardous 
and inaccessible locations; 
craters, steep slopes, dense 
obstacles; tethered exploration 
of cliffs 





 Single scientific targets 
 Multiple, expensive instruments 
in single agents 
 Multiple targets with agents 
assistance to decision about 
features that are worthy of 
scientific investigation 
 Scientific instruments 
distributed between multiple 
agents 
Risks  No redundancy; high risk of 
losing mission if an agent is 
damaged or destroyed 
 Redundancy; mission reliability 
and safety 
Duration  Weeks, months  Months, years 
Notes: a. balloons are restricted to exploration of bodies with atmosphere (e.g. Mars) 
Source: based on literature (Pedersen et al., 2002; Fink et al., 2005; Seeni et al., 2010) and NASA‘s 










Technologies relevant to GLXP-like missions 
(selected examples) 
State of the art Roadmap (~2020) 
Earth-to-
Moon transfer 
Propulsion Ion thrusters at TRL6 require 
flight demonstration or 
mission application 
Higher thrust, longer 





Lander horizontal velocity 
estimation (Mars Exploration 
Rovers) 
3-D Imaging Flash Lidar 
for safe landing / hazard 
detection and avoidance 
Chemical 
propulsion 
Cold gas systems are TRL 9; 
warm gas are TRL5/6 





Local map-based obstacle 
avoidance, limited onboard 
autonomy enables hazard 
avoidance while driving 
(Mars Exploration Rovers) 
Quickly assessment of 
subtle terrain geometric 
and non-geometric 
properties (e.g. visually 
estimating the properties 
of soft soil;) 
―autonomous systems‖ 
that resolve choices on 
their own, with target 
geometry unknown 
Mechanisms Predominant wheeled 
systems with specific 
problems related with 
extreme environments. 
High performance in 
traversing extreme 
terrain; new mobility 
mechanisms (e.g. motors 






2 Mbps 200 Mbps 
Source: based on NASA‘s technology roadmaps (NASA, 2011). 
 
6.2.5 Technology related incentives 
 To better understand technology development trends in the space sector and 
assess the impact of the GLXP, this research examined the perceptions regarding the 
value of the technologies involved in this prize. Insights from experts and other sources 
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also allowed a better understanding of the future drivers of these technology markets. The 
peculiar characteristics of the space sector have significant influence in the structure of 
the space technology markets. In particular, space agencies have significant influence 
through their space programs and programs aimed at promoting entrepreneurship and 
commercialization. 
 The GLXP—and other competitions launched by the XPF—are designed to have 
multiple backend business markets that can be supported by the technologies developed 
in pursuit of the prize (Pomerantz, 2010a). Ideally, prize entrants should be able to 
continue working on the commercial development of the prize technologies after the end 
of the competition and be able to differentiate their strategies through different business 
models. The XPF has expected the immediate near term market to be NASA and other 
foreign space agencies and GLXP teams to be able to provide data, heritage for new 
hardware, and, at the broad extent, risk management for government funded space 
missions. For example, the recent NASA‘s Innovative Lunar Demonstrations Data 
(ILDD) program has awarded six GLXP teams with contracts to purchase $30 million 
worth of data from commercial lunar missions. Moreover, the XPF expects that ―many 
contenders might eventually go into business, flying lunar robotic missions for $50 
million or $60 million.‖ (Hsu, 2010) 
 There is a consensus about the main drivers of technology development in this 
sector, yet there is uncertainty on the size of the potential markets for the prize 
technologies and the time horizon for their realization (Table 6.7). Experts and other 
sources (and even GLXP team leaders, as describer later) consider NASA and other space 
agencies as the most important customers. Private customers might increase their share of 
demand only in the mid- or long-term. Only reports by Futron Corporation—a 
technology management consulting firm—have provided some concrete estimates of the 
market value of technologies for lunar exploration and related services. On the other 
hand, experts explain that it is very difficult to know whether there is a market for 
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commercial lunar surface activity of one kind or another and, therefore, the value of those 
potential markets is uncertain. Moreover, experts suggest that this market depends greatly 
on the reactivation of NASA‘s programs aimed at lunar exploration such as 
Constellation. Finally, experts have also pointed out that the broader economic context 
has not been favorable for space projects lately. 
 A more detailed estimate of the size of the lunar market has been available to the 
GLXP teams. This estimate was developed by Futron Corporation and presented at the 4
th
 
annual GLXP Summit (Table 6.8). Considering all segments for commercial lunar 
activity, this market may be worth up to $1.6 billion in the next 10 years. The study by 
Futron remarks the problems to assess the size of individual markets due to the lack of 
successful track record in them and the lack of comparisons with other markets. This 
study also considers the government sector as the most important driver through the 
purchase of hardware and services. The private sector market for space hardware and 
other revenue streams may be also available to emerging companies in the sector. For 
example, GLXP teams may provide services of payload transportation, sell mission data, 





Table 6.7: Perceived technology incentives and expected scenarios related to the GLXP technologies 










 Uncertainty on whether there is a market for 
commercial lunar surface activity of one kind or 
another 
 Government interest in planetary landers and 
Moon exploration still exists 
 NASA‘s plans to return to the Moon would be a 
significant incentive, if ―reactivates something 
like Constellation‖ 
 Lunar Market estimate 2011-2019: $1.0 to $1.6 billion 
(Futron Corporation, 2010b) 
 NASA as a customer may pay between $4.5 and $7 
million per kg. for lunar transportation (optimistic and 
pessimistic scenarios, respectively) (Futron 
Corporation, 2010a). 
 NASA‘s 2011 budget proposal includes funding for 
lunar expeditions to test remote control of robots (Hsu, 
2010). 
Future drivers (for 
the next 3-5-10-20 
years) 
 3-5 years: economic slowdown affects the sector; 
programs may be cut or scaled down (both public 
and private); NASA‘s support for commercial 
resupply linked to space station; NASA‘s 
investment in commercial companies that can 
serve its needs continues 
 5-10 years: government agencies continue to be 
driving force; NASA has fixed demand for 
commercial services 
 20+ years: agencies drive human exploration of 
the Moon 
 5-10 years: NASA and other agencies are main driver 
(Futron Corporation, 2010a); uncertainty about 
NASA‘s programs (ASAP, 2011) 
 10+ years: NASA continues to be the driver; other 
foreign agencies are potential customers too; 
commercial demand increases (Futron Corporation, 
2010a); NASA‘s budget for lunar exploration 
expected to grow (CBO, 2004) 
Note: experts contributed to these estimates to different extent, according to their area of specialization and present knowledge (they did not conduct any 
pervious analysis to contribute these estimates.) 
Source: experts‘ assessment is based on interviews with industry experts cited in previous sections; other sources are cited in table and text. 
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Hardware sales for government sector $700M 
Services for governments $200-400M 
Products for commercial sector $30-160M 
Entertainment $10-100M 
Sponsorship $50-100M 
Technology sales and licensing $10-100M 
Total $1,000-1,560M 
Source: Futron Corporation. (2010). Emerging Commercial Lunar Activities: Assessing Market Size and 
Development, Presentation to the Google Lunar X Prize Summit. Isle of Man, UK. 
 
 The market segments presented by that study represent different business and 
revenue models. No much data are available to assess opportunities for each case. For the 
case of payload services, another recent study by Futron Corporation about commercial 
Lunar Transportation suggests that "…the majority of investors view lunar transportation 
as a new, unproven industry without proven business models that provide multiple 
revenue streams." (Futron Corporation, 2010a) For that reason, the study continues, 
venture capital investors expect returns on investment of 40-50 percent for space-related 
ventures. Private equity seeks 30 percent or more. In addition, to become interested in 
space ventures in the short-term, investors request strong commitments of NASA-funded 
programs, several ―beta-successful‖ companies, and multiple revenue streams, among 
others (Futron Corporation, 2010a). 
 It should be noted that commercial lunar exploration is not a new idea. This 
research was able to identify at least two private initiatives addressing such market. The 
first is BlastOff!, a company that was founded in 1999 to develop entertainment space 
missions financed through the sales of advertising, media content, merchandising, and 
payload delivery. Peter Diamandis, founder of the XPF, has been CEO of this company. 
The planned $50 million missions included soft-landing, rovers for long distance travel 
(10-20 km,) and high-definition video/image broadcasting (the company planned to use 
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consumer-grade cameras.) (Diamandis, 2008) The planned costs for the first and second 
missions were $50 million and $20 million, respectively, and the expected revenues were 
at $250 million. The company was able to raise about $15 million in private funding, yet 
ceased operations after the dot-com stock market crisis of 2001 (Pomerantz, 2006). 
 The second private initiative is LunaCorp. The case of this startup is similar to 
that of BlastOff! and is very interesting due to its connections with the GLXP. LunaCorp 
was co-founded in 1989 by today‘s GLXP Team Astrobotic president. Table 6.9 offers 
detailed data on this space venture and shows that the total mission cost is among the 
most significant differences between the both initiatives ($250 million then, $100 million 
now.) LunaCorp startup planned to land a rover on the Moon and offer a number of 
services associated with the mission, including tele-presence experiences and payload 
delivery. Team Astrobotic is pursuing similar market opportunities with the GLXP and 
have already received contracts from NASA for hardware demonstration and mission 
data. This team also offers payload delivery to private customers. Both enterprises are 
notably similar. LunaCorp could not raise enough interest from sponsors and went out of 
business in 2003 (Reichhardt, 2008). Team Astrobotic has been among the first teams to 
announce its participation in the GLXP and has contributed significant technology 
outputs, as described later in this section. This team has also been the first team to 
publicly announce the signature of a launch contract for its mission with SpaceX. 
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Table 6.9: LunaCorp private initiative in the 1990s and Team Astrobotic, a GLXP business case example 
LunaCorp Astrobotic 
 Business executives, scientists, and former NASA officials founded 
LunaCorp in 1989; Mr. Gump is the company‘s President. 
 Dr. William "Red" Whittaker of Carnegie Mellon University joins 
LunaCorp in 1993 to develop lunar rovers. 
 NASA supports CMU's lunar robotics effort with $1.25 million a year. 
 Placing two rovers on the Moon would have cost $250 million in 1996 
dollars ($75 million to launch both primary and back-up rover missions, 
$12 million in insurance to pay for a third mission, $80 million to develop 
rovers, $38 million for technical and management oversight, and $45 
million for contingency.) The cost announced in 1999 ranges between 
$80 million and $200 million. 
 Expected revenues $365 million: theme parks or telepresence ($80 
million,) corporate sponsors ($76 million,) science ($74 million,) TV 
networks ($65 million,) ancillary sales merchandising ($55 million,) 
Internet ($15 million.) 
 Rovers with 20-50 kg. payload capacity at $1.2 million per kg. 
 New reusable Roton vehicle by Rotary Rocket, or Boeing's Delta II 
 Spin-off of Carnegie Mellon university created in 2007; Mr. Gump is 
Astrobotic‘s President. 
 Core team led by Dr. William "Red" Whittaker, also participated in 
DARPA Challenges in 2005 and 2007 (won the latter) 
 Seeks to win $24 million in prizes with GLXP mission in 2013 
 GLXP mission will cost $90 million, may generate up to $175 million in 
revenues 
 Plans to send a robot to the moon every year after accomplishing the 
GLXP mission 
 Planned future activities on the Moon: mining (e.g. iron, aluminum), 
establish first Moon outpost 
 Awarded NASA‘s $10 million contract for ILDD (Nov 2010); NASA‘s 
$600K, two-year contract to develop lunar mining technology; NASA‘s 
$500K purchase order (from a $10 million total) for hardware 
demonstration (Dec. 2010) 
 Other planned revenue sources: remote experiences, communications via 
rover, training, music and art sponsorships 
 Private investor contributed funding 
 Spacecraft contains a 175-pound rover and up to 230 pounds (103 kg.) of 
payload for customers; they would pay $2 million per kg. of payload 
 Astrobotic signed contract with SpaceX to use Falcon 9 to launch the 
900-pound spacecraft (Feb. 2011) 
Note: these data do not represent a systematic comparison and are shown as a reference only. 
Source: LunaCorp (1996), Cronin, M. (2011), Bloomberg Businessweek (2011), and Astrobotic‘s website.
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6.2.6 Other prizes 
 There is no other ongoing prize competition equivalent to the GLXP. Similar 
prizes implemented simultaneously might dilute the incentive power of this competition. 
Prizes only related to some extent to the GLXP include NASA‘s National Lunar Robotics 
Competition. In October 2009, three teams claimed a total of $750,000 in prizes at this 
competition. Competitors were required to use mobile, robotic digging machines capable 
of excavating at least 330 pounds of simulated moon dirt, known as regolith, and 
depositing it into a container in 30 minutes or less. The rules required the remotely 
controlled vehicles to carry their own power sources and weigh no more than 176 pounds 
(California Space Education and Workforce Institute, 2009). 
 Moreover, the incentives offered by the GLXP may change if there is an 
equivalent government mission to the Moon (i.e. if there is a ―government landing‖ the 
Grand Prize would be reduced to $15 million.) Space agencies from countries like India 
and China have ongoing programs that may include Moon surface exploration. There are 
also new NASA initiatives with the goal of sending robotic spacecrafts to the Moon. The 
NASA‘s 2011 budget proposal considers lunar expeditions that would test the ability to 
control robots remotely from Earth or the International Space Station and transmit near-
live video (Hsu, 2010; NASA, 2010b; Werner, 2010). 
 
6.3 The prize entrants 
 Thirty-five teams from 17 countries entered the GLXP between September 2007 
and February 2011 (Figure 6.1). Six teams have withdrawn/merged and 29 remain in 
competition to the date this research was finished. Those 35 teams that entered officially 
include 17 U.S. teams and 18 foreign or multi-national teams (Figure 6.2). For example, 
the team Synergy Moon reports having members from at least 15 different countries, 
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including Bosnia, Serbia, Slovenia, Ireland, Sri Lanka, France, Australia, New Zealand, 
and USA, among others (GLXP, 2010b). Notably, several countries with teams in the 
GLXP have not had any significant space program before.  The actual number of teams 
and participant countries exceeds the initial target of the XPF, which was about a dozen 
teams from a few countries (Pomerantz, 2010a). To enter the competition, the XPF have 
required entrants to be some type of legal entity that it is not an individual (e.g. company, 
foundation) and sign a Letter of Intent to Compete first and then have 90 days to 
formalize its participation, or loss the registration fee. Not all teams that submitted a letter 






Note: The timeline indicates months since prize announcement; the deadline for registration to enter the competition closed in month 39. 
Source: based on official press releases by the XPF. 
 

























White Label Space (Multinational)
Part-Time-Scientists (Germany)
Selenokhod (Russia)
C-Base Open Moon (Germany)
Barcelona Moon (Spain)
Rocket City Space Pioneers (USA)
Moon Express (USA)













Note: entries as of Feb. 2011. 
Source: X Prize Foundation. 
 
Figure 6.2: Countries of GLXP team headquarters and member locations 
 
 There are diverse reasons why teams enter the competition months or even years 
after the prize announcement. The XPF suggests among the factors that may have 
prevented earlier entries are the economic slowdown that started in 2007 and the secrecy 
preference of some teams that might prefer to wait until their technologies are more 
mature before announcing its participation. From the late entrants‘ viewpoint, such 
economic slowdown may have played a positive role, as it may have prevented the teams 
that started earlier from getting as much of a head start as they might have (Pomerantz, 
2011b). 
 Many more potential entrants have demonstrated interest in this competition. 
Between the prize announcement and the summer of 2009, the XPF received more than 
2,500 inquiries from individuals, companies, and universities from 96 different countries 
(Pomerantz, 2011a). The XPF had required interested teams to submit an application 
package with diverse information about the team and its members, finances, and mission 
plan. Only those applications deemed serious were accepted. Non-serious potential 
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entries comprise those applicants that are ―completely unaware of what they are getting 
into,‖ are only seeking access to the ―brand‖ of the competition or its sponsors and 
partners, or are critically reliant on demonstrably impossible methods. Applications were 
not rejected in any case, yet a few interested would-be entrants were asked to revise their 
proposals. During the 2007-2010 registration period, between five and 10 applicants were 
invited to re-submit revised versions of their applications. In this regard, the registration 
fees acted as an ―external validator.‖ Fees are considerably lower compared with the 
expected cost of a GLXP mission. If would-be entrants are not able to raise funding to 
cover the entry fees based on a credible project proposal—assumes the XPF—then either 
their intentions are not serious or their mission designs have significant flaws. The most 
significant difference between the GLXP teams and those that ultimately did not enter the 
competition might be the level of seriousness of the applications. Inquiries that did not 
turn into formal entries seemed to be more ―spur of the moment‖ (Pomerantz, 2011a). 
 Otherwise indicated, the rest of this research focuses on the analysis of 17 teams 
that participated by responding questionnaires, accepting interviews, and/or allowing site 
visits. This research gathered team-level data until December 2010. To that moment, only 
26 teams had been officially announced as competitors and 23 of them were still active. 
A few other teams had signed letters of intent to compete as described in the previous 
paragraphs. 
 The GLXP teams adopt diverse legal forms. Seventeen teams reported their type 
of entity in questionnaires. Eight teams (47 percent) are for-profit organizations (e.g. 
company,) five teams (29 percent) are non-profit organizations (e.g. foundation,) three 
teams (18 percent) are independent, informally organized teams (e.g. group of 
colleagues,) and only one team is part of a larger organization (e.g. part of a university, 
company, or similar; in this case, part of a company.) Further investigation based on 
documentary sources and interviews indicates that the type of organization teams adopt 
may be correlated with the origin of the team. For example, a European team explains, it 
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is easier to incorporate the team as a non-profit but, in turn, it is more difficult to receive 
donations. Also, some multi-national teams include groups that adopt different 
organizational form in each country for related reasons. In questionnaires, five out of 
eight for-profit teams (i.e. companies) reported to be based in the U.S. and four out of 
five non-profit teams reported to be based abroad. 
 Most of the prize entrants are ―GLXP prize teams‖ yet there are also some pre-
existing teams. Eleven out of 17 GLXP teams (65 percent) were created exclusively to 
enter this competition. The six teams created before the GLXP have a working 
experience as a group that ranges from three to 20 years. 
 This research classifies the individuals working with teams into members and 
collaborators. Members are those individuals permanently with the team. Members are 
classified into full- and part-time according to the time they spend working on the GLXP. 
These members are considered to form the core team. Full-time members are those that 
spend 80 percent or more of their time working on the GLXP project. Part-time members 
are those that are permanently with the team, but share time with other job or activity. 
Collaborators or volunteers are the people that work with the team sporadically, only 
when it is necessary (maybe even remotely.) The total number of people engaged at any 
time in the GLXP project of a team is the sum of full- and part-time members and active 
volunteers. 
 The size and composition of teams varies significantly among teams and over 
time. New people join the teams and some people step down. There are also sporadic 
collaborators and volunteers. The teams that participated in this study had between one 
and 40 full- or part-time members when responding a questionnaire. The small size of 
some teams is generally explained by either the recent entry date or their early stage of 
project development. In average, these teams had four full-time and 11 part-time 
members. All but three teams enrolled an average of 14 volunteers each, with a maximum 
of 80 volunteers for a team. Considering both members and volunteers, the author‘s 
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estimate is that the 17 teams that responded a questionnaire engaged at least 438 people 
in 2010 (this is about two years and a half after the GLXP announcement.) 
 That estimate based on questionnaires may be misguiding when thinking of the 
total number of people engaged in the GLXP. Team FredNet is a special case and an 
example of that. This team is pursuing an open-source approach to the GLXP project and 
has enrolled more than 500 volunteers from about 30 different countries. These 
volunteers are between eight and 80 years old and contribute remotely to the project. In 
spite of its non-profit/open-source quality, the team has members dedicated to business 
development and has goals beyond the prize (Evadot, 2009). There is another open-
source team in the competition yet its number of members is considerably smaller. 
 Based on the responses of 15 teams, the primary background of the GLXP team 
members is engineering with diverse complementary backgrounds. In average, at the 
moment of responding the questionnaire, 58 percent of the team members (full- or part-
time) had an engineering background, 19 percent have a physics/chemistry/mathematics 
background, 14 percent have a computer science/IT background, and 23 percent have 
other backgrounds.
18
 The data also show a significant proportion of team members with 
graduate education among the GLXP entrants. Five teams have 90 percent or more 
members with graduate education level. Moreover, in average, 15 percent of the team 
members have reached the Ph.D. education level; 42 percent reached the Masters level; 
30 percent the College/Bachelor level; and nine percent reached only a High School 
level. In total, about 100 Masters-level and 40 Ph.D.-level team members have been 
engaged during 2010. Other 80 team members with College/Bachelor degrees were 
engaged as well. 
 The professional experience of team members varies but is still linked to 
aerospace technology research and development (Figure 6.3). Overall, minor proportions 
                                                          
18
 The total adds up to more than 100 percent because the questionnaire allowed respondents to indicate 
more than one type of educational background for each team member. 
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of the (full- or part-time) team members have working experience at either aerospace 
industry (34 percent) or space agencies (15 percent.) Moreover, almost 31 percent of the 
team members have undertaken academic research in aerospace-related topics and almost 
21 percent have some type of rocketry experience as an independent professional. A few 
GLXP teams and about seven percent of all team members have already participated in 
other technology competitions. For example, Team Micro-Space has participated in both 
the GLXP and the N-Prize until recently. Team ARCA participated in the AXP. Rocket 
City Space Pioneers‘ leader was part of Scaled Composites, the team that won the AXP. 
Team Phoenicia also participated in the NGLLC. Some members of Team Astrobotic 
participated in the DARPA Challenges (and won the 2007 edition of the competition.) 




Note: N=17 cases. 
Source: questionnaire to GLXP teams. 
 
Figure 6.3: GLXP teams’ professional experience 
 
 This research uses the team members‘ work experience data to classify GLXP 
teams into unconventional and conventional entrants (Table 6.10). Teams with significant 
space agency/industry experience (i.e. 50 percent of team members or more) have been 
classified as aerospace-experience or conventional teams. The rest of the teams have 






0% 10% 20% 30% 40%
Researched in aerospace tech.
Designed or dev. tech. as corp. employee
Worked for space agency
Rocketry as indep. professional
Participated in other tech. prizes
Percentage of all GLXP team members
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classification into nine unconventional teams and eight conventional teams. When the 
analysis required the classification of teams that did not participate in the study (for 
example, to assess technology outputs) the researcher assessed the information publicly 
available about the team and type of entity (i.e. for-profit, non-profit, or independent.) 
Nine teams that entered before December 2010 did not participate in this study. Five of 
those nine teams are companies or groups thereof and have significant aerospace 
experience. These five teams are considered to be conventional. There are also three non-
profit organizations or independent groups and one team organized as a group of 
companies and NGOs with uncertain space agency or industry experience. These four 
teams are considered unconventional. 
 That classification allows a more systematic analysis of the motivations, R&D 
activities, and technology outputs of prize entrants. This is a required assumption to 
continue this research yet, considering the diversity observed in teams, a word of caution 
is necessary. The competition has a moving target and teams evolve over time and 
therefore their perceptions and organization may change. Moreover, teams also change as 
both the competition and themselves gain visibility. Teams may gather new resources 
including more experienced or skilled new members. Teams may also evolve and adapt 
their form of organization to be able to raise funding or gather other resources and 
continue participating in the competition. This does not necessarily happen in other short-
term prizes with less challenging goals. 
 Teams have grown significantly since they entered the competition. The 
membership of the teams that responded a questionnaire grew an average 170 percent 
between the moment of their creation and their participation in this study. The most 
significant average growth was found in the number of full-time members (about 190 
percent,) followed by the average growth of part-time members (about 140 percent,) and 
then number of volunteers (about 90 percent.) At the moment of its creation, the largest 
team enrolled 15 members (full- and part-time) and the smallest team was just volunteers 
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collaborating sporadically. The volunteer effort has grown significantly as well. Only two 
teams started with significant number of volunteers (60 and 15, respectively) when 
formally created. FredNet is the team that has grown the most. The team enrolled about 
20 people within the first week of participation in the GLXP and then grew to about 100 
people in a few months. Currently, this team has about 500 members and volunteers from 
about 40 different countries (Evadot, 2009). Other teams have successfully recruited new 
members thanks to their participation at conferences and industry events. For example, 
team Part Time Scientists grew from 40 people in April 2010 to about 70 in October 2010 
by using those means. In interviews, the author learned that having an online presence 
helps teams significantly in the process of recruiting new members and volunteers. That 
presence not only comprises a team website, but also extensive use of social networks 
such as Facebook. Another method used by teams is presentation at conferences and talks 
at university classrooms, which has allowed a few teams to engage students (T11, 2010) 
and, sometimes, meet new partners (T20, 2010). A few teams such as White Label Space 





Table 6.10: Main characteristics of GLXP teams that participated in this study 
 Unconventional teams Aerospace-experience or conventional teams 




Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No 












Indep. Profit Indep. 
Non-
profit 
Profit Profit Profit Profit Profit 
Origin USA Foreign Foreign Foreign Foreign USA Foreign Foreign USA USA USA Foreign Foreign Foreign USA Foreign USA 
Members 20 10 20 40 38 11 15 6 1 21 12 1 12 7 11 4 2 


































































































Note: data corresponds to the date of completing the questionnaire; classification of teams into ―unconventional‖ and ―aerospace-experience‖ is based on 
significant proportion of members with experience in space industry or agency; the researcher confirmed the type of team with other data sources whenever these 
were available. 
Source: questionnaire applied to GLXP teams.
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 Prize advocates emphasize the advantage of prizes to engage students and other 
individuals not typically involved in R&D. This research examined this aspect of prizes 
by asking teams about the number of student and/or female members. In average, 15 
teams reported that 27 percent of (full- or part-time) members are students and 24 percent 
are women. In total, about 50 women and 66 students were engaged as team members at 
the moment these teams responded a questionnaire. After discussing the participation of 
students with teams in interviews, the researcher discovered that the real number of 
students engaged is higher, yet with a volunteer role. The number of students involved 
with teams also fluctuates considerably depending on the month of the year (e.g. when 
students return to class at the beginning of a semester.) For example, a team leader 
estimates that up to 200 students may have participated in a 20-people, university-based 
team during the first three years of competition (T4, 2010). 
 The assessment of the potential contribution of students to the prize developments 
varies, however. For example, a team leader explains that ―the problem with students is 
that you have to put a lot of energy into supervision of them,‖ and that that may offset the 
benefits of having them in the team in some cases (T20, 2010). On the contrary, a GLXP 
team‘s engineering student explains students‘ contribution with these words: 
 “Us as students, we’re extremely passionate. We’re right in the heart of 
our careers. We are learning a lot we know everything off of the top of our 
heads, and we have fresh thinking. We don’t have any traditional designs 
that would influence the way we work. We can kind of come up with new 
approaches and new ideas and just run with it, and not have to worry too 
much about what we’ve done in the past because we haven’t done much in 
the past. […] We have all of our time to dedicate to these things, we don’t 
have to focus on other projects that we are getting paid to do and put this 
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aside. We can continue working on it. So, things are getting done pretty 
fast.” (T16, 2010) 
 Interestingly, GLXP teams have very diverse goals including some beyond the 
prize achievement (Table 6.11). The achievement of some of these goals requires 
winning the competition or, at least, having a good performance (e.g. demonstration of 
technological leadership.) Yet, other goals may be achieved with the mere participation in 
the competition. For example, some teams have entered the GLXP to inspire other people 
or get hands-on experience. Moreover, there are teams that “are mainly in it for fun or for 
other things learned along the way” and honestly know that they do not have high 
chances of winning the prize (Pomerantz, 2010a). This has been also observed in other 
competitions such as the NGLLC (Davidian, 2010). In addition, a number of teams are 
primarily in the pursuit of more sustainable commercial opportunities and not necessarily 
focused on winning the competition. The XPF‘s Director for Space Prizes explain: 
“We have a number of teams that view their ultimate line of business 
primarily as a support business, so where they are going to develop the 
best mission control for a robotic lunar mission, and even if they don’t get 
all the way to the moon, they’re going to develop that step, and they’re 
going to sell it to other teams, and they’re going to sell it to Boeing, 
Lockheed Martin, and NASA, and aren’t really anticipating getting to the 
further step unless something in the market changes or something in the 
company changes in a way that they don’t foresee.” (Pomerantz, 2010a) 
 The GLXP team members seek to continue working in space development and 
commercialize the technologies they develop for the competition, according to the 
assessment of the team leaders about the future plans of the team members (Figure 6.4). 
Fifteen out of 17 teams (88 percent) have members that will seek opportunities to 
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commercialize prize technologies; a similar share of teams has members that will seek 
opportunities to continue research in aerospace/aviation/satellite communications; only 
one team reported that its members will retire from the aerospace/aviation/satellite 
communications career or projects; and, six teams (35 percent) have members that will 
seek other prizes to compete. Ten out of 16 respondents also indicated having at least one 
team member dedicated exclusively to commercialization of prize technologies. Open-
source teams also have members dedicated to business development. 
 
Table 6.11: Types of team goals in the GLXP (selected examples) 
Team goals 
(selected examples) 




“When you lead a team, the world expects you to 
win” (T4, 2010) 
Create commercial space 
enterprise 
“trying to develop technologies to eventually 
start a company up in the future that can provide 
these services.” (T16, 2010) 
Increase professional reputation, 
publicity, networking 
“we can gradually build up the ideas and 
promote ourselves.” (T20, 2010) 
Other organizational goals “to increase the level of aerospace activities in 
our country and the desire to promote innovative 
research projects” (T13, 2010) 
Inspire other people “Most of the people in the team are like me, what 
I want to do is create education and inspire 
students” (T11, 2010) 
Learn “If you get to bend metal, test out equipment, do 
more hands on work, it’s a lot more interesting.” 
(T16, 2010) 
Note: N=7 cases. 







Note: N=17 cases. 
Source: questionnaire applied to GLXP teams. 
 
Figure 6.4: Future activities of members of GLXP teams 
 
6.4 Motivations of prize entrants 
 To investigate the incentives perceived by the GLXP teams and their motivations 
to enter the competition, this research gathered data with questionnaires and interviews. 
In questionnaires, team leaders were asked about the importance of a set of nine 
alternative reasons to participate in the GLXP prize. The questionnaire asked to classify 
them as Very Important/Important/Somewhat important/Not important at all. In addition, 
the questionnaire provided space for respondents to mention and classify up to two other 
reasons to participate if they have reasons that were not included in the questionnaire. 
Interviews produced richer data because interviewees were given the opportunity to 
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that interviewees put into their statements and classified them according to their 
importance. 
 Table 6.12 summarizes the overall importance of motivations to participate in the 
GLXP based on both questionnaires and interviews. In questionnaires, the GLXP teams 
mentioned that the three most important reasons (i.e. ―very important‖) to enter this 
competition are the benefits that technology development may bring for society 
(mentioned by 10 teams or 59 percent,) the commercialization of technologies developed 
for the prize (nine teams or 53 percent,) and the recognition from NASA or other 
government agencies for potential future contracts (eight teams or 47 percent) (Appendix 
Figure B.2 shows data from questionnaires only.) Participation in a real technical and 
intellectual challenge is the next motivation in order of importance. Seven teams (41 
percent) consider it very important, and other seven teams consider it important, making 
participation in a real technical challenge the option most cited as either very important or 
important. The prize money is very important to only four teams (24 percent) and 
important to only two teams. Similar importance was given to the recognition from 
family, friends, or colleagues that may result from participating in the prize. 
 The questionnaires also anticipated the diverse motivations to enter the 
competition that were later confirmed in interviews. Six questionnaire respondents used 
the extra space provided to indicate other reasons to participate (Appendix Table A.6 
shows a detail at the team-level.) In total, they indicated 11 other reasons to participate in 
this competition and classified them as either very important or important. Those reasons 
included three types of prize incentives and two types of other incentives that were not 
initially considered by this research. Three of those teams mentioned the ―entertainment 
value‖ the GLXP offers and ―having fun‖ as very important reasons.  Interestingly, 
another team indicated a very important religious reason to participate in the GLXP. 
 Interview data highlight two facts (Appendix Table A.7 shows a detail at the 
team-level.) First, motivations vary significantly among teams. At least eight new types 
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of prize incentives with varied degree of importance emerged from interviews with seven 
teams. For example, the GLXP helps to publicize R&D efforts, contributes to build 
reputation, and allows demonstrating technological leadership. When asked about why 
not pursuing the same kind of project on their own (i.e. without entering the GLXP,) two 
engineers explain that thanks to the prize their project ―get a lot more publicity” and “a 
lot more people know about it so you can talk about it.” (T16, 2010) A team leader who 
entered early in the competition illustrates the opportunity to demonstrate leadership with 
the following words: “When you lead a team, the world expects you to win” and 
―…teams that are slow respond later. So, that when Google announces the prize, or the 
foundation announces a prize, they think it is a story about themselves and the prize. But 
if you are quick, it is a world story about your team.‖ (T4, 2010) 
 The GLXP project also helps in accomplishing other goals of the teams and their 
members and focuses their efforts. Engineers explain that the GLXP “…gives you 
something to compete against; so, it makes you work faster‖ and ―sets a time line‖ (T16, 
2010) and “we are constantly stimulated by competition, which leads us to push our 
limits.” (T13, 2010) This suggests that there are teams that use the GLXP challenge as a 
point of reference for other organizational goals and not as a goal in itself. Other 
motivations include the opportunity to gather resources to pursue other projects, the 
opportunity to gather resources to pursue this project thanks to the sponsorship 
value/credibility created by Google, and the opportunity to demonstrate a technological 
concept. The three most important motivations are still the opportunity to participate in a 
challenging project, the opportunity to compete, and intrinsic motivations related to the 
personal traits of the team members. Prize money is considered not important at all by 
most of the team members. 
 The second fact highlighted by interviews is that, at the individual-level, 
motivations of team members vary significantly within each team, i.e. while the main 
goals of the team seem to be shared by all members, certain members emphasize other 
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motivations to participate in the prize. Most notably, the author perceived such 
differences in the perception of the relevance of the cash purse and the pursuit of 
commercial opportunities. A team leader refers to these differences with these words:  
“...everyone got a different motivation [...] for some people there is a 
motivation like to say I just want to do this specific part [...] we have 
people that just want to build the rover or a certain part of the rover [...] 
we have people who say “I want to put this rover on the moon” [...] So, 
yes we have people who believe in the entire mission and we have people 
who believe in their single part of the mission.” (T11, 2010) 
 The competition also offers the opportunity to gain hands-on experience not only 
for students but for engineers in general. A team member with industry experience 
explain that participation in this prize allows students to ―work on something, which is 
really close to the edge of what is possible‖ and, to all team members, to work in ―an 
exciting environment‖ and ―work in complete things‖ and not only in components or 
subsystems for a larger mission project. Moreover, a team mate continues, when working 
for a space agency ―…you’re put in a box. You’re a structure specialist, which was my 
role, you’re thermal or electronics, whatever it is, and that was a bit frustrating because 
people want to be a bit more general.‖ (T20, 2010) 
 The team member-level of analysis has to be expanded in further research to 
uncover other factors that explain prize participation. Intrinsic motivation appears to be a 
very important factor. Teams engage people that are very proactive, hard working, and 
are very attracted to challenging projects. For example, an engineer defines himself using 
these words: ―I’m not a 9 to 5 person. I’m a 9 to 2 AM person.‖ (T16, 2010) Another 
engineer with space agency experience explains that space agencies do not have clearly 
defined competitors and therefore there are no real measures of success. He continues: 
―But, a competition with a clearly defined objective, which is achievable, but difficult, I 
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think, is a perfect measure of success and a measure of one’s ability.‖ (T20, 2010) 
Interviews also allowed grasping the richness of the team members‘ personal stories 
which shows how different their perceptions about prize participation may be compared 
to family, friends, or other individuals. For example, a young engineer explained that part 
of his family did not believe that the prize was worth the effort and that felt like he was 
questioned with “Eh, you’re still doing that?” (T11, 2010) However—he continues—the 
quality and seriousness of his team‘s presentation at an international aerospace exhibition 
ultimately convinced his family about the value of the pursuit. 
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Table 6.12: Motivations of GLXP teams 
Motivations related to prize incentives 
(options given in questionnaires) 
Data sources, 
 assessment of 
importance 
Selected statements 











Knowledge and skills acquired from 
practice and competition    
“…for me it was mostly learning everything.” 
Recognition from family, friends, or 
colleagues    
 
Participation in a real technical and 
intellectual challenge    
“…like doing something that is really difficult to do.” 
Business, professional, or personal 
reputation    
“…want to be recognized as a competitor, that’s already very 
valuable to me.” 
Recognition from NASA or other gov. 
agencies for potential future contracts    
 
Cash purse 
   
“…we are not driven by the prize” 
Table continues in next page. 
References: 
 








Note: a. assessment of motivations indicated in pre-defined options in questionnaire (N=17); b. assessment of additional motivations indicated by respondents in 
questionnaire (N=6); c. assessment of motivations mentioned in interviews (N=7); when needed, the examples omit part of the text to maintain the anonymity of 
teams. 





Table 6.12: Motivations of GLXP teams (Contd.) 
Motivations related to prize incentives 
(added by entrants in questionnaires or 
interviews) 
Data sources, 
 assessment of 
importance 
Selected statements 











Opportunity to gather resources to pursue 
other projects    
"Help raising money from non space related companies for space 
projects" 
Opportunity to gather resources to pursue 
this project    
“...only in the competition we can do this. If we do this in our spare 
time without the competition, for the companies has no value or it 
doesn’t make sense for to spend money or energy or components.” 
Demonstrate technological concept 
   
“…looked at the Google Lunar X Prize as a perfect way to 
demonstrate the […] concept” 
Opportunity to engage in aerospace 
development, hands-on experience    
“…wanted to be a part of something real and be able to make 
something different.” 
Opportunity to demonstrate technological 
leadership    
“we are the only team that is with the experience of winning a prize.” 
Opportunity to participate as an additional 
incentive to accomplish organizational goals    
“[The GLXP] fits with our own goals.” 
Networking 
   
“The benefits that I have is that I’m getting in contact with a lot of 
interesting people.” 
Competition 
   
“We are constantly stimulated by competition, which leads us to push 
our limits.” 
Table continues in next page. 
References: 
 








Note: a. assessment of motivations indicated in pre-defined options in questionnaire (N=17); b. assessment of additional motivations indicated by respondents in 
questionnaire (N=6); c. assessment of motivations mentioned in interviews (N=7); when needed, the examples omit part of the text to maintain the anonymity of 
teams. 




Table 6.12: Motivations of GLXP teams (Contd.) 
Motivations 
(shaded cells indicate options given in 
questionnaires) 
Data sources, 
 assessment of 
importance 
Selected statements 











Related to technology incentives 
Commercialization of technologies 
developed for the prize    
“We have great hopes though that we could grow customers on the 
commercial side…” 
Development of technologies for other 
activities of the team or its members    
 
Related to other incentives 
Benefits that technology development may 
bring for society    
"Help spreading/raising interest within youth in science & 
technology" 
Religious 
   
"Opportunity to Showcase and Testify to the Lord Jesus Christ's 
Blessings, Provision and Assistance for His Followers who are 
involved in Innovative Technology!" 
Entertainment 
   
"To have fun as a team" 
Intrinsic motivation 
   
“the team itself is a really proactive people. [...] …people that are 













Note: a. assessment of motivations indicated in pre-defined options in questionnaire (N=17); b. assessment of additional motivations indicated by respondents in 
questionnaire (N=6); c. assessment of motivations mentioned in interviews (N=7); when needed, the examples omit part of the text to maintain the anonymity of 
teams. 




 The analysis of motivations by type of team and entry period shows that different 
types of prize entrants/cohorts have different motivations and that would-be entrants‘ 
perceptions of the benefits of participation might vary over time (Figure 6.5). The latter 
seems reasonable—in principle—considering the evolution of the economic context of 
the competition. The GLXP was announced in September 2007 when the economic 
context was generally still favorable or neutral for industry. About a year later, the 
rumors of an important economic slowdown become more widely spread and markets 
plummeted (the Dow Jones index went down about 25 percent in the week after 
September 22, 2008.) According to the official entry date, seven teams of those that 
participated in this study entered the GLXP in that first year of competition (three 
unconventional, four conventional,) and 10 teams entered after that (six unconventional, 
four conventional.) Considering all the teams that have ever officially participated in the 
GLXP, 14 teams entered during the first year, eight teams during the second year, three 
teams during the third year, and 10 teams entered after three years and before the 
registration period closed. 
 Unconventional teams are generally driven by PIs, i.e. those created by the 
announcement of the competition, and TIs in some cases (Figure 6.5a). Other motivations 
are also important for early entries. The benefits that this type of project may bring to 
society are the most important motivation for the unconventional teams that entered 
during the first year of competition, followed by learning and commercialization of prize 




 year of competition have 
emphasized the importance of participation in a real technical challenge, learning, and 
benefits to society as well, yet to lesser extent in this case. Developing technologies for 
other purposes is the next most important motivation (more important than 
commercialization of technologies.) The importance of the cash purse is notably lower 
for unconventional teams that entered more recently. Conventional teams are primarily 
driven by PIs, particularly by the opportunity to get recognition from NASA and other 
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space agencies (Figure 6.5b). The potential value of the prize technologies is a strong 





 year of competition have similar motivations, yet they consider the development of 
technologies for other purposes and the participation in a real technical challenge more 
important. Benefits that technology development brings to society are also important for 
conventional entrants. Not surprisingly, learning is not a motivation for them (by 
definition, this group has space agency/industry experience.) The decreasing importance 
of the cash purse in all cases may indicate the perception of fewer chances to win the 
prize as the number of competitors increase, or the higher relative importance of other 
incentives such as those linked to the commercialization of prize technologies. 
 
  
Note: N=17 cases; radar charts show importance given to each type of incentive, by type of team and prize 
period; lines in red indicate technology incentives and lines in blue indicate other incentives; number of 




 years=10 (6 
unconventional, 4 conventional.) 
Source: questionnaire applied to GLXP teams. 
 
Figure 6.5: Motivations of GLXP teams, by type of entrant and period of entry to the prize. 
 
 Teams, however, may not change their motivations and goals during the 
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haven’t changed. My expectation of what’s possible didn’t change a lot, but I learned a 
few things along the way” (T20, 2010) and “Maybe not changed, but I think we learn as 
we go.” (T11, 2010) 
 The analysis of the context of the GLXP has exposed the potential sizable market 
value of the technologies involved in this competition. Recent contracts with agencies 
downgrade the value of the cash purse. For example, the NASA‘s Innovative Lunar 
Demonstrations and Data (ILDD) program already awarded six GLXP teams with up to 
$30 million in contracts for the next few years. NASA also awarded $500,000 to Team 
Astrobotic for hardware demonstration. Commercialization of services has even higher 
price tags. Astrobotic‘s customers would pay about $2 million per kg. of payload sent to 
the Moon. Teams perceive that value and seek the recognition from space agencies for 
potential contracts, commercialization of the prize technologies, or implementation of the 
technologies for other space projects (including the provision of services.) In interviews, 
teams explained how important are these technology incentives compared to the cash 
purse and assessed the prospects for potential commercialization. In words of a team 
leader, ―…the point is if one of the teams land on the Moon, it will get much more that the 
$20,000,000. […] If you have really a working technology, a reproducible working 
technology, those $20,000,000 are not the point anymore.‖ (T6, 2010) However, with 
venture capital investors expecting returns on investment of 40-50 percent for space 
ventures and private equity expecting 30 percent or more, a business case based on 
revenues from government customers may not be sustainable. A team leader explains: 
―Government space agencies…they don’t let you take away huge profits in 
general. You’re typically limited to a certain percentage of your contract 
value, which is your profit, 5% or 8%, and of course, if you’re clever, you 
can stretch that out a little bit by saving costs on your projects. But you’re 
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not going to have that sort of exponential growth that you have, you know, 
venture capital investment.‖ (T20, 2010) 
 The payback period is as important as the return on investment in this type of 
projects. Some team leaders consider that the realization of sustainable profits may be 
only possible in the distant future. In words of GLXP team leaders: 
“…this is all kind of an initial phase to something maybe 20 years down 
the road…” (T16, 2010) 
“In the distant future, maybe 10, 20, 30 [years], there will be private 
customers paying to send payloads to moon. But in the foreseeable future, 
which is sort of the timescale where you need to a see a financial return 
on an investment, it’s really government who will be your customers.” 
(T20, 2010) 
 The scenarios that are considered by teams (as suggested by these and other team 
leaders) can be summarized as follows. In the short- and medium-terms (3-10 years,) 
governments are the space market. U.S. teams will have NASA as the single biggest 
customer. The first Moon mining missions are likely to occur in this period and 
commercial demand is likely to grow as well. In the long-term (10-20 years,) private 
customers will pay to send payloads to the Moon and there will be deployment of robotic 
units to land on other surfaces beyond the Moon, such as Mars and asteroids (―is going to 
be a hot topic‖) (T16, 2010). In the distant future (20+ years,) the first Moon outpost will 
be a reality and lunar/planetary excavation technologies will be on demand. 
 It should be noted that the GLXP also offers a monetary reward that is not linked 
to the accomplishment of the lunar mission. The Diversity Award for $1 million is for to 
team that, in the opinion of a panel of experts, makes the greatest attempts to promote 
diversity in the fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. Although 
156 
 
this amount of money is considerably lower than the grand prize, it may be still a 
significant reward for some teams that are already engaged in the promotion of diversity. 
For example, Team JURBAN (from Baltimore, Maryland) is a non-profit team focused 
on motivating underrepresented students to enter fields of study in science, technology, 
engineering, and math (STEM) as it applies to space entrepreneurship. This and a few 
other similar teams may have entered the competition considering that specific award for 
diversity. 
 The perception of risks from participation is another important aspect related to 
the motivations to enter the prize. In general, there are more GLXP teams that indicate no 
concern with potential risks than those that do indicate so (Appendix Figure B.3 shows 
responses for all teams.) For example, most of the teams do not worry at all about 
investing time and resources but losing the competition anyway, or embarking on a 
technological approach that is not the most adequate for the competition. Moreover, 
whether the sponsor ultimately pays the cash purse if they achieve the prize challenge is 
not a concern for most of the teams. The two most significant risks perceived by the 
teams is assuming excessive financial risk and compromising other activities of the team 
members. Embarking on a technological approach that is not the most adequate for the 
competition, and investing time and resources yet losing the competition are significant 
concerns for only a few teams. Not being paid by the prize sponsor in spite of being the 
first to achieve the prize target is a great concern for one team only. 
 These data suggest that unconventional teams are less risk averse than other teams 
(Table 6.13). Unconventional teams generally report that those risks of participation are 
not a concern for them. With regard to the financial risks, a risk perceived by most of the 
entrants, unconventional teams are also less concerned than the rest of the teams. On the 
other hand, some conventional teams are particularly concerned with compromising other 
activities of the team members or invest time and resources and lose the competition 
despite those efforts. 
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 In interviews, team members pointed out that there are no significant risks 
resulting from being involved in the competition. Only one of the team leaders mentioned 
a concern with deviating efforts from more important, non-prize goals that the team has 
(T13, 2010). Four interviewees mentioned possible technical risks in testing or launching 
phases, but promptly clarified that those risks also apply for technology development in a 
non-prize environment. In this regard, two team leaders explained that their teams apply 
risk management procedures, and one of them described those procedures as "pretty 
similar to the one that NASA has." (T16, 2010; T20, 2010) Three team leaders also 
explained that there may be some financial, business, or legal risks resulting from 
sponsorships or partnerships, and that those risks affect them to different extent 
depending on their organization (T11, 2010; T16, 2010; T20, 2010). For example, that 
risk would be mostly with the partners for a team that expects to develop partnerships to 
commercialize prize technologies (T20, 2010). For teams that use partners to source 
technologies in exchange for IP rights, percentage of revenues or other benefits, such 
relationships imply either a risk that has to be mitigated by reducing the team's 
commitments or an opportunity to actually decrease the risks by pursuing a much more 
collaborative effort (T4, 2010; T11, 2010). A team leader explains that “…partners are 
very important. Every partner that you can get that has that subject area expertise is 
crucial to reduce your risk and to get you flying in a shorter period of time.” (T4, 2010) 
Two team leaders emphasized that, personally, “…there is not much you can lose, except 
your time” (T20, 2010) (these teams are in early and very early stages of project 





Table 6.13: Risks perceived from participation in the GLXP, by type of entrant 
Potential risks of participation 
Percentage of teams with each level of concern 
with potential risks 
Unconventional teams Conventional teams 
A lot A little None A lot A little None 
Assume excessive financial risk 22% 33% 44% 43% 57% 0% 
Not being paid by the prize sponsor in 
spite of first achieving the prize target 
0% 33% 67% 14% 43% 43% 
Embark on a technological approach 
that is not the most adequate for the 
competition 
11% 22% 67% 14% 29% 57% 
Compromise other personal or 
professional activities of the team 
members 
0% 22% 78% 43% 57% 0% 
Invest time and resources but lose the 
competition anyway 
0% 22% 78% 29% 29% 43% 
Note: N=16 cases. 
Source: questionnaire applied to GLXP teams. 
 
 Technical risks are not trivial in space projects. A mission with a catastrophic loss 
has no revenue and therefore it would imply a very significant economic loss for a GLXP 
team that has reached the point of a launch. Risks include those of any research and 
development activity and the programmatic risks. Research and development risks are 
inherent to any R&D process and are related with the cost, schedule, and technical 
performance of the technology. The advancement of technologies with different level of 
maturity is linked to different levels of risk as well.  TRLs 1-2 represent situations of 
relatively high risk, TRLs 3-5 represent moderate risks, and TRLs of 6-9 represent lower 
risks. The programmatic or mission risks are with the uncertainty about whether the 
mission using that technology will actually fly, which can be considered in this case the 
―market risk‖ of space technologies (Shishko et al., 2004). The programmatic risk has 
been also related with technology development with below-average lead times. 
Historically, mission development times for planetary missions of less than 36 months 
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are correlated with a significantly increased chance of failure (Bearden, 2003; Bitten et 
al., 2006). 
 The opposite side of motivations to enter the prize is the reasons to withdraw the 
competition. In general, difficulties to raise funding, find new members, or obtain other 
in-kind support might explain the inactivity and drop outs in GLXP teams, as discussed 
in the following sections. However, there have been other special circumstances as well. 
Team Micro-space‘s leader, Mr. Richard Speck, has recently passed away and his team 
withdrew the competition (he kindly collaborated with this research before that.) Two 
other teams were involved in legal issues that forced them to withdraw (those issues were 
at the team- and personal-levels, not related with the competition.) Another team 
withdrew due to reasons related with the use of the results of the competition (as 
discussed later.) The causes of other two drop outs are unknown to this research. 
 
6.5 Prize R&D activities 
6.5.1 Design criteria and sources 
 A key aspect that defines the R&D activities of prize entrants is the design criteria 
they use for their projects and the sources of inspiration for such designs. The three top 
design criteria used by GLXP teams are technical simplicity, project cost, and market 
value of the technologies, as indicated by seven teams (44 percent,) six teams (38 
percent,) and three teams (19 percent,) respectively (Appendix Figure B.4 shows 
questionnaire data only.) All teams consider project costs within the top-three criteria and 
12 teams (75 percent) consider technical simplicity within the top-3 criteria. Seven teams 
(44 percent) ranked novelty and market value within the top-3 criteria. The lowest ranked 
design criteria are environmental impact and standardization (i.e. seek compliance with 
industry standards.) There are no significant differences between types of teams (Table 
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6.14). Unconventional teams are more likely to consider technical simplicity as the top 
design criterion. Conventional teams are more likely to consider project cost as the main 





most important design criteria. 
 In interviews, team leaders suggested additional design criteria and insights on 
criteria that may be prize context-specific and/or represent innovative approaches to 
aerospace design.
19
 The three criteria that were mentioned the most are reusability, or the 
design of systems that can be used for multiple missions; optimization, or the balance of 
efficiency and performance of the system with the accomplishment of the prize goal; and 
performance, or the design of systems that meet the mission‘s requirements and minimize 
failure and maintenance (Table 6.15). Other criteria were mentioned fewer times, yet 
resemble those attributes that characterize new non-government space developments. For 
example, there are ―simple and smart‖ design and ―minimalism.‖ There is also 
―scalability,‖ a design criteria used in telecommunications and software design. Some of 
these design criteria are exclusive of unconventional teams. These include performance, 
minimalism, robustness, and scalability. Finally, exclusive of the prize competitive 
environment, there is the ―minimum technology development effort.‖ 
 The words of a GLXP team leader are very insightful about what the key 
differences between prize R&D and traditional industry practices are: 
“Government missions can be a bit more expensive because you’ve got 
other reasons for spending that money. […] We can’t play that game for 
minimum cost solutions, and that impacts all aspects of the mission 
architecture. Also, we have a race so we have to have minimum 
                                                          
19
 The interviewees mentioned several design criteria in addition to those pre-defined in questionnaires and 
emphasized their importance for their GLXP projects. Sometimes, interviewees referred to the same 
concepts using different statements and the researcher grouped them. There may also be some criteria that 




development time. So these two points together mean that we want to have 
absolute minimum technology development effort. We don’t want to do 
fancy things; we want to do simple things in a smart way.” (T20, 2010) 
 Another team leader explains the importance of accomplishment over other 
design criteria: 
―Almost is good enough. Never listen to ideals, optimality, or solutions 





Table 6.14: Design criteria used by GLXP teams, by type of entrant 
Design criteria 
Percentage and type of teams that rank criterion as…. 



















Technical simplicity 67% 22% 11% 14% 43% 43% 44% 31% 25% 
Project cost 33% 67% 0% 38% 57% 0% 38% 63% 0% 
Market value 22% 11% 67% 14% 43% 43% 19% 25% 56% 
Novelty 11% 22% 67% 14% 43% 43% 13% 31% 56% 
Reliability 11% 33% 56% 14% 14% 71% 13% 25% 63% 
Environ. impact 11% 22% 67% 0% 0% 100% 6% 13% 81% 
Standardization 11% 0% 89% 0% 0% 100% 6% 0% 94% 
Note: N=16 cases. 
Source: questionnaire applied to GLXP teams. 
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Type of team 




Reusability Design useful for multiple missions Both 
Optimization 









―do less engineering and buy cheaper 
components‖ (T4, 2010) 
Both 
Simple and smart 
Creative, simple solutions that work efficiently; 




Minimum capabilities required to accomplish 
mission 
Unconv. 
Robustness System that resists many mission days Unconv. 
Scalability 
“…going to be useful in the future when we 
want to pursue larger missions” (T16, 2010) 
Unconv. 
Note: the table shows additional design criteria mentioned in interviews yet not offered as options in 
questionnaire; a. statements used by the interviewees or interpretations of the researcher; b. either 
conventional or unconventional or both.. 
Source: interviews to GLXP team members. 
 
 The GLXP‘s designs are mainly based off the team members‘ knowledge, 
available commercial products, and past projects of the team members (Table 6.16; 
Appendix Figure B.5 shows percentages.) Nine teams (56 percent) consider team 
members‘ knowledge very important and five teams (31 percent) consider it important. 
The second source of design inspiration is available commercial products. Five teams (31 
percent) consider that source very important and nine teams (56 percent) consider it 
important. Projects that the teams pursued before joining the competition are similarly 
important. Teams also draw upon ideas found in non-aerospace projects, yet it was not 
possible to identify what types of projects they are. Four teams (25 percent) consider 
those projects very important design sources. In general, the designs of other GLXP 
teams and designs of teams participating in other prizes are considered the least important 
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among the set of sources of design inspiration offered in questionnaires. Eleven teams (69 
percent) indicated that those sources are not important at all. 
 
Table 6.16: Most important design sources of GLXP teams, by type of entrant 
Sources of inspiration 
Percentage of teams that consider each design 
source as very important/important 
Unconventional Conventional All teams 
Theoretical knowledge that team 
members already had 
78% 100% 88% 
Available commercial products 78% 100% 88% 
Projects the team had before the 
GLXP 
44% 86% 63% 
Projects of NASA or other space 
agencies 
56% 29% 44% 
Designs found in non-aerospace 
projects 
44% 29% 38% 
Designs of teams participating in 
other prizes 
33% 14% 25% 
Designs of other GLXP teams 11% 0% 6% 
Note: N=16 cases. 
Source: questionnaire applied to GLXP teams. 
 
 Unconventional teams have slightly different sources of inspiration compared to 
other teams. In particular, unconventional teams find more inspiration in projects that 
space agencies have developed and designs found in non-aerospace projects. Their 
designs are also less based off previous projects of the team, which is related with the fact 
that most of these teams are newly created to enter the competition and, by definition, do 
not have industry experience. These teams may be also learning from other GLXP teams 
and teams that participated in other projects. Nonetheless, as the literature suggests, 
unconventional teams also bring new approaches to space development. A GLXP team 
leader refers to this explicitly: “…the fact that our team isn’t normally working on the 
subject and maybe we have somewhat like an outsider’s perspective to this. So, we are 
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looking at things differently like people who are doing this in an all day job.” (T11, 
2010) 
 Three alternative design sources not included in questionnaires were mentioned in 
interviews: external expert advice, partnership networks, and online documentation. The 
use of external experts was mentioned by four teams out of seven that responded 
interview questions. Those external experts are either networks that the team members 
had developed in past projects or new contacts that the team develops to work on this 
specific project. Access to multi-disciplinary advice is also available to teams that partner 
with universities (T4, 2010). The use of partnership networks as knowledge sources for 
design was mentioned by only one team that also uses strategically the same network to 
source technologies for its project (T11, 2010). The third source, documentation 
published online, was mentioned by another team and refers to work produced by other 
organizations that is freely available on the internet, including work by rocketry clubs, 
declassified aerospace agency's documentation, and software tools provided by 
manufacturers, among others (T20, 2010). The interviews also revealed that some 
technologies developed for the NGLLC may be useful for the GLXP as well. In this 
regard, one team mentioned contacts with Armadillo Aerospace and Masten Space 
Systems (the winners of the NGLLC) (T16, 2010) and another (foreign) team mentioned 
unsuccessful intents to establish those contacts (T20, 2010). 
6.5.2 Own development vs. use of existing technologies 
 To better understand the nature of the R&D activities performed by entrants to 
achieve the prize challenge, the GLXP teams were asked about the reasons to use existing 
technologies rather than developing new ones. In questionnaires, the respondents had to 
rank four pre-defined reasons for using existing technologies according to their 
importance. The teams indicated that the most important reason to use existing 
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technologies is reducing project costs, as indicated by nine teams (56 percent) (Figure 
6.6). Other six teams (38 percent) indicated that increasing technology reliability is the 
most important reason for using existing technologies. Only two teams indicated that 
speeding up technology development is the top reason, yet other eight teams (50 percent) 
ranked this reason as the second most important. Five teams indicated that both lowering 
costs and speed up development are the two most important reasons for using existing 
technologies. In some cases, according to interviewees, teams are obligated by agreement 




Note: N=16 cases; the percentages indicate the proportion of teams that ranked each reason according to its 
importance. 
Source: questionnaire applied to GLXP teams. 
 
Figure 6.6: Reasons to use existing technologies in the GLXP 
 
 In interviews, team leaders and other members contributed additional insights not 
only about the reasons to use existing technologies but also about the reasons to develop 
their own subsystems (Table 6.17). The lack of knowledge or expertise is the only reason 
that forces teams to rely upon existing technologies. In all other cases, teams choose 
existing technologies as a strategy to achieve the prize challenge. There are a few cases of 
teams that adopt a collaborative effort approach in which partners provide technologies 
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components) or built after teams order them from a catalogue (e.g. solid rocket motors.) 
There is also at least one team using surplus parts from NASA‘s space programs. 
Existing technologies reduce project costs and time, reduce development effort, and 
increase reliability. However, testing and adaptation efforts are required to be able to use 
existing components and parts. For example, Team Astrobotic has screened components 
in a cryogenic freezer to determine which bounce back from the extreme deep freeze—
simulating the extreme lunar temperatures—and identified batteries, solid state drives, 
and processors that resume operation when the temperature warms back up to roughly 
minus 80 degrees Fahrenheit (Astrobotic Technology, 2010). 
 Some teams seek to develop their own technologies when they have other 
organizational goals. For example, a team that is very interested in gaining hands-on 
experience seeks to develop own technologies whenever is possible. An engineer 
explains: “We’re trying to find a happy medium where we’re developing as much 
technology as we can to get to the moon, but at the same time, we want to try to be able 
to compete in the timeframe that we are given.” (T16, 2010) Some teams also choose to 





Table 6.17: Further reasons to use existing technologies or develop new ones in the GLXP 
Seek to use existing technologies Seek to develop own technologies 
Reasons related with strategies to 
achieve the prize goal 
Reasons related with the characteristics 
of the teams 
Reasons related with strategies to 
accomplish other goals 
 Reduce costs and speed up project: use 
of COTS compatible components (even 
non-space components) that are “pretty 
expensive but they are still cheaper and 
less time consuming” (T16, 2010); use of 
surplus parts of government programs 
(T4, 2010) 
 Reduce development effort: partners 
and ―friend companies‖ collaborate (T4, 
2010) 
 Increase reliability/reduce risks: use of 
proven solutions (T4, 2010; T16, 2010; 
T20, 2010) 
 Collaborative effort strategy: 
integrating technologies from 3rd parties 
is a strategy implicit in the organizational 
structure, using more extensive 
partnership networks (T11, 2010) 
 Lack of knowledge/expertise: delegate 
development to individuals, 
organizations with expertise. “Every 
partner that you can get that has that 
subject area expertise is crucial…” (T4, 
2010) 
 Facilitate commercialization: develop 
subsystems that may eventually be 
commercialized (T20, 2010) 
 Own use: develop systems that are 
useful for other projects of the team 
(T13, 2010) 
 Other team goals: for example, get 
hands-on experience (T16, 2010) 
Note: the reasons shown were provided by different teams. 
Source: questionnaires to GLXP teams and interview with GLXP team leaders and members. 
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 Teams use significant proportions of COTS technologies and also delegate 
significant development effort to contractors. All teams plan to use some COTS 
components and parts and all but one team plan to subcontract part of their projects. Most 
of the teams estimate that their systems will be between 20 and 50 percent subcontracted 
to others (seven teams or 47 percent) and/or COTS (nine teams or 60 percent) (Table 
6.18). Two teams indicated that more than 50 percent of their systems will be 
subcontracted. Three teams indicated that more than 50 percent of their systems will be 
COTS. There are also a number of teams making a more significant development effort 
and using less than 20 percent of third-party technologies. Five teams (33 percent) 
indicated that less than 20 percent of their systems will be subcontracted and three teams 
(20 percent) that less than 20 percent of their systems will be COTS. The data suggest 
that unconventional teams might be less likely to subcontract their development efforts to 
third-parties. Two teams with vast industry/agency experience entered the GLXP with 
intentions to subcontract most of their projects to either a set of partner companies or a 
single company (T14, 2010; T20, 2010). Other three unconventional teams are pursuing 
own development efforts, yet they seek to reduce that engineering effort when 
parts/components are available COTS, from partners, or ―friend companies.‖ (T4, 2010; 
T11, 2010; T13, 2010) In some instances, partners provide cutting edge technologies that 
teams would not have access to if they were not engaged in this project. For example, the 
German carbon-fiber manufacturer Crosslink-Fibertech provides Formula One-grade 
technologies to Team Part Time Scientists in exchange for cooperation to open new 




Table 6.18: GLXP teams that use subcontracting and COTS technologies, by type of entrant 
Type of 
team 
Number of teams that 
subcontract each percentage of 
GLXP project 
Number of teams that use each 
percentage of COTS technologies 



























2 3 2 
 
1 5 1 
 
Total 2 7 5 1 3 9 3 - 
Note: N=15 cases (8 unconventional teams, 7 conventional teams); cells show number of teams for each 
range of subcontracting. 
Source: questionnaire applied to GLXP teams. 
 
6.5.3 Organization of R&D activities 
 The GLXP projects span across the teams‘ organizational boundaries as they 
involve multiple actors and relationships. Teams partner with multiple other 
organizations to source technologies, seek support and advice, and gather other types of 
resources needed to pursue their projects. There are clear reasons and advantages into 
that. GLXP teams are relatively small to pursue this type of space project and most of 
them (particularly unconventional teams) are new organizations. Some teams have 
members with no aerospace background/experience and, therefore, need to source know-
how, facilities, and equipment they originally do not have access to. Certainly, having 
that access is an advantage.  For example, teams with university partners access to 
multidisciplinary advice from different departments and may recruit engineering students 
as volunteers. Teams with corporate partners may access to specialized expert advice 
with hands-on experience in aerospace systems development. 
 Table 6.19 shows the number and type of partners that the researcher was able to 
identify by examining GLXP team websites and press releases. Conventional teams have 
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partnered with more organizations than unconventional teams, though these data 
underestimate the real number of partners because—as team leaders explained—some 
partnerships are not publicly announced. Moreover, the researcher noticed 
inconsistencies in the number of partners reported by alternative data sources that cannot 
be attributed to normal variations related with team growth. Most of the GLXP teams‘ 
partners are private companies. At least 15 teams have small or large corporate partners. 
Unconventional and conventional teams are similarly linked to both large companies and 
SMEs, yet the median number of corporate partners is larger for conventional (median=4) 
than for unconventional teams (median=2.) Companies become partners of teams (e.g. 
Sierra Nevada Corporation, partner of the U.S. team Next Giant Leap) or, in a few cases, 
team up with other organizations to form new teams (e.g. Dynetics, a privately held U.S. 
company with defense technologies expertise that is new to the space business, teamed up 
with Teledyne and Andrews Space to form the team Rocket City Space Pioneers.) 
 
Table 6.19: Number and type of partners of GLXP teams, by type of entrant 
Type of team 
Type of partner 






5 22 5 3 35 
Conventional 
teams 
5 21 13 10 49 
All teams 10 43 18 12 83 
Note: data as of January 2011, including 26 GLXP teams; based on teams that report at least one partner 
(i.e. seven unconventional teams; 8 conventional teams.) 
Source: GLXP team websites and press releases. 
 
 Teams also partner with universities and NGOs. Twelve teams engaged 18 
different university partners and 12 different NGOs. Conventional teams have been more 
likely to partner with universities and NGOs. Notably, the Charles Stark Draper 
Laboratory (a U.S. non-profit R&D lab) is partner with both Next Giant Leap and Rocket 
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City Space Pioneers. Finally, there is at least one instance of collaboration with 
government agencies as well. That is the case of Team Odyssey Moon, which signed a 
Reimbursable Space Act Agreement with the NASA Ames Research Center by which 
NASA provides technical data and engineering support to the team to develop a lunar 
lander and the team reimburses the costs and shares the data from tests and actual lunar 
missions (all GLXP teams can, under a Space Act Agreement, access NASA‘s 
engineering and technical expertise, subject to ITAR regulations.) (MacDonald & 
Marshall, 2008) 
 Interestingly, teams gain credibility to engage partners thanks to the brand image 
of Google, the competition‘s sponsor. The words of a team leader illustrate this: ―You 
could be a scientist in this specialized area, but they won’t take you serious without 
having someone like Google sponsoring the money.‖ (T11, 2010) Moreover, well 
connected team members are more likely to engage partners. A team leader of a well 
connected team explains: ―If you were a team and you had no connections and no one 
was helping you, it would be very hard to get things done.‖ (T4, 2010) The rest of the 
teams may face a more difficult situation, particularly when they begin their projects. For 
example, another team leader explains that during the first months of prize participation 
was difficult to get the attention of partners and available partnership opportunities did 
not allow the team to impose any condition (T20, 2010). In this initial stage, teams have 
less negotiation power and need appropriate skills to persuade partners. In the case of that 
team, after increasing visibility offered by the competition (―after the team built its 
brand‖) it was other organizations that sought to attract the team to partner and then the 
team was able to choose the best candidates and impose certain working conditions. This 
is not only the result of increasing visibility or performance of the team. The GLXP 
offers the opportunity to participate in a complex project from the engineering viewpoint 
and may help to build heritage for subsystems and components, which is very important 
in space industry and other industries that produce systems and components for extreme 
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environments. In these partnerships, partners offer technologies, expertise, access to 
facilities, and other in-kind resources. Teams offer IP rights exchanges, publicity, 
exposure to potential customers, and sometimes a share of the potential cash purse or 
revenues from commercialization. Partners also require to be informed about the 
activities of the team and know not just its ―public story.‖ 
 Teams not only maintain R&D relationships with partners but also seek sponsors 
for their projects. These sponsors typically contribute monetary or in-kind resources in 
exchange for publicity. A GLXP team member explains that “the competition has a 
special marketing value and then we can talk with the companies and say it’s a good 
thing for you to advertise, if you help us or if you give us a discount or if you give us 
access to your technology. Often, they don’t spend money, but they give access to 
technology, sometimes components. So, we don’t have to pay for this.” (T11, 2010) 
Promotional actions for sponsors include, for example, sponsor‘s logos on prototypes or 
actual spacecrafts, acknowledgements/credits in conference presentations or websites, or 
even allowing the sponsor to name the team. The latter is the case of White Label Space, 
a team that expects to change its name to a sponsor‘s in the future. 
 The GLXP teams adopt different internal structures and organization of R&D. In 
questionnaires, teams were asked about the organization of their R&D work in terms of 
groups and locations. Four options were given to respondents to select the one that best 
describes the internal configuration of the team. None of the four internal configurations 
suggested in questionnaires predominates. Seven teams (44 percent) indicated that they 
organize their activities as different work groups that work on the project from different 
locations; five teams (31 percent) indicated that their members work remotely and only 
meet for some tasks; two teams (19 percent) have different work groups and regularly 
meet in the same location to work on the project; and, only one team is configured as 
only one workgroup that regularly meets in same location. The division of tasks among 
subgroups in different sites (sometimes even internationally) is a common characteristic 
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of the GLXP teams. For example, there are groups focused on the development of the 
lunar lander and groups focused on the development of the rover or camera subsystems. 
 At least four types of exemplar team organizations are identified based on 
available data and attributes such as type of entity, goals, volunteer effort, partnerships, 
internal organization, and other R&D characteristics (Table 6.20). Three out of these four 
examples are unconventional teams. Also three of them were created to enter the GLXP. 
A non-aerospace experience is by definition their main attribute. These four examples 
include the Space Agency Legacy team, with strong space agency/industry experience; 
the University Partnerships team, led by aerospace students; the Partnerships Network, 
with multidisciplinary background and predominance of computer science/IT; and the 
University Spin-off with strong academic multi-disciplinary background and 
entrepreneurial experience. The Space Agency Legacy team has a main corporate partner 
and draws upon an extended network of space agency/industry contacts; the Universities 
Partnership team is a partnership of two universities and a newly-formed foundation that 
collaborate for the GLXP project; the Partnerships Network team emerged as an 
independent team that have built university and corporate partnership networks; and the 




Table 6.20: Organization of R&D activities of GLXP teams (identified examples) 
Characteristic 
Type of team organization 
Space Agency Legacy Universities Partnership Partnerships Network University Spin-off 
Type of entity / 
type of team 
Non-profit / Conventional team Non-profit / Unconventional 
team 
For-profit /  Unconventional 
team 
For-profit / Unconventional 
team 
Goals Professional reputation, 
publicity 
Learning, other organizational 
goals 
Pursue a challenging project 
Demonstrate tech. leadership 
and commercialization of tech. 
Size core 
team/volunteers 
2 / 15 ~5 / ~25 (est.) 40 / 10 20 / 8 
Background 
/ experience 
Strong agency and corporate 
aerospace experience 








Corporate main partner; network 
of space agency/industry 
contacts 
Foundation and university 
partners; university 
collaborations 
University collaborations and 
network of corporate 
partnerships 
University-based, commercial 
orientation; corporate and 
leading university support 
Internal 
organization 
Subgroups work from 
diff. locations (incl. 
intl.) 
Subgroups work from 
different locations 
Work remotely (incl. 
intl.) and only meet for 
some specific tasks 
Workgroups meet same 
location, ―everything 





team leaders and 
author‘s 
assessment) 
 Flexible organization, no 
hierarchies 
 Formal communications and 
face-to-face interactions 
 R&D dependent on external 
funding 
 Standard procedures of 
development 
 Entire project is not known to 
all team members 
 Rapid prototyping and testing 
 Flat, ―cost effective 
organization‖ 
 Small core team that "knows it 
all" 
 Virtual collaboration 
 Access to specialized facilities 
 Analysis based on actual 
prototype testing 
 NASA-like risk management 
procedures 
 Rapid prototyping and testing 
 Optimized workflow for idea 
sourcing 
 Low cost development 
structure 
 Agile organization 
 Open knowledge sharing 
 No bureaucracy 
 Small core team 
 Key ―know it all‖ members at 
the center of the network 
 Virtual collaboration 
 Flat organization 
 Face-to-face communications 
 Multi-disciplinary inter-
departmental collaborations 
 "Craft culture" 
 Trial and error approach 
 Iterative prototyping and 
testing cycles that evolve 
design 
 Simulation supports process 
 Creative problem-solving when 
need to adapt technologies  
Team example T20 T16 T11 T4 
Note: characterization of R&D activities based on assessment of the researcher and actual descriptions of interviewees; not all teams define themselves in terms 
of the same characteristics—this does not imply a lack of particular features, i.e. only features described by the interviewees are mentioned in the table. 
Source: questionnaires, interviews, and site visits to GLXP teams. 
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 Interviews and site visits exposed more diverse features of the internal 
organization of teams. In general, these organizations tend to be flat and flexible due to 
the small number of core team members. The main difference emerges at the moment of 
approaching the GLXP problem (this analysis does not seek to assess the organizational 
performance of teams.) The Space Legacy team has sought to implement more formal 
procedures and communications, documenting project tasks and using standards. This 
approach allows international collaborations and the pursuit of a project that goes beyond 
the GLXP mission. A GLXP engineer with vast industry experience explains that there is 
however much less paperwork and ―red-tape‖ than compared with aerospace companies 
(T20, 2010).  In this case, the project has become more complex and seems to depend 
more on external funding to make progress. The Partnership Networks and University 
Spin-off teams have quickly proceeded to prototyping and testing solutions for different 
subsystems. The results of tests inform further steps in development in those cases. In 
general, these teams do not document all procedures. The agility gained with informality 
has been paid with coordination issues in a few cases and the need for re-organizing 
groups internally. Two of these teams have core members that "know it all." The other 
teams that do not have those members suggest that that is because the project has become 
more complex (Space Agency Legacy) or because in that way ―you waste the cycles of all 
of your people, all of the time‖ (University Spin-off.) The Partnerships Network has 
engaged a few key members with aerospace experience and its internal organization 
evolves over time as the team learns how to better approach problem solving after 
iterations or cycles of development (T11, 2010). The University Spin-off team has similar 
attributes, yet draws upon very experienced, multidisciplinary members and external 
advisors. Its approach is methodical yet not bureaucratic, which may result from past 
successful prize experience of key team members. 
 Unconventional teams have a tendency to rapid prototyping and testing. That 
approach is characteristic of new space missions –suggests the literature—yet, in this 
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case, it is combined with key, considerable volunteer effort and special skills. A team 
leader defines it as ―craft culture‖ and explains how that relates to cost and degree of 
achievement of project milestones. His words are very illustrative in this regard: 
―So, it’s a craft culture. To get something like that done might be 
$100,000. A group that has these values and experiences, and resources 
and facility [he refers to his team] might get the same thing done for 
$4,000. But the money isn’t the key thing. My point is there is also a 
tremendous inefficiency in getting it done  in that traditional way, where 
there is the idea of what is needed which is transferred to a designer that 
puts it into some tangible form, which moves it to analysis, which 
determines if it going to be this or that, that it should be changed in this 
way , which then sends it to a productions shop, which then orders the 
materials that then gets the things done, which then goes to the assembly, 
which then goes to an inspection, which sends it back with communication 
and bills and all that kind of thing. It’s very common around here to 
conceive something that is needed at this time, at lunchtime one day and 
have that thing, just like that, the next day. And, people die for it. They are 
all nighters. Three o’clock in the morning. People that could not or would 
not ordinarily be an analyst that have tremendous craft skills. They’re 
what matter.‖ (T4, 2010) 
 There are significant knowledge flows between teams and other 
individuals/organizations external to the GLXP. Only one team—conventional, with vast 
aerospace industry experience—has not exchanged information about its project with 
diverse other entities. The latter include academic researchers, family and friends, 
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consultants, contractors, colleagues with prize experience, and even other GLXP teams. 
All but one team mentioned at least three of those types of information exchange, and 
three teams mentioned exchanges with all the types of people/organizations. According to 
these data, 14 out of 16 respondent teams (88 percent) exchange information with 
academic researchers regularly. Also notably, 13 teams (81 percent) exchange 
information with providers or contractors and 12 teams (75 percent) with family and 
friends. Those three are the most important channels of information exchange. In 
addition, 11 teams (69 percent) mentioned exchanges with consultants, nine teams (56 
percent) with colleagues with prize experience (e.g. former NGLLC competitors,) and 
seven teams (44 percent) with other GLXP teams. 
 Information exchanges are generally about knowledge to find solutions to 
technical problems (Figure 6.7). Eleven out of fifteen teams that exchange information 
(73 percent) consider ―solutions to technical problems‖ as the most important topic for 
information exchange. Four teams (27 percent) indicated that the most important topic for 
information exchange is commercial opportunities (other five teams indicated this topic 
as the second most important.) ―Overall strategies to win the prize‖ is the main topic for 
only one team. ―Team contribution to industry or society‖ is the least important topic in 
information exchanges. 
 Collaborations between GLXP teams were not evident to this research and are 
certainly less intense than in prizes such as the NGLLC. However, they may exist and be 
more sporadic interactions rather than stable or formal collaborations. Attending the 4
th
 
GLXP Annual Summit was instructive in this regard. Representatives of only 11 teams 
attended the meeting (most of these teams are among the most active teams in terms of 
technology outputs.) The team leaders openly presented technical aspects of their projects 
and explained their progress. Informal conversations were also held between team leaders 
in break times. These presentations are not a requirement of the XPF. Indeed, a few teams 
suggested allowing presentations after the first GLXP Summit. The author also had the 
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opportunity to assist a GLXP team‘s members meeting in which one of the members—
specialized in computer visualizations—commented on his interactions with another 
team‘s member specialized in the same area. That team member illustrated those 
interactions with a simple ―we are making each other better.‖ (T4, 2010) Teams that are 
very open to share their developments on their websites or online social networks may 
also receive important feedback from the public, even about technical aspects of their 
projects (T11, 2010). 
 
 
Note: N=15 cases. 
Source: questionnaire applied to GLXP teams. 
 
Figure 6.7: Topics of information exchange of GLXP teams with selected individuals and 
organizations 
 
6.5.4 R&D effort 
 Space projects have significant funding requirements. For example, the total cost 
of the 1960s Surveyor program, which involved building, launching and landing softly 
seven Moon spacecrafts, was $469 million. The U.S. Mars Pathfinder, a mission designed 
primarily to demonstrate a low-cost way of delivering science instruments and a rover to 
the surface of Mars in 1997, had a total cost of about $200 million. Equivalent new space 
missions are likely to have lower budgets. Marshall et. al. (2007) suggests that a small 
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mission cost of about $88 million. The GLXP project may have a budget similar to small 
missions, which still represents a significant R&D effort for small teams. In 2008, the 
XPF estimated project expenditures between $15 million and $100 million, i.e. up to 
three or four times the total cash purse. For a $30-50 million mission, the expected 
breakdown was: $5 million for rover development, $10 million for lander development, 
$6-25 million for launch services, $2 million for payload integration, $5 million for 
development/acquisition of 3
rd
 stage motor (trans-lunar injection,) $2.5 million for 
insurance costs, and $0.5 million for ground network use (communications) (XPF, 
2008c). More recent estimates expect an average mission cost of $60 million, with up to 
two-thirds of that amount covered with hard cash and the rest with in-kind contributions 
and volunteer efforts (Pomerantz, 2011a). Interview data and team websites also show 
estimates that range from $4 million to $90 million, with only four teams that expect to 
accomplish the mission with $30 million or less (Figure 6.8).
20
 In general, the lack of 
upfront funding exposes teams financially to a great extent. 
 Further examination allows a better understanding of the R&D effort required to 
accomplish the GLXP challenge. Figure 6.9 shows a simplified scheme with cycles or 
iterations and costs for an illustrative $30 million GLXP mission, based off discussions 
with GLXP team leaders and other sources (this scheme may not represent the process 
followed by most of the teams.) These costs do not represent cash flows yet provide 
insights about the financial gaps that teams may face. The Start-up is the initial phase 
after the team enters the competition; it contributes the initial ideas. Iteration A (about six 
months) comprises the initial models and mockups of spacecrafts that teams use not only 
for development purposes but for starting to seek fundraising and sponsorship 
opportunities. Teams also grow significantly in this stage. Iteration B (about 12 months) 
comprises further development of prototypes, tests, and initial production of subsystems. 
                                                          
20
 Range based on data gathered from five different teams. The estimate for other teams is very likely to be 
within the same range.  
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Teams also use their prototypes for public demonstrations that give them access to new 
members and increasing visibility. Iteration C (about 12 months) comprises the 
production of subsystems and further testing. Iteration D (about 12 months) continues 
with the production of systems and system-level tests. Iteration E (about one month) 
comprises final preparations, launch, and mission accomplishment. 
 
 
Note: GLXP 1-4 represent cost/schedule estimates of four different teams for GLXP mission achievement. 
Source: own analysis based on data from sources cited in the text and team interviews. 
 
Figure 6.8: Schedule/cost comparison for past robotic missions, literature, and selected 
GLXP projects 
 
 Notably, about 70 percent of the total cost of the GLXP mission is related to the 
final iteration of mission accomplishment as the launching vehicle is the single most 
expensive item of the entire mission (this was confirmed by several team members that 
follow different mission approaches.) Commercially available launching rockets may cost 
between $10 million and $50 million depending on payload capabilities.
21
 Rockets with 
smaller payload capabilities are less expensive, yet in turn require the team to exert a 
                                                          
21
 For example, SpaceX, preferred launch partner of the XPF, offers discounts of up to 10 percent in its 
Falcon 1e and Falcon 9 rockets, which cost about $10 million and $50 million before discount, respectively 






































significant engineering effort to develop smaller and lighter spacecrafts. Rockets with 
larger payload capability allow teams to make less engineering effort and use cheaper 
components (T4, 2010). In general, teams have to pay this amount about 12 months 
before launch (this may be negotiated with the launch provider, who has to build and 
integrate the payload after the contract is signed.) Teams may also launch their 
spacecrafts as secondary payload on a larger launch vehicle to be able to share the costs 
with other spacecrafts. Launch costs may be significantly lower if a team develops its 
own launcher, yet cash flows are likely to be more significant earlier in the mission 
timeline (and, at least three GLXP engineers suggest, that would be impossible to 
accomplish within this time frame.) 
 Team leaders explain that there is almost no correlation between how much gets 
spent and what really gets accomplished in this type of project (T4, 2010). In terms of 
Figure 6.9, the most significant engineering effort is made during the initial iterations to 
develop crafts such as rovers and landers. This occurs between iterations A and C and 
represents about six percent of the total cost of this mission. In missions with costs 
between $4 million and $90 million, that percentage represents between $250,000 and 
$5.5 million to be afforded during the first 30 months of the project. These costs include 
the development of working models and prototypes among other tasks. Initial prototypes 
can be produced quickly and at relatively low cost. For example, Team FredNet 
developed a handful of small rover prototypes for concept testing purposes within its first 
year of competition; one of them, a small ball rover, was built for only $1,000 (XPF, 
2009b). Team Part Time Scientists, within its first 16 months of competition, built a more 
complex prototype that demanded about six months of development and costs between 
$41,000 and $55,000 including all the mechanical parts, the electronics, and most of the 
other subsystems, yet excluding labor and an ―unbelievably expensive‖ solar panel 
antenna introduced by the team (PTS, 2011b). This illustrates the kind of funding 
requirements faced by teams in early stages of their projects before the production of 
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spacecrafts and launch. Production and further testing stages are more costly. For 
example, Team Odyssey Moon estimates the cost of its lander (developed under a Space 
Act Agreement with NASA) at around $3.5 million, including $500,000 in parts and $3 
million in labor (Kay, 2010). 
 
 
Note: the description of phases is only illustrative and does not represent the budgets and processes of all 
teams; duration of iterations may vary and/or overlap. 
Source: interviews to GLXP teams and other sources cited in text. 
 
Figure 6.9: Cycles and cost estimates of an illustrative $30 million GLXP mission 
 
 There is another interesting difference between teams that becomes evident in 
interviews and a more careful analysis of team activities. While there are some teams that 
optimize their efforts to satisfy the minimum requirements of the prize challenge, there 
are other teams that design, test, and develop technologies that may be helpful in a GLXP 
mission yet imply significantly larger efforts and increase development lead times. For 
example, a GLXP engineer explains such optimization with: “…making something last 
five hours is significantly easier than making something that can last years, and even 
with a small budget and a very hard time constraint, if you really want to focus on this 
one goal, then you can ignore lots stuff.” (T11, 2010) On the contrary, there are also 
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efforts that not only satisfy the GLXP minimum requirements but also increasing 
performance and functionality. For example, there is the effort of Team ARCA to 
develop the E-111 carrier airplane that is able to take-off from the sea and to transport 
another vehicle (a launcher also developed by the team) to a certain altitude for ignition 
(XPF, 2010). This variance in efforts is also evident in the diversity of design criteria 
(including efficiency/performance vs. mission accomplishment balance) and 
demonstrates that there are teams that seek the shortest path to achieve the prize 
challenge and there are teams that are focused on this and other goals as well. 
 Teams raise funding for their efforts from a number of sources. The most 
significant monetary contributions come from sponsors and, sometimes, private investors 
when teams are able to attract them. Sponsorships are more frequently available than 
private investments. Only a handful of teams may have received private investments. One 
of the main reasons for this is the economic slowdown started in 2007 (Pomerantz, 
2010a). A team leader explains that, more generally, ―nobody is interested in investing in 
technology up front. They want to harvest the results after it’s proven that it works.‖ 
Nevertheless, he continues, ―the fact that the competition is sponsored by Google is 
important for credibility. If Google is involved in a leading edge activity, then more 
people will believe that it makes sense‖ (T4, 2010). 
 An example of teams that did receive equity investments is Next Giant Leap from 
Boulder, CO. This team has received investments from two private companies 
($225,000,) eSpace: The Center for Space Entrepreneurship (more than $30,000,) and its 
own founder ($200,000.) Moreover, Draper Laboratory, one of the team‘s partners, 
recently committed over $1 million from its internal R&D program to fund the design 
and development of a guidance, navigation and control system testbed for use in the 
team‘s mission (Kolodny, 2011). Another example is Team Astrobotic, which seeks to 
raise at least $25 million from private investors and cover the rest of the mission cost—
about $90 million—with progress payments from, for example, payload delivery 
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services. Other teams find that technologies they have developed for their own projects 
(and not with commercialization goals) have some market demand and use the 
opportunity to cash in to fund their GLXP missions. For example, Team Phoenicia 
expects to cover between 15 and 20 percent of its total mission cost in this manner (Team 
Phoenicia, 2011). 
 Visits and direct observation of workplaces of GLXP teams also suggest that there 
are other valuable non-monetary resources and in-kind contributions used by teams (Kay, 
2010): (a) teams with formal or informal linkages to universities have access to key 
equipment, laboratories, and special facilities such as clean rooms or test areas for 
propulsion systems; these teams have access to equipment through the work of student 
and faculty members as well; (b) also teams with corporate partners may have access to 
specialized facilities and resources such as workstations and expensive equipment; (c) 
teams also use facilities provided by family and friends to hold regular team meetings, 
meet potential sponsors or partners, assemble subsystems, or store equipment, parts and 
supplies; (d) teams use significant volunteer effort in the form of direct labor (including, 
for example, students, friends) and, sometimes, contribution of production effort, parts, 
and components. 
 The efforts of volunteers and collaborators are serious. For example, Team 
FredNet‘s mission has an estimated cost of $30 million, yet up to about $6 million may 
be saved thanks to volunteer effort (Kay, 2010). Another GLXP team leader refers to part 
of that volunteer production effort as ―company friends‖ and explains that they represent 
an important contribution: “…anywhere from 5-20 percent of our costs might be covered 




6.5.5 Constraints and challenges 
 Teams face a number of constraints or challenges in their pursuit of the prize. 
Overall, both limited time and lack of resources to undertake their projects are the most 
significant constraints that GLXP teams face. Limited time is a great constraint for six 
teams (38 percent,) a moderate constraint for eight teams (50 percent,) and not a 
constraint for two teams (Table 6.21). Limited funding is a great constraint for six teams 
(38 percent,) a moderate constraint for five teams (31 percent,) and not a constraint for 
five teams. The third most significant constraint is unclear rules or technical requirements 
for the prize target (a great constraint for four teams.) The two least challenging factors 
are the competitive strategies of other teams and the time advantage that first-to-enter 
teams have. Unconventional teams have a peculiar perception of those constraints. In 
general, they consider less significant most of the constraints, being limited 
resources/time still the most widely perceived constraints, though they are considered 
moderate constraints. These teams are generally not concerned at all with the 
intelligibility of the rules, the advantages of other teams, the strategies of other teams, 
and the lack of knowledge/skills. Conventional teams show a higher level of concern with 
a number of constraints, particularly the limited resources and time available to the team. 
A number of conventional teams feel constrained to some extent by unclear rules, the 
lack of knowledge/skills, and the time advantage that other teams have. 
 The organizers of the GLXP point out that they have observed how the 
fundraising problem may become more challenging than the technical problem in itself 
(Pomerantz, 2010a). Team leaders also expressed that in interviews and emphasized the 
significance of a lack of funding more than limited time to accomplish the mission. Team 




“…yeah, if they [the other teams] have more resources, they could win 
with worse technology. That’s one of the limiting factors. If you don’t have 
the money, you can’t get much accomplished. So, if someone granted one 
of the other teams $100,000,000 up front, they could probably beat us, 
because they can buy some solutions or buy expertise, whereas we have to 
do it the hard way with internal work.” (T4, 2010) 
“To develop and acquire technologies, simple; to achieve the prize 
target, not a problem; but this... that depends on monetary issues, I mean, 
if we don’t get the funding, then none of that applies. […] If you have the 
full funding, it’s possible to achieve within time, no problem.” (T16, 
2010) 
 Other constraints discussed in interviews include the prize rules (T6, 2010; T11, 
2010; T16, 2010; T20, 2010), the impediment to use ITAR restricted components (in the 
case of foreign teams) (T11, 2010; T20, 2010), and the limited access to professional and 
partnership networks (T6, 2010). The final version of the GLXP‘s MTA, which includes 
rules and other legal provisions for the competition, was released on January 2011, more 
than three years after the prize announcement (Table 6.22). These rules evolved favorably 
according to the teams and become ―reasonable‖ and ―positive.‖ Initially, the rules had 
issues and restricted potential innovations (e.g. rules required pictures of the rover‘s 




Table 6.21: Factors that constrain or challenge GLXP teams, by type of entrant 
Constraints 
Percentage and type of team that assess each constraint 



















Limited resources 22% 67% 11% 57% 29% 14% 37% 50% 13% 
Limited time 22% 44% 33% 57% 14% 29% 38% 31% 31% 
Unclear rules 22% 11% 67% 29% 71% 0% 24% 38% 38% 
Lack of knowledge/skills 22% 11% 67% 14% 57% 29% 19% 31% 50% 
Time advantage of other teams 0% 33% 67% 0% 57% 43% 0% 44% 56% 
Strategies of other teams 11% 0% 89% 0% 29% 71% 6% 13% 81% 
Notes: N=16 cases (9 unconventional teams, 7 conventional teams); cells indicate number of teams of each type and with each perception. 
Source: questionnaire applied to GLXP teams. 
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 Though the change of the original deadline (December 31, 2012) was something 
positive for some teams, others were disappointed (T11, 2010). During the first years of 
competition, the uncertainty around what the ultimate set of rules would be raised 
concerns and may have constrained the activities of teams (Werner, 2010).  A team leader 
explains: “I think a frustration for all the teams is the fact that the rules have not been 
finalized yet. I think that limits our ability to plan finally and decisively with regard to 
approach.” (Goldsmith, 2009) In relation to this, the author is also aware of at least one 
team that withdrew the competition after an emerging disagreement between the use that 
the XPF expects for the results of the competition (i.e. the achievement of the GLXP 
mission) and the goals of the team. 
 



















 Some rules impeded 
free negotiation of 
teams to partner and 
raise funding 
 Rules level the field, 
―…especially with 
the part of the 
government money‖ 
 ―A lot of things were 
fixed or corrected or 
reformulated‖ 
 Issues with 
interpretation of 
copyrights 
 Some requirements 
considered pointless 
from the engineering 
viewpoint 
 Roughly defined 
requirements ―a 
good way to work 
because it leaves a 
lot of room‖ 
 ―Reasonable rules‖ 
 ―Positive in general‖ 
 Conducive rules 
 Final version of 
MTA 
Note: author‘s assessment of rules based on document analysis and interviews with GLXP teams 




 In questionnaires, teams were also asked about their responses to a lack of 
funding and/or the need to speed up technology development. When facing a lack of 
funding, GLXP teams respond to great extent with the design of simplified technologies, 
additional fundraising, and the design of technologies that can be commercialized, as 
indicated by seven teams (47 percent,) six teams (40 percent,) and six teams, respectively 
(Table 6.23). Other teams (between eight and five) indicated that, only to some extent, 
those are their responses to a lack of funding. Fewer teams have responded (or plan to 
respond) to great extent to a lack of funding by relying upon existing or standard 
technologies and partnering with other organizations (only five and four teams, 
respectively.) The least common responses to a lack of funding have been to skip risk 
analyses or test phases and to think of withdrawing the competition. 
 
Table 6.23: Selected responses to a lack of funding and the need to speed up technology 
development 
Selected responses 
When faced lack of 
funding… 
When needed 

















Designed simplified new 
technologies 
47% 33% 20% 60% 20% 20% 
Relied more upon existing 
technologies 
33% 47% 20% 40% 40% 20% 
Sought additional funding 
from investors 
40% 47% 13% 33% 33% 33% 
Partnered with other 
organizations 
27% 53% 20% 36% 43% 21% 
Designed tech. that can be 
comm. 
40% 40% 20% 14% 29% 57% 
Skipped risk analysis or test 
phases 
7% 47% 47% 7% 43% 50% 
Thought on abandoning the 
competition 
7% 13% 80% 0% 29% 71% 
Notes: N=15 cases (8 unconventional teams, 7 conventional teams); cells indicate percentage of teams with 
each response. 




 The responses of GLXP teams to the need to speed up developments are similar. 
Most notably is the design of simplified new technologies, which is the most frequent 
response to the need to speed up projects. Nine teams (60 percent) indicated that have 
responded or planned to respond to great extent with simplified designs. A significant 
proportion of teams have also relied (or plan to rely) upon existing technologies to a great 
extent (six teams or 40 percent) or partnered (or plan to partner) with other organizations 
to a great extent (five teams or 36 percent.) 
 There is no significant correlation between the perception of time and funding 
constraints and the number of partnerships identified for each team. 
 In interviews, team leaders confirmed the importance of reducing engineering 
efforts to shorten achievement times and explained that a number of technologies needed 
for their projects are readily available at affordable price tags. An experienced engineer 
also explained that there is a limit to make things cheaper and the main approach its team 
uses to speed up developments includes drawing upon more volunteers and combining 
things ―to minimize the number of items you are building‖ (e.g. develop a model that 
serves both testing and promotional purposes) (T20, 2010). 
 The data show only significant differences between types of teams with regard to 
the use of simplicity as design criterion (Table 6.24). Unconventional entrants are more 
likely to introduce simpler designs when facing a lack of funding or the need to 
accelerate projects. Four out of five unconventional teams that indicated time as a 
great/some constraint reported technical simplicity as the main design criterion. 
Moreover, four out of eight unconventional teams that indicated funding as a great/some 
constraint reported simplicity as the main design criterion. No conventional team shows 




Table 6.24: Selected responses to a lack of funding and the need to speed up technology 
development, by type of entrant 
 

















When faced lack of funding 
Designed simplified new 
technologies 
63% 25% 13% 29% 43% 29% 
Relied more upon existing 
technologies 
38% 38% 25% 29% 57% 14% 
Partnered with other 
organizations 
25% 50% 25% 29% 57% 14% 
When needed to speed up developments 
Designed simplified new 
technologies 
75% 25% 0% 43% 14% 43% 
Relied more upon existing 
technologies 
38% 38% 25% 43% 43% 14% 
Partnered with other 
organizations 
38% 38% 25% 29% 57% 14% 
Notes: N=15 cases (8 unconventional teams, 7 conventional teams); cells indicate number of teams of each 
type and with each response. 
Source: questionnaire applied to GLXP teams. 
 
6.6 Technology outputs 
 Teams may produce diverse types of technology outputs in their attempts to win 
the competition or pursue related goals. This research anticipated that the PTOs may be 
produced in the form of, for example, new concepts, designs, models, mockups, 
prototypes, and actual spacecrafts. The number and quality of these outputs are likely to 
vary among teams as they have been involved in the competition for different periods. 
Moreover, teams may begin their work in ―stealth mode‖ before entering the competition 
officially and/or have previous work experience as a group before even thinking of 
competing for the prize. The questionnaires to GLXP teams requested information about 
the technological achievements during the competition and further investigation was done 
to discover the characteristics of the technology outputs in their various forms and assess 
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their novelty and potential to become truly innovations as a result of their 
commercialization or introduction for the teams‘ own use. 
 The teams that participated in this study (17 teams) had a combined total of 450 
months of technology development on their GLXP projects at the moment this analysis 
started. These teams entered the GLXP between September 2007 and April 2010. Nine 
teams (53 percent) had already more than 30 months of work on the GLXP project when 
they responded a questionnaire (Figure 6.10). None of these teams had completed more 
than 50 percent of its project at the moment of responding a questionnaire and according 
to each team‘s plans to accomplish the GLXP mission. Ten teams (63 percent) completed 
less than 20 percent and six teams (38 percent) completed between 20 percent and 50 
percent. In average, these 17 teams have started their work on the GLXP about four 
months before their official announcement as GLXP teams. Two teams had worked up to 
12 months before being announced as official competitors. According to team leaders, the 
teams use this initial time-period to hire members and gather the initial resources to start 
their projects. 
 The time that each team had spent in its GLXP project is only a hint of the actual 
technology outputs. A number of teams describe their GLXP projects as the continuation 
of past projects of the team or its members. Seven teams (41 percent) have past projects 
that relate to very great extent to the GLXP, and only two of them are unconventional 
teams. Other four teams (24 percent) have past projects that relate to the GLXP only to 
some extent. Six teams (35 percent,) four of them unconventional, reported that their 
projects are not related with previous projects of the team or its members. The nature of 
the relationships between past and GLXP projects are diverse. Five teams responded that 
the GLXP project is the expansion of ongoing projects. Four teams indicate that it is the 
application of results or knowledge from other projects. One team indicates that this is 
the restart of discontinued projects. Another team indicates that there is other type of 




Note: N=17 cases. 
Source: questionnaire to GLXP teams. 
 
Figure 6.10: Time of competition and time of actual development for GLXP teams 
 
 There is a wide range of planned development lead times to complete the GLXP 
missions. Teams reported in questionnaires that they expect to complete their projects in 
time periods that range between 31 and 91 months with a median of about 57 months. 
There are no significant differences between unconventional and conventional teams‘ 
development lead times. Lead times reported by conventional teams range between 31 
and 91 months, and those reported by unconventional teams range between 38 and 81 
months. 
 Large proportions of COTS technologies and the criterion of the smallest possible 
engineering effort anticipate that part of the systems used in GLXP projects are not novel. 
Teams were asked to assess the degree of novelty of their technologies and report 
whether they build completely new systems and components (―from scratch‖) or acquire, 
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adapt or copy existing technologies. Only one-fourth of the systems designed for the 
GLXP are completely new according to that self-assessment. Most of the teams (63 
percent) classified their technologies as ―somewhat new.‖ Only four teams (25 percent) 
responded that their technologies are ―completely new‖ and only two teams responded 
―not new at all.‖ 
 In particular, the subsystems most indicated as completely new are the lunar 
lander and rover (Table 6.25).
22
 Eight teams (50 percent) indicated that their lunar landers 
are completely new and six teams (38 percent) indicated that their landers are somewhat 
new technologies. Similarly, eight teams indicated that their lunar rovers are completely 
new and seven teams (44 percent) indicated that their rovers are somewhat new. Using 
the same criteria, the systems that follow in terms of development effort are the 
photo/video system, the control/navigation hardware and software, and the Earth-to-
Moon transfer vehicle. Four out of 16 teams (25 percent) indicated that these three 
subsystems are completely new. Moreover, nine teams (56 percent) indicated that their 
photo/video system is somewhat new, seven teams (44 percent) indicated that the 
control/navigation hardware and software are somewhat new, and only five teams (31 
percent) indicated that the Earth-to-Moon transfer vehicle is somewhat new. Overall, the 
systems that were most characterized as not new at all are the Earth-to-Moon transfer 
vehicle and the ground support system, as indicated by seven teams (44 percent) in each 
case. 
 There are some differences between unconventional and conventional teams in 
the degree of novelty of their subsystems. Most notably, most of the unconventional 
entrants use control/navigation hardware and software, communications, and ground 
support systems that are not new at all. Moreover, contrary to the rest of the teams, most 
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 The GLXP does not require using a rover to accomplish the challenge. As discussed in the next section, 
there are teams that expect to introduce alternative approaches to traverse the required 500-meter distance. 
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of the conventional teams consider that their Earth-to-Moon transfer vehicles are not new 
at all. 
 Most of the teams (10 out of 15) consider that they have achieved significant 
innovations and reported achievements in the form of new products or components 
(Table 6.26). Eight teams (80 percent) also achieved innovations in the form of new uses 
for existing materials, products, or components. Six teams (60 percent) achieved 
innovations in the form of new ways to organize technology design and development. 
These innovations have been achieved either purposely or unexpectedly. Eight teams 
have planned innovations. Six teams mention to have achieved innovations unexpectedly. 
Unconventional teams report the achievement of significant innovations more often than 
other teams, innovate mostly in terms of new products, and plan most of their 
innovations. All the teams that reported significant innovations also indicated that their 
innovations are useful not only to accomplish the GLXP mission but also pursue other 
projects. The high proportion of innovating teams suggested that some of these 
innovations may actually be, for example, new designs that the teams are exploring and 
not actual technologies that the teams are introducing. Further investigation with 
interviews confirmed that that is the case with a few teams yet, in most cases, innovations 
refer to new-to-industry or ―new-to-industry in this world‘s region‖ (i.e. Europe) 
subsystems that teams are implementing in their own missions. Most of the concerns with 
the interpretation of the meaning of innovation in questionnaires were also eliminated 
when at least three engineering-background team leaders acknowledged the difference 
between invention and the traditional concept of innovation (creation and 




Table 6.25: Novelty in GLXP teams subsystems, by type of entrant 
Subsystems 
Percentage and type of teams that characterize subsystem as…. 

























Lunar lander 56% 33% 11% 43% 43% 14% 50% 38% 13% 
Lunar rover 33% 56% 11% 71% 29% 0% 50% 44% 6% 
Photo/video system 22% 56% 22% 29% 57% 14% 25% 56% 19% 
Control/navigation hardware and software 11% 33% 56% 43% 57% 0% 25% 44% 31% 
Earth-to-Moon vehicle 33% 44% 22% 14% 14% 71% 25% 31% 44% 
Comm. Moon and Earth 22% 22% 56% 14% 71% 14% 19% 44% 38% 
Ground support system 0% 44% 56% 14% 57% 29% 6% 50% 44% 
Note: N=16 cases.  
Source: questionnaire applied to GLXP teams. 
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 The GLXP teams have produced various technology outputs in three years of 
competition (i.e. between the prize announcement in September 2007 and the end of the 
data gathering process in December of 2010.) Table 6.27 and Table 6.28 show one 
example of significant technology output for each of the 26 GLXP teams competing in 
that period. The list does not seek to be comprehensive yet offer illustrative examples of 
the outputs of each team. The list was created based on interview data and data collected 
from team websites by selecting at least three of the most widely publicized 
developments for each team. The data available on actual PTOs underestimate outputs 
that are not publicly shared by teams. The list includes assessments of the maturity of the 
technology in a scale equivalent to TRL levels and the assessment of the implementation 
of the technology (for own use or commercialization.) Figure 6.11 shows four selected 
examples of technologies under development (these were selected to show some 
variation.) 
 
Table 6.26: Number of GLXP teams that achieved significant innovations, by type of 
entrant 
Type of innovation 
Number and type of team with innovations, by form of 
achievement 
Unconventional Conventional Total 
teams Planned By chance Planned By chance 
New Products 5 1 3 1 10 
New ways to organize 
tech. design and dev. 
3 2 - 1 6 
New use for existing 
materials, products, or 
components 
3 2 1 2 8 
Other innovations 1 - - - 1 
Total teams 5 2 3 4 10 
Note: N=15 cases; cells indicate number of teams that achieved significant innovations of each type. 




 Most of the teams (17 out of 26, or 65 percent) have produced significant 
technology outputs, that is, outputs that contribute significantly to the achievement of the 
GLXP. There is wide range of types of technologies under development and, although 
teams need similar systems to accomplish the mission, is not evident whether two or 
more teams are working on the same type of solution. Nine of them have implemented 
those technologies in their own missions and/or seek hardware commercialization (the 
latter is less frequent.) Only three out of nine teams exclusively motivated by the 
existence of the GLXP contributed some significant technology output, and other two of 
them have withdrawn the competition. A few unconventional teams have introduced 
novel concepts and produced lower TRL level technologies for experimentation and 
demonstration purposes. It is not clear whether these technologies will ultimately be 
deployed or commercialized. For example, there are teams such as Selene that are 
exploring concepts to find the simplest, most reliable, and cost-effective method to travel 
the required 500 meters, including the ―classic planetary rover design‖ (GLXP, 2011a). 
Conventional teams have been more likely to produce technologies aimed at delivering 
launch, payload, and/or other services. Several of those technologies were already under 
development prior to the GLXP by the team or a partner, are under development at 
NASA and will be adapted for the GLXP (through Space Act Agreement partnerships,) 
or are based on designs of proven implementations in past space programs. Teams such 
as Team Italia seek to use high TRL level technologies purposely to contain project costs 
(GLXP, 2010c). Overall, nine teams have not introduced any significant technology 
output and four of them have already withdrawn the competition. The GLXP is an 
ongoing prize competition and therefore the PTOs are likely to increase over time. 
 Many of the PTOs of teams are actually produced by their partners or in 
collaboration with other organizations, particularly in the case of conventional teams. 
Those technologies may be already under development or be produced specifically for 
the prize. For example, Team Odyssey Moon is developing its lander based upon the 
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engineering and technical expertise provided by the NASA Ames Research Center under 
the development of the Common Spacecraft Bus lander program. This team has also sold 
75 percent of the available payload capacity of its spacecraft to five customers (Odyssey 
Moon, 2008). Team Rocket City Space Pioneers is developing its own propulsion 
systems based on previous work of a company owned by the team's leader (such 
company was acquired a few years ago by Dynetics, the leading corporate partner of this 
team formed by a handful of companies.) These systems may eventually be used in the 
team‘s GLXP mission, yet the team is also aiming at creating a sustainable space 
business (the team even offered other teams to share the launch vehicle.) (GLXP, 2010a) 
Team White Label Space is drawing upon the work of Lunar Numbat, one of its partners, 
to develop an engine throttle controller (this is an open source effort.) (White Label 
Space, 2010) The hopping lander of Team Next Giant Leap is under development at 





Table 6.27: Selected examples of GLXP technology outputs (unconventional entrants) 







No evidence of significant outputs 31 - - - 
No evidence of significant outputs 31 - - - 
Stereo Vision Canera for 3D Mapping and Navigation 40 I U M 
No evidence of significant outputs (team withdrawn) 31 - - - 
No evidence of significant outputs 23 - - - 
Solid-steam rocket motor prototype 25 N E L 
Five-inch ball robot that can climb slopes 34 N D L 
New, optimized software algorithms for systems error control and detection 24 N C/H M 
Re-development of modular rocket system with parallel stages (25+ years old concept) 22 I U M 
New air-launched, three stages orbital rocket 37 N U M 
Lightweight, sealed, and scalable N wheeled-motor design 29 I U M 
No evidence of significant outputs 30 - - - 
Ion motor-powered Cubesat 40 I D M 
No evidence of significant outputs (team withdrawn) 37 - - - 
Note: the description of outputs does not seek to be comprehensive and is presented with illustrative purposes; assessment as of Dec. 2010 based on data 
available to the author. 
Source: interviews with teams, GLXP website, team websites, and press releases. 
References  
Lead time: Months since project started (or since official entry if other data are not available) 
Novelty: C=Current-day technology, I=Significant improvements, N=New-to-industry technology 
Target: E=Only experimental (experimental technologies not necessarily used for GLXP project), D=Tech. demonstration/test for GLXP 
mission, U=Use in GLXP mission, C/H=Expect comm. of hardware, C/S=Expect comm. of services, N/A=unknown 




Table 6.28: Selected examples of GLXP technology outputs (conventional entrants) 







Hopping moon lander concept with regional-scale science measurement capability (based on spacecraft 
previously built by partner) 
35 N C/S M 
Propulsion systems for new launcher (based on technologies previously developed by team members) 3 I C/S M 
No evidence of significant outputs 2 - - - 
Spinning lander concept (concept previously developed by team members, with widely use in 
communication satellites) (team withdrawn) 
8 N U M 
No evidence of significant outputs (team withdrawn) 34 - - - 
Leg-enabled robotic system prototyped 34 I D M 
Lander‘s rocket motor and navigation control for engine (based on existing technologies) 34 I C/H H 
Software for autonomous rover‘s travel 19 C U H 
No evidence of significant outputs 19 - - - 
No evidence of significant outputs (team withdrawn) 37 - - - 
Adaptation (under Space Act Agreement) of NASA‘s Common Spacecraft Bus program‘s vehicle into 
lunar lander for payload delivery 
39 C C/S M 
Cubesats for demonstration of navigation techniques 37 C D H 
Note: the description of outputs does not seek to be comprehensive and is presented with illustrative purposes; assessment as of Dec. 2010 based on data 
available to the author. 
Source: interviews with teams, GLXP website, team websites, and press releases. 
References  
Lead time: Months since project started (or since official entry if other data are not available) 
Novelty: C=Current-day technology, I=Significant improvements, N=New-to-industry technology 
Target: E=Only experimental (experimental technologies not necessarily used for GLXP project), D=Tech. demonstration/test for GLXP 
mission, U=Use in GLXP mission, C/H=Expect comm. of hardware, C/S=Expect comm. of services, N/A=unknown 




a) Prototypes “Asimov Jr.” R1 and R2 developed by Team Part Time Scientists 
 
Source: Team Part Time Scientists. 
b) Prototype “Red Rover” developed by Team Astrobotic 
 
Source: Team Astrobotic. 
c) Concept of supersonic carrier E-111 developed by Team ARCA 
 
Source: Team ARCA 
d) Prototype of rover developed by Team Selenokhod 
 
Source: Team Selenokhod 
Figure 6.11: Selected examples of GLXP technology outputs 
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 Further examination of the technologies in terms of the degrees of novelty and 
implementation shed light on the general characteristics of the GLXP‘s PTOs and 
possible patterns associated with types of entrants. Figure 6.12 shows that only 
unconventional teams have developments around the area formed by improvements/new 
technologies and experimental/mission uses. Also, several technology outputs are likely 
to be commercialized (by conventional entrants) in the form of service delivery or, in a 
few cases, hardware sales. Only a few of these technology outputs may become truly 
breakthroughs not only for aerospace application (e.g. new lander concepts) but also for 
broader industrial use (i.e. software algorithms.) Other technologies, particularly those 
aimed at providing services (e.g. payload delivery) are based on improvements of 
current-day technologies or technologies already under development. Several significant 
improvements in terms of mobility mechanisms and electronics and navigation systems 
are in progress to be used in GLXP‘s missions. Teams are also testing multiple 
conceptual designs of mobility systems (e.g. rovers or other units) and alternative 
propulsions systems (e.g. thrusters, fuels.) The overlay of outputs shown in Table 6.27 
and Table 6.28 on this chart shows that unconventional teams‘ developments tend to 
gather around the area formed by improvements/new technologies and 
experimental/mission uses. 
 Though the evidence shows that most of the PTOs are not aimed at or yet readily 
available for commercialization/service delivery, most of the teams seek to generate 
revenues from their activities. Eleven out of 17 teams (65 percent of both unconventional 
and conventional teams) have at least one full- or part-time member exclusively 
dedicated to business development and commercialization of the prize technologies. Still, 
not all teams have been equally successful in that regard. For example, in October 2010, 
NASA awarded up to $30.1 million in Innovative Lunar Demonstrations Data (ILDD) 
contracts to six U.S. teams for a period of up to five years (NASA, 2010d) (the 
application process for ILDD contracts was also open to foreign teams—and some of 
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them applied—but none of them was awarded.) The purpose of these contracts is the 
purchase of technical data resulting from the development and demonstration of 
capabilities of robotic lunar missions. The awardees include Team Astrobotic (Pittsburgh, 
PA), Team Next Giant Leap (through its partner The Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, 
Inc., Cambridge, MA,) Team Rocket City Space Pioneers (through its parent company 
Dynetics Inc., Huntsville, AL,) Team Omega Envoy (Orlando, FL,) Team Moon Express 
(San Francisco, CA,) and Team FREDNET (Huntsville, AL.) 
 
   
Note: only selected outputs are shown, based on data available to this project; outputs are described in 
general terms and are not associated with any specific team or type of team. 
Source: own analysis. 
 
Figure 6.12: Selected technology outputs in a novelty/implementation scale 
 
 Teams‘ strategies also include revenue models based on products other than 
hardware sales, payload delivery, or IP licensing (Table 6.29). In their effort to raise 
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funding or profit from their projects, teams also commercialize/plan to commercialize 
sponsorship opportunities, expertise/project management services, and a variety of final 
consumer services related with social networking, photography and video, and remote 
exploration experiences. These diverse revenue sources have different strategic 
implications to mission financing. For example, data licensing or moon experience 
commercialization requires the mission to be executed to produce revenues. Payload 
delivery services and sponsorship opportunities may generate revenues through payments 
in advance (this is typical in the space business for payload delivery.) Certainly, the value 
of expertise/project management services is associated with the team‘s performance 
during the competition. On the other hand, revenue sources are linked to technical 
capabilities as well. For example, commercialization of moon experience through 3D 
video and remote driving of the rover requires longer mission times and technical 
capabilities to perform certain functions not required to claim the reward. 
 
Table 6.29: Planned/actual revenue sources in the GLXP (selected examples) 
Source of revenue Description 
Sponsorship 
opportunity 
Commercialization of the naming rights for team‘s space 
vehicles, mission, or other appearances of the team or its 
members; space in team‘s logo (to the extent allowed by 
GLXP‘s rules) 




Delivery of scientific (e.g. scientific instruments,) commercial 
(e.g. human remains, personal objects, corporate-related 
instruments,) or artistic (e.g. objects, inflatable sculptures) 
payload in landers/rovers 
Commercialization of 
expertise 
Consulting or project management services based on expertise 
from GLXP mission 
Moon experience 3D video and images, remote driving of rovers 
Hardware 
commercialization 
Agency or corporate contracts for hardware demonstration 
Note: the description of the services does not seek to be comprehensive for each team; only relevant 
examples are mentioned. 
Source: interviews with teams, team websites, and press releases. 
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 The GLXP does not require teams to place their technologies in the public domain 
and that enables not only the commercialization activity but also the R&D activities of 
teams. Figure 6.13 illustrates the diverse sources and uses of the intellectual property (IP) 
created by GLXP teams. Interview data were the most insightful in this regard. In 
general, teams define themselves as ―fairly open‖ to share their technologies. Most of 
them publish progress updates on their websites and the official GLXP website (the XPF 
requires teams to use the latter to post updates on their general activities.) Sometimes, 
teams disclose or share technical details and other project management information 
openly. An overall assessment of the digital media published on the GLXP‘s and teams‘ 
websites (e.g. online videos) suggests that unconventional entrants are more inclined to 
share such details. Teams are more likely to publicly share methodologies, approaches to 
solve specific problems, and test results. The teams that have access to university 
resources such as laboratories and machine shops enter/plan to enter in agreements to 
license the technologies developed at universities. Some teams have created more dense 
networks of corporate partners to source key technologies in exchange of other 
technologies they have developed. Six GLXP teams have already signed ILDD contracts 
with NASA for the provision of mission data. The teams that are organized as 
workgroups, use collaborators/volunteers, and have other types of partners enter in 
agreements to share the technologies developed for the prize. A few team leaders 
explained in interviews that they will eventually seek to file patents for some of their 
technologies, yet the cost of doing that is a constraint. This research cannot foresee all the 
alternative schemes that the teams will pursue to commercialize technologies, yet it is 
possible to anticipate a wide range of approaches. These approaches may range from 
direct commercialization of hardware through licenses to the creation of a consortium of 
flexible smaller companies to produce and commercialize the technologies on the basis of 
co-owned IP (the latter is an example offered by only one team.) 
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 Discussing with entrants the possibility of working in a similar project if the 
GLXP did not exist contributes other insights on the overall effect of the competition. In 
this regard, eight teams that participated in this investigation (i.e. 50 percent) reported 
some probability or certainty of pursuing robotic planetary exploration projects if the 
prize did not exist: six teams consider this ―very likely‖ and two teams ―likely‖ (Table 
6.30). On the other hand, seven teams responded that it would be not likely for them to 
work in this area if the GLXP did not exist. Not surprisingly, conventional teams are 
those more likely to pursue similar projects. This supports the idea of the ability of prizes 
to allow the participation of unconventional entrants that, otherwise, would not be 
involved in technology development. Five out of nine unconventional entrants indicated 
that they would not work on this type of project if the prize did not exist. 
 
 
Note: the purpose of this scheme is to illustrate the diversity of uses and sources of the IP created by prize 
entrants; line width indicates the overall importance of the link in the GLXP according to the assessment of 
the author. 
Source: analysis of interview data (N=7 teams) and documentary sources. 
 





Table 6.30: Number of GLXP teams that would pursue similar projects if the prize did not 
exist, by type of entrant 
Type of entrant 
Number of teams that would pursue similar projects if the 
GLXP did not exist 
Very likely Likely Not likely Do not know 
Unconventional 2 1 5 1 
Conventional 4 1 2 1 
All teams 6 2 7 2 
Note: N=17 cases; cells indicate number of teams that indicated each type of response. 






7.1 Prize incentives and the motivation of entrants 
H1 anticipated that for any given technology sector and its general context, more 
significant PIs are more likely to induce the participation of unconventional entrants and 
more significant TIs are more likely to induce the participation of conventional entrants. 
There is evidence to reject H1 and elaborate alternative explanations. 
 In principle, the participation of conventional and unconventional entrants is 
generally associated with the perception of TIs and PIs, respectively. The immediate 
caveat is that conventional entrants are also particularly incentivized by the potential 
recognition from NASA and other space agencies for potential future contracts, which is 
linked to the value of the prize technologies yet, by definition, is considered an incentive 
created by the prize (PIs.) The recent award of NASA‘s contracts to six GLXP teams 
(including five newly created teams and a team led by established companies) is an 
example of how prizes support the realization of the market value of the prize 
technologies. This is a sector-specific phenomenon as it results from the combination of 
both the effect of the prize and the features of the space sector. The GLXP a) creates a 
platform in which the activities of new, small startup teams are visible and can be 
followed by space agency and corporate officials, and b) contributes to building 
reputation by highlighting the achievements of the teams and, ultimately, distinguishing 
the winner and runner-ups from the rest of the participants and other non-participant 
organizations. The reputation and publicity values created by the competition reflect the 
value of Google‘s sponsorship, the promotional effort undertaken by the XPF, and the 
symbolic value of being recognized as a competitor. Yet, most importantly in this case, 
those values also reflect the existence of high entry barriers to the space sector, which has 
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been traditionally dominated by space agencies and large corporations or companies that 
have develop space heritage after years of work and delivery of proven solutions. It is fair 
to say that instruments other than prizes also build reputation in this industry, though not 
based on visibility or publicity. For example, hardware demonstration contracts awarded 
by space agencies also help awardees to increase credibility and raise more funding 
(Culver et al., 2007). Certainly, the reputation/publicity values may have also their effect 
on those teams that seek to produce and commercialize aerospace technologies to private 
customers or enter other related markets. 
 The motivation of H1 has been testing whether attracting groups of interest (e.g. 
unconventional entrants) is possible by designing prizes that offer certain types of 
incentives. The fact that the relationship between types of entrants defined in this 
research (i.e. unconventional and conventional) and perceived incentives (i.e. PIs and 
TIs) is not straightforward calls for further elaboration of alternative explanations for the 
types of incentives, the motivations of teams, and the relationships between them. 
 The GLXP offers several monetary and non-monetary incentives (PIs) (Table 
7.1). The monetary incentives include the cash purses and other equivalent in-kind 
benefits such as access to discount price services from the XPF‘s preferred partners. The 
cash purse is particularly interesting to conventional teams, who consider that potential 
source of revenue to close their business cases. Other entrants may consider the value of 
the cash purse for their personal strategies.
23
 The fact that there are 2
nd
 place and bonus 
prizes creates a more sustainable incentive as runner-ups can still win some money even 
if they were not the first to accomplish the challenge. This distribution of prizes also 
allows a second set of teams to continue attracting the interest of investors and engaging 
more members and volunteers (Pomerantz, 2010a). The Diversity award is probably 
targeted by a few teams involved in education and outreach activities. Still, the 
contribution of the cash purses to the entrant effect of the GLXP is moderate. Their 
                                                          
23
 See, for example, the case of the Kremer Prize of 1977 discussed in Chapter 3). 
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relatively significant value (up to $30 million) raises more public and media awareness 
(as suggested by, for example, Diamandis, 2009) and help in increasing the 
reputation/visibility of the teams. 
 
Table 7.1: Prize incentives offered by the GLXP 




Cash purse $30 million in Grand and 2
nd
 place prizes, 
bonus prizes, and Diversity Award 
Access to software and 
services at discount cost 
These services are exclusively aimed at 
supporting the GLXP project. Teams that 
prepare business cases may reach a break-
even point sooner by drawing upon these 
in-kind contributions. 
Non-monetary Opportunity to pursue a 
challenging technical 
goal 
This drives curiosity, desire of 
participation, desire to compete and 




These are necessary to gather resources to 
accomplish the prize challenge or pursue 
other goals (e.g. commercialization.) 
Access to a platform with 
new actors, activities, 
networks, and rules 
These are valuable resources to pursue 
multiple types of personal/organizational 
goals (e.g. teams get to know business 
contacts and gatekeepers to test ideas 
and/or access further resources and 
opportunities for commercialization and, 
eventually, enter the industry sector linked 
to the prize.) 
Source: own analysis. 
 
 The non-monetary PIs are the most significant incentives offered by the GLXP. 
There is the opportunity to pursue a challenging technical goal, gain reputation or 
visibility, and the valuable access to a prize platform that comprises diverse actors (e.g. 
teams, sponsors, partners, collaborators,) R&D and business development activities, 
events (e.g. annual GLXP summit, presentations at space conferences and industry fairs,) 
collaboration networks, and participation rules. Teams may use this platform to, for 
example, recruit new members, raise funding, learn, find customers for them and for their 
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sponsors and partners, and gather other key resources. Even team members may use this 
to promote themselves (e.g. Masten Space Systems, winner of the NGLLC, saw an 
increase in interest in its employees after it won the prize.) (Masten Space Systems, 2010) 
Furthermore, this platform may transcend the competition time frame to become not only 
problem solving communities but also become the stepping stone to emerging sectors that 
target niche markets. In relation to this, the literature has addressed the potential ability of 
prizes to lower the entry barriers to industry sectors. This research maintains that it is 
through this platform that teams that demonstrate exceptional performance (generally the 
winner and/or the runner-ups) are able to successfully enter the technology sector as they 
build reputation, visibility, and relationships. 
 TIs are also potentially significant yet uncertain. The markets for lunar 
exploration technologies may be worth up to $1.5 billion in the next 10 years. However, 
it is not clear what the top market segments, market values, and required capabilities to 
exploit them will be. Most of the anticipated revenues in the medium-term are expected 
from government agencies with NASA as the primary demand. In the short-term, there 
are only relatively small, concrete opportunities for commercialization of payload 
delivery, mission data, and hardware for only a handful of teams—mostly demand from 
NASA as well—yet they also signal potential opportunities for other well performing 
teams. 
 To explain how different types of incentives weigh on the decision to participate, 
motivations can be linked to priority goals. Beyond their more or less significant industry 
experience, teams have diverse goals and therefore distinct perceptions of the value of the 
GLXP. Team goals are explicitly revealed by the teams or are implicit in their strategies. 
Interviews and other data gathered from multiples sources (e.g. prize summit, team 
websites) offered insights to assess the priority goal of teams and classify them on that 
basis. There are at least three types of teams based on their priority goal: challenge teams, 











Main driver Challenge-driven 
(seek “Glory” or self-
fulfillment, focus on 
winning the prize) 
Profit-driven (“money 
rather than fame, glory 
or glamour”) 
Opportunity to 
pursue other goals 
through prize 
participation (the 




New teams or teams 
with prize experience 
Existing space 
companies, companies 
that re-direct activities, 
teams backed by 
established companies 
Very diverse, mostly 
newly formed teams 
Team strat-
egy 
Seek shortest path to 
win the prize 











Clear and explicit 
focus on the creation 




Explicit or implicit 
goals beyond the prize 
and not necessarily 
















 I  I  W  W 
 W  W
 
Note: based on the analysis of 26 GLXP teams that entered the competition before December 2010; each 
icon represents a team; I: inactive in terms of technology outputs; W: withdrawn. 
Source: own analysis. 
 
 Challenge teams focus their efforts on winning the competition. These teams are 
driven by strong intrinsic motivations, willingness to compete, and the opportunity to 
channel all their ideas and energy. These are only a handful of unconventional teams in 
the case of the GLXP. They are probably the least risk-averse entrants as well. These 
teams ―pick up the gauntlet‖ of the challenge as their members have the ―this has my 
name on it‖ feeling. They describe themselves in terms of leadership and progress toward 
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the target. These teams also perceive other opportunities—including commercialization 
of technologies in the case of two out of four GLXP challenge teams—yet winning the 
competition is still the priority (the idea of predicting the prize winner by looking at this 
group is very appealing.) 
 Industry/startup teams are profit-driven teams. These teams consider the prize‘s 
reputation/publicity and platform values to close their business cases for 
commercialization of lunar technologies. Most of the conventional teams are part of this 
group. Winning the competition is also important for them as a good prize performance is 
likely to build even a better reputation. However, they also do a cost-benefit analysis in 
this case and profits dominate the pursuit of the prize challenge. 
 Finally, the Diverse majority comprises teams that find in the GLXP the 
opportunity to accomplish other very diverse personal/organizational goals or enjoy the 
mere participation in a project that, otherwise, they would not have access to. These 
teams may seek to win the competition, yet most of them honestly know that they do not 
have the best chances for that. These teams outnumber the teams of other types. They are 
predominantly unconventional teams and comprise most of the teams that have 
withdrawn or are relatively inactive in terms of technology outputs. 
 Considering that classification of entrants, three factors are likely to explain why 
teams decide to participate in prizes and why they choose the GLXP. The first factor is an 
essential component of the decisions of those that participate. The second and third 
factors (together or individually) are the ultimate determinants in that decision, and 
depend on the goals of the entrants. 
1. SHARED BELIEFS: there are shared beliefs among teams and prize organizers. 
These are a) the belief about the technical and/or commercial feasibility of the 
project (which may be based on own knowledge, previous experience, or even 
ingenuity,) and the belief about the merit of the pursuit from the social, 
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commercial, or personal perspective. These beliefs are stated implicitly in the 
spirit of the competition or explicitly in the prize rules and the sponsor‘s 
promotional actions. 
2. ADDED VALUE OF THE COMPETITION TO BUSINESS CASES: the prize is 
a catalyst that adds value to the business cases of those teams that seek to create a 
commercial enterprise. This happens through different means: a  potential cash 
purse that might help in closing a business case (e.g. in the GLXP, the cash purse 
represents a 20 percent ROI in a $100 million mission;) in-kind benefits (e.g. 
access to free software, discount launch services;) and access to the prize platform 
to find new customers, partners, and gather other key resources. Potential entrants 
that consider the project commercially viable yet do not perceive this prize added-
value would pursue a similar project without entering the competition and having 
to abide by prize rules. 
3. PURSUIT OF PERSONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS: participation in 
prizes gives the opportunity to, for example, win a cash purse, demonstrate 
leadership, gain prestige/popularity, and participate in an exciting project. 
 Those factors can explain why teams enter the GLXP and why other entities do 
not (Figure 7.1). In general, teams share the belief about the feasibility of the project and 
consider it worthwhile as it is commercially attractive, contributes to other team goals, 
and/or benefits society. The source of this belief is with the teams and their more general 
perceptions as a group or as individuals. For example, experts have suggested the 
existence of a new generation of entrepreneurs inspired by the possibilities offered by 
space exploration that were not fulfilled in the past. The context of the prize is also 
conducive in that regard. The new space industry and movements toward a more open 
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space activity offer success stories and demonstrations that the achievement of low-cost, 
low-technology space projects is possible. This is inspiring for the GLXP teams. The 
other two factors ultimately encourage teams. Industry/startup teams perceive the added 
value of the competition to their business cases. That is the reason why four of these 
teams officially entered the GLXP more than 24 months after the prize announcement. 
For example, participating in a competition sponsored by Google, Inc. speaks of the 
seriousness of the team and helps in fundraising. Other teams that seek to create a 
commercial enterprise (Challenge or Diverse majority teams) also consider such value, 
yet they are primarily driven by the opportunity to accomplish their 
personal/organizational goals through participation. For example, some teams seek to 
demonstrate leadership or raise society‘s interest in science. These teams consider the 




Note: stars indicate overall importance in the GLXP (more starts, more importance.) 
Source: own analysis. 
 
Figure 7.1: Factors that define participation in the GLXP 
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 Traditional industry players (e.g. Boeing, Lockheed) and many other established 
space companies did not enter the competition simply because they consider that the 
GLXP does not have any commercial merit. The GLXP mission is a discrete, one-off 
product and winning the competition is, in principle, not a sustainable business over 
time.
24
 Established companies have a costly structure to maintain and that requires 
pursuing projects that are likely to generate sustainable revenues through, for example, 
space hardware sales or provision of services. Though there is at least a source that 
anticipates attractive lunar commercial markets, the prospects are very uncertain. 
Certainly, there may also be company-level strategies whereby, for example, firms 
acquire small startups rather than developing the technology themselves (e.g. Northrop 
Grumman completed its acquisition of the AXP‘s Scaled Composites after this team won 
the competition.) 
 Partners follow a similar rationale than traditional industry players. The project is 
technically feasible for them, yet direct participation is not worthwhile from the 
commercial standpoint (i.e. it is not profitable.) Large traditional companies (e.g. 
Raytheon) enter the competition only through partnerships with GLXP teams to provide 
technologies and other in-kind support based on their existing technical solutions. Other 
companies, particularly the smaller ones, participate to benefit from increasing exposure 
to potential new customers or developing heritage for their technologies. 
 All late entries are possibly explained by these factors as well. There are nine 
teams not included in this research that entered more than 36 months after the prize 
announcement, just before closing the registration period to enter the competition. This 
fact strengthens two plausible explanations: a) there is a period for prize entrants (and 
team members, sponsors, and partners) to ―convince themselves‖ about the feasibility of 
the project and the merit of the pursuit; and, b) since the chances of winning the 
                                                          
24
 It is possible the case of teams that seek to participate in multiple prizes to generate sustainable revenues 
over time.  To the author‘s knowledge, no participating team in these three prize case studies has 
participated in more than two competitions (i.e. in a 15-year period.) 
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competition may decrease substantially for late entrants, there has to be priorities beyond 
winning the prize and/or there has to be a significant added-value of the prize to the 
strategies of these teams. However, still remains uncertain how other strategic factors at 
the team-level may affect the timing of the decision to enter the competition. Early 
entries have the advantage of longer public exposure and priority to access certain 
resources or partnerships. Yet, at the same time, these early entries possibly expose 
themselves to higher technological uncertainty and higher costs of attracting partners and 
investors (as the competition may not be visible yet.) 
 Ultimately, shared beliefs are at the core of prize competitions and can explain 
their later outcomes. An illustrative, graphical representation of the evolution of the 
GLXP in terms of its number of ―believers‖ (i.e. people that consider the prize challenge 
both feasible and rewarding) is instructive in this regard (Figure 7.2). At the beginning, 
the sponsor comes up with the idea for a prize (point A in chart, probably at the time 
Blastoff! went out of business) and shares it with experts to assess its potential (point B.) 
The XPF consulted a number of experts in 2006 and most of them considered the feat 
achievable. The sponsor also contacts potential entrants to discuss their interest in an 
eventual competition, ―trades‖ prize design features to make it even more interesting to 
potential entrants, and announce the prize (point C.) At this point, only a certain number 
of people (probably around 100) possibly know about the competition and are convinced 
that the prize challenge is feasible and worthwhile. After the prize announcement, not 
only new entrants convince themselves about the merit of this project but, most 
importantly, the media begins to support the idea and help in disseminating the vision and 
spirit of the competition. This is also a very important time period in which teams have to 
convince new members, sponsors, partners, and investors—and even their friends and 
family—that their projects are rewarding and valuable. The entry period for the 
competition closes (point D) and entrants continue their work toward the achievement of 
the prize challenge. The media helps considerably during this process to communicate 
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progress and further engage the public. When the prize is won, the facts themselves 
transform the general belief of the rest of the industry, the media, and the public about the 
feasibility of the prize target. Still, this is more likely to occur only when the achievement 




Note: the chart is for illustrative purposes based on the GLXP case. Legend for X-axis is: A: Sponsor 
comes up with prize idea; B: Sponsor test the idea with experts; C: Sponsor test the idea with potential 
entrants and announce the competition; D: Prize registration closes; E: Prize won. 
Source: own analysis. 
 
Figure 7.2: Evolution of the number of “believers” in the GLXP 
 
 Patterns like this were also observed in the most popular, historic prize 
competitions. For example, the Orteig Prize initially did not attract participants and it was 
renewed for other five years. Yet, when it was won in May 1927, it sparked a widespread 
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interest in aviation and follow up investments in this industry (O'Sullivan, 2009; Kessner, 
2010). Inspired in the Orteig Prize, the more recent AXP—purposely designed to change 
beliefs—may have also had a similar effect on public perceptions about private space 
industry capabilities (Maryniak, 2010). On the contrary, the NGLLC had a weaker effect 
as the achievement of the competition was not evident to the public (i.e. it was, among 
other things, based on the unapparent flight precision achievement) and the prize target 
did not induce a race as exciting as other competitions. This is not necessarily a negative 
assessment of this prize, since it was not designed with such purpose. 
 Overall, individuals and organizations that enter prizes tend to be less risk-averse 
than traditional industry players. Experts consulted on the matter suggest that there is 
high uncertainty about the characteristics and value of the markets for the GLXP 
technologies and that contributes to the primary reason why traditional companies do not 
enter the competition. Still, there are GLXP teams that seek to create a commercial 
enterprise based on the prize technologies anyway. In particular, unconventional teams 
perceive lower risks than conventional teams as they perceive the competition as an 
opportunity to expand their activities, professional relationships, and/or personal 
experiences. On the contrary, conventional entrants already work on related projects and 
may consider the competition as an additional risk as it compromises other personal or 
professional activities of the team members. 
 From the point of view of the implementation of competitions, the classification 
based on agency/industry experience is still valuable—to analyze the possibility to target 
―outsiders‖—and can be conveniently operationalized. Moreover, the evidence shows 
that unconventional teams also have other distinctive attributes (Table 7.3). In particular, 
unconventional entrants are in average larger teams, tend to use more volunteer effort and 
students, and, by definition, have no predominant experience with the prize technologies. 
These teams are generally organized as new, non-profit or independent groups. 
Unconventional teams perceive less significant constraints and are less risk-averse as 
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well. The most important risk for them is an excessive financial exposure. These teams 
would generally not pursue similar projects if the prize did not exist. 
 
Table 7.3: Classification of entrants based on industry experience 
Attribute Unconventional entrants Conventional entrants 
Composition  Larger in average, more 
volunteer effort, and students, 
non-aerospace experience 
 Smaller, less volunteer effort 
and students, space 
agency/industry experience 
Type of entity  Generally new, non-profit or 
independent entities 
 Pre-existing or new, generally 
for-profit entities 
Motivation  Participation in a real technical 
challenge, benefits to society, 
learning, reputation, make 
money and use technologies in 
other projects in some cases 
 Make money, develop 
technologies for own use, 
benefits to society, participation 
in a real technical challenge 
Perceived 
constraints 
 Time/funding (to some extent)  Time/funding (great extent), 
unclear rules , advantages of 
other teams, strategies of other 
teams, lack of skills 
Perceived risk  Financial (in some cases)  Financial, diversion from other 




if the prize did 
not exist? 
 Less likely  More likely 
Note: only more significant differences are shown 
Source: own analysis. 
 
7.2 Prize R&D activities 
 H2 anticipated that shorter lead times and more significant funding requirements 
posed by the prize lead to simpler technological designs, more significant use of existing 
or standard technologies, and more collaborative R&D efforts. The evidence does not 
reject H2 conclusively yet suggests a spurious relationship influenced by entrant- and 
context-level factors. Moreover, there are other stronger alternative explanations and 
other unique characteristics of R&D organization in the GLXP. 
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 In general, there is a weak relationship between designs, technology sources, 
collaborations and the conditions posed by the PC. Teams do introduce simpler designs 
and rely more upon existing or standard technologies when facing a lack of funding or 
the need to accelerate projects. Most of the teams also partner with other organizations. 
However, there must be other explanatory factors to this because teams introduce simpler 
designs, use existing technologies, and partner with other organizations even when they 
do not perceive time- or funding-related constraints for their projects. 
 The examination by type of entrant is instructive. Unconventional entrants have 
been more likely to introduce simpler technologies to shorten development lead times and 
respond to a lack of funding, yet, at the same time, these teams are more likely to 
consider that time and funding are not a constraint. In other words, they may effectively 
implement approaches to problem-solving based on simpler solutions that help to 
accelerate their projects and/or overcome funding shortages. On the other hand, 
conventional entrants are more likely to partner with other organizations when facing 
time/funding constraints, which may be explained by more dense, pre-existing 
professional networks. These teams have also been more likely to perceive significant 
constraints in the form of lack of time and funding, possibly explained by approaches to 
space projects inherited from traditional industry practices. Compared to unconventional 
teams, the differences in the use of existing technologies have been, nonetheless, 
minimal. 
 Further comparisons with the organization of R&D activities in the new space 
industry and other emerging space initiatives are also insightful (Table 7.4). Design 
criteria such as simplicity, minimalism, and low cost are characteristics of other space 
private/amateur initiatives as well. Cost is an independent variable in these cases yet, in 
contexts other than prizes, minimum mission requirements can be internally adjusted by 
R&D performers to match budgets. Prize teams balance the use of existing technologies 
with in-house development depending on teams‘ ultimate goals. Yet, there is a wide 
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range of technology sourcing approaches in the GLXP. Generally, there is a strong 
reliance on COTS technologies and subcontracting and the principle ―minimum 
engineering development effort.‖ These attributes are explained by the need to reduce 
costs and shorten lead times. Other non-prize efforts also tend to use COTS technologies 
yet seek to develop technologies in-house. 
 Compared to other non-prize space activities, it is more difficult to find distinctive 
patterns of internal organization of R&D. The most prominent difference is the density of 
partnership networks created by GLXP teams. Teams also draw upon significant 
volunteer effort, but this is not a prize-specific feature. Moreover, there are several 
entrepreneurial- or startup-like styles in the GLXP that differ from new space industry 
enterprises mainly in terms of fundraising and revenue models. New space industry‘s 
startups depend mostly on government contracts, venture capital, and commercial 
contracts/services. GLXP teams have also raised funding from private investors and 
received contracts from NASA, yet their most important support comes from partners, 
sponsors, and significant in-kind efforts (e.g. volunteers) and resources (e.g. access to 
specialized facilities.) Significant knowledge exchanges also occur in the context of 
prizes. This suggests an open innovation approach to leverage external research and 
complement internal technological activities with increasing knowledge flows 
(Chesbrough, 2003, 2006). In prizes, partners are sources of expertise. The new space 
industry and other amateur initiatives are also key sources to find solutions to specific 
technical problems. For example, some GLXP teams have discussed technical solutions 
with former NGLLC teams (now space startups) or considered designs introduced by 
amateur rocketry associations. 
Design criteria, technology sources, and the extent of collaborations are more 
distinctive attributes at a lower level of analysis—the R&D organization of each team. 
This research was able to identify four illustrative examples named Space Agency 
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Legacy, Universities Partnership, Partnerships Network, and University Spin-off. These 
forms of organization are diverse and demonstrate that, ultimately, the R&D organization 
that teams adopt expresses their goals, knowledge, skills, and available resources, and 
may not be directly influenced by the prize. For example, while some teams draw upon 
existing COTS technologies to reduce engineering effort and costs, others seek to 
produce in-house to gain hands-on experience, develop technologies for other projects, or 
commercialize hardware. This also relates with approaches based on trial-and-error or 




Table 7.4: Main differences between selected instances of technology R&D in space projects 
 
Traditional Space New Space Industry 
Other space initiatives (e.g. 
Copenhagen Suborbitals) 
GLXP 
Design criteria  Performance and reliability 
are top criteria 
 Cost is dependent variable 
 Project requirements given by 
space agency in the context of 
long-term programs 
 Reliability and security 
 Cost-benefit analysis 
 Requirements given by 
emerging market segments 
(e.g. space tourism, scientific 
payload delivery) 
 Simplicity and low cost, 
minimalism 
 Cost is independent variable 
 Simple, concrete goals set the 
specifications for new space 
projects 
 Simplicity and low cost, 
minimalism; new criteria, e.g. 
scalability, ―simple and smart‖ 
 Cost is independent variable 
 Specifications in the form of 
minimum capability and 
implicit reference to the cost 




 High-technology, low TRL 
levels 
 Engineering effort 
 Use of in-house development 
capabilities 
 Prime contractors 
 Engineering effort 
 In-house development 
 Significant use of proven, 
commercially available off-
the-shelf technologies 
 Use of non-space components 
 In-house production 
 Significant use of proven, 
commercially available off-
the-shelf technologies, gov. 
programs‘ surplus 
 Subcontracting 
 Minimum development effort 
R&D 
organization 
 Large, bureaucratic, integrated 
organizations with significant 
in-house engineering 
capabilities 
 Program budget 
 Specialization and part-
nerships yet retaining project 
control 
 Startup-like organization, 
small companies 
 Government (e.g. SBIR, 
COTS) and commercial 
contracts, private investors, 
venture capital, prizes (e.g. 
NGLLC) 
 Small organizations 
 Volunteer effort 
 Donors support, in-kind 
contributions 
 Collaborations, open-source 
approaches 
 Move fast from idea to 
construction 
 Flat, flexible, small 
organizations 
 Volunteer/collaborative effort 
 NASA contracts and 
commercial contracts; 
partnerships and sponsors; 
investors in some cases; in-
kind contributions 
 Collaborations, open-source 
and networked approaches 
 Rapid prototyping 
Note: these characteristics do not seek to be comprehensive; only the most distinctive features are shown. 
Source: own analysis based on data presented in previous sections. 
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 This research was not able to uncover all the diversity existing in other teams, yet 
contributed some evidence of new-to-industry approaches to space R&D in the GLXP. 
Most notably, there are open source-like organizational forms (i.e. with explicit open-
source strategies to coordinate distributed efforts,) highly networked organizational forms 
(i.e. organizations that draw upon significant number of partners to source technologies 
and expertise,) and open-innovation organizational forms (i.e. that are open to significant 
knowledge flows from multiple sources.) In this regard, the geographically distributed 
efforts inside the organizational boundaries of teams and between teams and their 
partners are very interesting. Generally, face-to-face communications enable more rapid 
feedback, decoding, and synthesis of complex information in contexts such as 
engineering projects (Kessler & Chakrabarti, 1999). For a GLXP-like project, it may be 
expected for teams to co-locate their activities to perform even better or, at least, lower 
costs. Yet, on the contrary, teams generally engage members and collaborators from 
multiple locations and even multiple countries. The explanation for this might be in the 
pursuit of projects with lower levels of systems complexity and in very efficient use of 
new communication technologies and virtual collaboration tools (there is some evidence 
of cases of miscommunication, though.) 
 Though the overall development of the prize competition approximates an open-
innovation process, the evidence suggests that the collaborative efforts performed by 
GLXP teams represent competitive strategies and are, possibly, competition-specific (i.e. 
the examination of other competitions may uncover different configurations.) There are at 
least two factors that explain collaborative strategies in this context. First, teams use 
specialized partners to reduce programmatic and technology risks by using their proven 
technological solutions and relying upon their expertise. Second, building a reputation of 
proven solutions is very important to succeed in the space business. The GLXP gives 
many non-traditional aerospace organizations (particularly, smaller companies) the 
opportunity to invest in building reputation by providing technologies to prize entrants. 
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For those organizations, this is a unique opportunity to demonstrate their capabilities in a 
sector that has been traditionally reserved to government agencies and large corporations. 
This opportunity is not only available for aerospace-related companies but also for 
companies that manufacture components and systems that have to deliver high 
performance and reliability in harsh environments other than space. 
 On the other hand, collaboration between GLXP teams is not significant 
according to the evidence available to this research, at least in a comparison with 
competitions such as the NGLLC. A potential explanation for this is the very competitive 
environment created by the prize and the diversity in entrant goals. Moreover, team 
headquarters are widely distributed in many countries which reduces the chances of face-
to-face interactions, something that only occurs at the annual GLXP summits and/or 
industry conferences. Not all teams, however, participate in the annual summits and even 
fewer coincide at conferences. The NGLLC, which held annual races with participation 
of all teams, created many more opportunities for interaction and collaboration between 
teams. Collaborations in the context of the competition may be the basis for the formation 
of stronger problem-solving communities that transcend the prize time frame. The 
literature has found that this is the case of online prize platforms (Bullinger et al., 2010; 
Hutter et al., 2011). Furthermore, collaborations in those competitions are also key for 
individual innovators to succeed. Similarly, the GLXP website allows posting comments 
on teams‘ profile web pages, but neither incentivizes nor offers tools for more intense 
virtual interactions and collaborations.
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 The evidence suggests that, ultimately, the lead times allowed by the GLXP are 
not as stringent as the funding requirements emerging from the PC definition, and that the 
most unique characteristic of the overall organization of prize R&D activities is not in the 
                                                          
25
 The GLXP website originally hosted an online forum open to the public as well. According to the XPF, 
―the small team that works on GLXP simply ran out of the time resources required to moderate such a 
large and active forum community.‖ (GLXP, 2009) Therefore, the forum was moved to a third-party, space 
specialized website (SpaceFellowship.com GLXP Forum.)  
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design criteria, technology sources, or collaborations. Past government-led missions have 
executed even more complex projects and with more bureaucratic procedures in shorter 
development lead times and there are GLXP teams that plan mission achievements one or 
two years shorter than the prize maximum lead time. The GLXP is, nonetheless, a 
competitive context and the externally imposed deadline has a unique significance. The 
prize deadline has the more general effect observed in studies of task performance under 
time constraints (Amabile et al., 1976): it causes the energizing effect that makes teams 
work harder and induces them to make decisions about the organization of their 
individual work based on their perceptions of the time needed to accomplish the task, 
which, in this case, as discussed earlier, depends on the ultimate goals of the team. 
 Therefore, both the deadline and implicit funding requirements have, in 
conjunction with the minimum mission requirements, the key role of defining the 
boundaries of the solutions space or area of convergence for the expected solutions to the 
challenge (in other competitions such as the NGLLC there are also technical 
specifications to deliver some technology.) (Figure 7.3) This space, however, does not 
necessarily dictate the design criteria and technology sources in GLXP projects and 
certainly is not a precise focus. The expected development lead times in GLXP projects 
range between 30 and 90 months and the expected mission costs range between $5 
million and $100 million. These wide ranges are explained by teams‘ distinctive goals, 
strategies, and access to resources. This also points to a feature of prizes widely discussed 
by the literature, yet with an interesting twist in this case. Contrary to other prizes such as 
the NGLLC, the GLXP neither requires creating a spacecraft of certain 
type/characteristics and demonstrating its capabilities nor specifies how the prize 
challenge has to be achieved. The potential result is, as suggested by the literature, 
unexpected approaches to the prize challenge which may include, in this case, more 
novel, affordable, and/or flexible project management approaches to planetary 
exploration. Those approaches might be implemented in future missions and become one 
231 
 
of the most significant (organizational) innovations induced by this competition. The 
interesting part of this explanation is that this is not only valid for unconventional 
entrants which may bring their unorthodox R&D approaches—as the literature 
suggests—but also for conventional entrants that seek to be the first to accomplish the 
prize challenge. 
 The basic prize problem solving activity observed in the GLXP—aimed at 
winning the competition—encompasses both the convergence of solutions toward that 
solutions space and the interaction between R&D activities and 
fundraising/commercialization efforts. This process is characterized by iterations or 
cycles with significant learning opportunities during the competition. The ability of teams 
to retain the IP and commercialization rights on their technologies enables this process as 
it allows to develop partnerships, exchange resources, and raise funding. This has 
important theoretical implications because the development of this innovation process 
requires for the prize technologies—contrary to the general assumption of economic prize 
models—not to be placed in the public domain. 
 The general approach of teams to solve the GLXP problem can be explained as 
follows (Figure 7.4). The prize poses a challenge in the form of soft-landing-, mobility-, 
and communication-capability requirements that can be approached in multiple ways. 
Any approach still requires significant funding to be carried out, particularly due to the 
expensive launch vehicle. Teams are free to choose their launch services or even develop 
their own launch vehicles. Most of the teams, however, consider using proven, 
commercially available solutions since the development of new launch vehicles is not 
feasible within the GLXP‘s timeframe (this timeframe is relative for those teams with 
extra-prize goals.) Those commercial launch solutions determine both the minimum 
funding requirements and the maximum payload capabilities. Teams perform significant 
effort on fundraising and/or business development to finance their missions, which 
diverts their engineering efforts and sometimes imposes new design 
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requirements/development efforts. For example, the successful commercialization of 
payload transportation services generates revenues yet, on the other hand, increases the 
spacecraft mass and, eventually, the launch costs. Other revenue models—such as those 
based on data sales—do not impact spacecraft designs, but require accomplishing the 
mission first. Teams also seek to reduce engineering efforts to produce their technical 
solutions. COTS technologies or technologies sourced from partners help in that regard, 
yet those technologies may be not readily compatible with the team‘s systems and thus 
require some adaptation effort. Teams also perform significant trial-and-error and 
prototyping iterations to find solutions to specific technical problems when they do not 
have resources to acquire certain parts or components. Overall, the R&D-fundraising 
interaction makes project management more complex and induces a spiraled evolution 
that converges into a final solution. 
 
 
Note: based on data available for costs and duration of five GLXP projects. 
Source: own analysis. 
 




 To a limited extent, the interrelation between budget and R&D activities also 
exists in other contexts. For example, in agencies‘ space programs, changes in project 
goals and actual developments are introduced due to both the uncertainty about the 
funding available for a program and the constraints resulting from annual revisions of 
budgets (Bitten, 2008). The examples shown for other private space initiatives also 
depend greatly on fundraising, yet the interaction in those cases might not be as strong as 
in prizes since they are not in a competitive, race-like context or do not seek to 
commercialize technologies. On the other hand, the much discussed, general interrelation 
between corporate R&D management, investment, and debt policies depends on very 
different factors that include, for example, predictability and movement of debts, profits, 
and cash flows (see, for example, Hall, 1992; Himmelberg & Petersen, 1994; Bond et al., 
1999; Hall, 2002) 
 Finally, there is also evidence that builds upon that interaction between R&D 
activities and fundraising/commercialization and stresses the entrepreneurial or 
commercially-oriented forms of R&D organization in the GLXP. In general, similar 
responses to a lack of funding and a lack of time suggests that both factors, schedule and 
cost, have analogous effects and that there is no tension between them, i.e. faster 
development is likely to be less expensive as well. This is generally also the case of space 
projects due to large overhead costs of agencies and large contractors. There are a few 
GLXP teams, however, that refer to the relationship cost/schedule as a trade-off, in the 
sense that more funding can ―buy time‖ or shorten development lead times. This type of 
trade-off has also been noted by the specialized space literature to describe recent 
NASA‘s smaller missions (Dornheim, 2003) and has largely been discussed by the new 
commercial product development literature (see, for example, Mansfield, 1988; Gupta & 





Notes: the chart is a simplified representation of the problem-solving process according to data gathered from several GLXP teams; this overall description of the 
team activities does not represent necessarily the strategies or approaches of all teams. 
Source: own analysis 
 





7.3 Prize technology outputs 
 H3 anticipated that, for any fixed prize challenge definition, unconventional 
entrants are more likely to introduce novel technologies and conventional entrants are 
more likely to advance more mature technologies for commercialization. There is some 
evidence compatible with this hypothesis, yet is not conclusive to completely explain 
PTOs as a function of the types of entrants that produce them. 
 Unconventional teams have introduced a small number of novel concepts and 
produced new models and prototypes aimed at technology demonstration and 
experimentation. Those developments have been mostly related to landers, rovers, and 
propulsion systems/transfer vehicles. These teams have also reported significant 
innovations in the form of new products or components that are useful for both the GLXP 
and other projects. However, only a share of these technologies might ultimately be 
further developed and enter a production phase for own use/commercialization as teams 
generally use them to explore and test alternative approaches to accomplish the GLXP 
challenge. In other cases, technologies may not reach a production or implementation 
phase if unconventional teams lack resources, skills, or further incentives (about half of 
the unconventional teams that entered the GLXP before December 2010 are inactive or 
have withdrawn the competition.) The newness of these technologies not only results 
from fresh ideas and unorthodox approaches as suggested by the literature and the 
evidence of a number of new design criteria. These teams also draw upon larger 
volunteer efforts and are less risk-averse which allows, for example, more significant 
trial-and-error iterations. 
 On the other hand, most of the conventional teams advance existing technologies 
and seek their implementation to commercialize payload delivery, launch, or other types 
of services. There is little evidence of commercialization of hardware which might signal 
this is not the top lunar market segment as private estimates foresee (see Prize Context in 
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previous section.) These teams have focused their engineering efforts not only on new 
landers and rovers but also, to some extent, on the development of new photo/video 
systems and control/navigation hardware and software. Some of these teams have also 
reported significant innovations. A few of these teams have worked on introducing novel 
designs (e.g. hopping lander) that may be used not only to accomplish the GLXP mission 
but also to deliver commercial services. 
 More generally, the GLXP induced significant outputs from similar numbers of 
unconventional and conventional teams. Most of the teams contributing significant PTOs 
have advanced technologies at medium-high levels of technology maturity (somewhere 
between TRL levels 6 and 8) that might eventually become proven technologies after 
successful achievement of the challenge. Figure 7.5 illustrates the distribution of 
significant technology outputs of the GLXP at different TRL levels. The bell-shaped 
curve reflects the concentration of outputs at higher maturity levels and the introduction 
of fewer experimental and novel technologies as well. At least four main types of outputs 
have been produced in three years of competition: 
a. NEW CONCEPTS AND EXPERIMENTAL TECHNOLOGIES: these outputs 
either contribute new-to-industry concepts or solutions (e.g. new mobility 
concepts such as ball-shaped robots, new software algorithms) or advance the 
maturity of existing technologies (e.g. hoppers or leg-enabled systems.) Some of 
these may not reach production/implementation phases in the foreseeable future 
yet others may become truly breakthroughs in planetary exploration or other 
industrial applications. The evidence does not allow establishing a causal 
connection between these outputs and the design of the prize competition, yet 
they are undoubtedly enabled by an open-ended definition of the PC. 
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b. CREATIVE SOLUTIONS TO SPECIFIC, WELL-DEFINED PROBLEMS: these 
outputs address specific technical problems such as operation in the harsh lunar 
environment and balance of mass/size/capabilities of spacecrafts. These are 
problems found in previous planetary missions and are well-known to the teams. 
The solutions are still unproven, generally introduced by unconventional teams, 
and likely to be first implemented in GLXP missions (e.g. solar panel-antenna 
integration, internal mobility mechanisms.) These solutions are the ―smart 
response‖ of teams to solve those problems while reducing project costs and 
shortening technology development lead times. 
c. MORE AFFORDABLE AND SIMPLER VERSIONS OF EXISTING 
SYSTEMS: these outputs comprise mostly landers and rovers based on existing, 
more mature technologies (e.g. wheeled rovers) and are aimed at the achievement 
of the PC or delivery of payload services. The quality of these outputs respond to 
specific team goals and generally result from engineering efforts to satisfy the 
minimum requirements of the prize (e.g. producing a rover with life-time to 
traverse 500 meters only) or commercially oriented spacecraft developments. 
These technologies are relatively similar between teams and can be considered as 
―me-too‖ systems rather than original developments. 
d. NEW DEVELOPMENT AND MISSION APPROACHES: these outputs are 
already implemented by some teams for their GLXP missions and are likely to be 
commercialized, in the form of expertise—by the team members individually or 
as a new enterprise of the team—and/or provision of mission support services. 
These new approaches combine partnerships and other forms of collaborative 
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effort, more affordable technologies, and new business models. These outputs can 
be connected to the new schedule/funding requirement conditions posed by the 
GLXP. 
 
 An elaboration on the team goals, the PC definition, and the maturity of planetary 
exploration and related technologies can explain the GLXP‘s PTOs. Ongoing industry 
projects, relevant technical solutions, and more affordable and reliable non-space grade 
components allow major proportions of the GLXP projects to be based on existing—
particularly COTS--technologies. Moreover, these technologies attenuate projects risks as 
well. Therefore, to win the prize, teams generally seek to perform the least possible 
engineering effort by either a) working on advancing technologies that are closer to be 
flight-ready or b) adapting/using existing, proven technical solutions. Since this 
competition does not explicitly require building any system, decisions about a) and b) 
depend on whether technologies and/or funding are available to teams. Generally when 
facing a lack of funding, teams partner with other organizations to source/develop 
technologies or they explore creative ways to solve technical problems. While the latter is 
associated with the introduction of more novel ideas, experimentation, and lower TRL 
levels, both a) and b) are linked to higher TRLs. Other teams that have goals beyond the 
prize (e.g. having fun, creating a company, other organizational goals) do not have to 
optimize their prize performance in that way. These entrants may seek to explore novel 
technologies, use existing solutions, or produce technologies with commercial merit, 
which involves R&D in a wide range of maturity levels. Decisions in those cases depend 
on specific goals and resources available to teams and require individual, team-level 
analyses for their interpretation. In the GLXP case, this diversity comprises experimental 
tests of alternative propulsion methods, novel mobility systems concepts, and landers 
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Note: the chart is illustrative based on evidence available to this research as of December 2010. 
Source: own analysis. 
 
Figure 7.5: GLXP technology development activity 
 
 The consideration of the same factors in the three case studies—PC definition and 
technology gap and state of the art of relevant technologies—offers interesting insights 
for further elaboration (see Table 7.5). 
 Let us discuss first, at least briefly, the case of a historic prize to start this 
elaboration. The French government‘s Food Preservation Prize of 1795 was aimed at 
creating a new technology. It offered a sizable cash award of 12,000 francs (about 
$44,000 in current dollars) to any inventor who could devise a cheap and effective 
method of preserving large amounts of food for troops in foreign land. This prize was 
won in 1809 by Nicolas François Appert, who invented the canning method based on the 
discovery of new principles (the method involved boiling and seal-packing food in 
airtight glass jars.) No empirical evidence exists on other approaches used in the attempt 
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to win the prize. The fast commercial implementation of Appert‘s solution (only a few 
months after) demonstrates that its newness was not in its technological complexity. Yet, 
it took more than 50 years until Louis Pasteur provided the scientific explanation of the 
method‘s effectiveness (KEI, 2008; McKinsey & Company, 2009). 
 The recent AXP involved the development of suborbital spacecraft technologies 
building only upon some prior experimental research (the USAF/NACA X-15 program.) 
The idea of space tourism was not new, yet the XPF defined it in concrete terms or 
minimum requirements. The winning entry—the most notable technology output of this 
competition—was a spacecraft based on existing technologies and materials, but it 
featured a novel configuration at lower-medium TRL levels. Other entries analyzed here 
were based on even more experimental methods such as balloons. While the prize 
spanned eight years of competition, the winner reported that the winning entry had a 
development lead time of only three years. But, subsequent works to develop and 
manufacture new flight-ready suborbital vehicles based on such technology have taken 
Scaled Composites about six years.
26
 
 The NGLLC spanned even shorter lead times and more mature technologies. It 
involved building and flying a VTOL vehicle with relevant technologies readily 
available, including the 1990s antecedent Delta Clipper program. All cash purses were 
won after four years of competition, with outputs primarily observed in terms of 
converging rocket technology developments and efficiency improvements at medium-
high TRL levels. Subsequent developments have taken place since with support from 
NASA contracts. 
 Finally, the existence of a significant pool of knowledge and relevant technologies 
available to GLXP entrants (some of them readily commercially available) has enabled 
the pursuit of commercially viable approaches to space technologies. The longer lead 
                                                          
26




times to win the GLXP can be explained by challenging fundraising activities and 
unfavorable economic conditions. 
 Two patterns can be probed in these prize cases. First, there is the relationship 
between the maturity levels of the prize technology outputs and the availability of prior 
technical solutions. In general, it can be posited, the larger the pool of knowledge and 
technologies readily available to address the problem, the higher the maturity levels the 
prize can target. For instance, in both AXP and NGLLC, but particularly in the former, 
the technologies were still experimental at the moment the prize was won. In the case of 
the Food Preservation Prize, the method just discovered was quickly introduced and 
disseminated, yet the underlying scientific principle was not understood until 50 years 
later. The GLXP technologies are concentrated at higher maturity levels. 
 Second, in the same vein, there are the development lead times that prizes had to 
allow to come up with a solution to the challenge, which may be significantly longer at 
lower maturity levels when controlling for contextual factors and resources available to 
teams. In this prize cases, discovering a new principle (i.e. the Food Preservation Prize) 
took 15 years, developing new technologies (i.e. AXP) took a few years, and increasing 
efficiency and incremental development took months (i.e. in each NGLLC competition.) 
In the GLXP, technology and services commercialization started as soon as the prize was 
announced. 
 This perspective on prizes suggests that a) prizes may not be effective to induce 
technology development if they pose challenges for which the relevant technologies are 
not yet up to the PC requirements (e.g. may not be effective to induce commercialization 
of technologies if these are not mature yet;) or, b) prizes may effectively produce such 
effects but only if they allow longer development lead times, provide more significant 
incentives, and/or development support. Theoretically, this line of thought finds support 
on the sequential and cumulative nature of innovation by which each successive 
invention builds in an essential way on its predecessors and follow-up developments 
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substantially enhance the commercial value of the technologies (Green & Scotchmer, 
1995). 
 On the other hand, the examples of Table 7.5 also bring to mind the question of 
whether technology prizes should explicitly require building new systems or let entrants 
decide about the means to accomplish the challenge. Two of the examples—the AXP and 
NGLLC—are prizes for technology demonstration, i.e. they explicitly required to build 
certain equipment and demonstrate its capabilities. The other two—GLXP and Food 
Preservation Prize
27
—are prizes for technology-based achievement, i.e. entrants choose 
the means to accomplish the feat, which may involve building new systems of 
unspecified characteristics. With that requirement, sponsors can set minimal technical 
parameters (i.e. design and/or functional requirements) that focus efforts and increase the 
likelihood of obtaining a winning entry compatible with the expectations of the sponsor. 
That may, however, limit the introduction of more creative, affordable, or efficient 
methods and technologies that are not exactly up to the characteristics required by the 
prize. Interestingly, the latter may be still preferable in some circumstances. If sponsors 
do not use the requirement of developing a new technology with certain characteristics, 
entrants may unexpectedly find a solution based on current-day methods and 
technologies and win the competition ―by cheating,‖ i.e. without producing any 
technological development or innovation. For example, if the AXP did not require 
building a spacecraft, entrants would probably have adapted existing aircrafts with 
operational capabilities to reach higher, suborbital altitudes. 
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 This research has no data on whether the Food Preservation Prize actually required building, for example, 
a new device or equipment. Considering the type of function required by the prize challenge, it is likely that 
the sponsor expected any kind of method to accomplish that function, which may have involved building 
something new or not. Ultimately, the prize was won by applying a newly discovered principle. 
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Table 7.5: Selected prize cases, prize challenge definitions, technology gaps, and technology outputs 
 
Prize cases (selected examples) 
Historic prizes? 
e.g. French gov. Food 
Preservation Prize (KEI, 
2008) 
Ansari X Prize NGLLC GLXP 
Sponsor‘
s goal 
Need to preserve food for 
troops in foreign lands 
Change belief about private 
industry capabilities 
Commercial development of 
VTOL vehicles 




1795 1996 2006 2007 
Prize 
won in 





Prize for technology-based 
achievement 
Prize for technology 
demonstration 
Prize for technology 
demonstration 





Create a method to preserve 
large amounts of food 
Build and launch a reusable 
manned spacecraft into space 
twice within two weeks 
Build and fly a reusable, 
rocket-powered vehicle 
simulating a flight on the 
moon within pre-specified 
timeframe, performance, and 
location 
Land a spacecraft on the 
Moon, traverse 500 meters, 





N/A USAF/NACA X-15 project 
NASA Apollo landers, DC-X 
Delta Clipper 
NASA Apollo missions, 
planetary missions, startups 
(e.g. LunaCorp, Blastoff!) 
Note: a. Type of prize according to required output. 




Table 7.5: Selected prize cases, prize challenge definitions, technology gaps, and technology outputs (Contd.) 
 
Prize cases (selected examples) 
Historic prizes? 
e.g. French gov. Food 
Preservation Prize (KEI, 
2008) 
Ansari X Prize NGLLC GLXP 
Technol-
ogy gap 
Nature of solution unknown 
Demonstration of technology 
feasibility 
Demonstration of technical 
efficiency 





Winning entry: new 
invention, canning method 
Varied conceptual 
approaches including 
balloons, aircrafts with 
different configurations, 
rockets.  
Winning entry: Spacecrafts 
with new application of 
materials, new configuration 
and conceptual approach 
Converging conceptual 
approaches, more efficient 
VTOL technologies and 
methods 
Winning entry: New 
controls, rocket engine 
components, operational 
capabilities 
Use of existing launch 
technologies, creative 
solutions to specific 
problems, COTS 
components, new business 
development approaches; 




Low TRLs Medium TRLs Medium-High TRLs Medium-High TRLs 
Note: a. Type of prize according to required output. 
Source: own analysis and cited literature. 
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 Those examples allow exploring alternative classifications of competitions to 
further probe the effect of prizes and systematize the implementation of prize programs, 
despite the number of factors that demonstrate how unique each prize is. The 
generalization of the perspective discussed in prior paragraphs leads to the typology 
shown in Table 7.6. These four types of prizes are characterized by the relationship 
between the expected technology outputs of the competition and state of the art of the 
technologies in the technological field in which the prize is announced. This typology is a 




Table 7.6: Typology of prizes based on expected technology outputs 
 Typology of prizes based on expected technological outputs 
 
Prizes for novel solutions and 
concepts 
Prizes for technology 
development 
Prizes for incremental 
improvements 





Find or create a method to 
perform new function 
Develop technology to 
accomplish a feat 
Improve technology to achieve 
higher performance standards 
Implement technologies under 




of the art 
Unclear what basic principles 
the solution should draw upon 
Basic principles known, 
experimental research 
performed 
Existing technologies with at 
least medium level of maturity 
Existing technologies with 
medium-high level of maturity 
Technol-
ogy gap 












    
Examples 
French gov. Food Preservation 
Prize, Longitude Prize 
Ansari X Prize NGLLC, DARPA Challenges GLXP 
Source: own analysis. 
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 The evidence on the GLXP also suggests that two factors—both parameters in 
prize design—may affect the focus of the expected technology outputs if the appropriate 
development lead times are allowed (Figure 7.6). First, significantly low target budgets 
and/or funding constraints to accomplish the mission in commercially viable terms may 
represent a new technical problem that induces engineering effort at lower TRL levels to 
find more affordable solutions, despite the existence of related technologies. In the 
GLXP, this can explain the use of creative solutions to specific well-defined problems, 
more affordable versions of existing systems, and new development and mission 
approaches. This effect depends on the minimum funding requirements to perform R&D 
activities for the technologies involved in the prize. In more general terms, significantly 
lower target costs may lead to the advancement of technologies with lower maturity 
levels if that implies finding more affordable solutions to the prize challenge (effect 
shown by (a) in Figure 7.6). Second, the perception of a sizable market value for the prize 
technologies and/or a prize challenge that includes a commitment to buy prize 
technologies may lead to advancing technologies toward 
implementation/commercialization stages at higher TRL levels (shown by (b) in Figure 
7.6). In the GLXP, for example, the perceptions of a sizable market are generally driving 
the development and, most importantly, the implementation of technologies to deliver 
lunar commercial services. 
 It is also compelling to examine how teams with different goals contribute 
technological outputs in the GLXP. Table 7.7 shows examples of outputs and the 
assessment of the contributions of the three groups of teams according to priority goals. 
Challenge teams can be associated with more creative solutions to specific problems, 
more entrepreneurial orientation, and development of technologies at medium and high 
TRL levels. These outputs can be generally explained by efforts to shorten typical 
development lead times and reducing project budgets by introducing simpler and more 
affordable solutions. A few—yet potentially valuable—new conceptual approaches have 
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also been introduced by this group (e.g. open source development, new mobility 
systems.) Industry/startup teams have a clear profit-driven approach and work mostly on 
the advancement of more mature technologies for commercialization. There are some 
novel concepts in this group yet, even in those cases, technologies are developed based 
on existing projects and commercial developments of partners or target the provision of 
services. Finally, there is a majority of teams that contribute very diverse technologies, 
including more affordable versions of existing technologies and new development and 
mission approaches. Several teams in this group have not contributed significant outputs. 
 
 
Note: the figure is illustrative and does not represent any prize in particular. 
Source: own analysis. 
 
Figure 7.6: Generic effect of more stringent prize challenge conditions and increasing 
technology incentives on expected prize technology outputs 
 
 Interestingly, the duplication of R&D efforts suggested by the literature is not 
generally apparent in the analysis of technology outputs, as a wide range of technologies 
is under development. If there is duplication of efforts, it must be related with the 
development of, for example, more affordable landers and wheeled rovers. However, it is 
difficult to find similarities beyond the more visible 4-wheel or 6-wheel traditional 
configurations. Overall, a possible explanation for the diversity of technologies is that, in 
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spite of the low barriers to enter the competition and the number of would-be entrants 
interested in the prize, only 35 teams ultimately entered the competition–26 analyzed 
here—and several teams that did enter the competition are inactive in terms of 
technology development. There is a handful of teams offering similar payload delivery 
services based on those alternative lander/rover designs, which is a positive outcome 
considering the sponsor‘s goal of promoting space commercialization (i.e. a larger 
number of companies offering those services would lead to lower payload delivery costs.) 
By design, the GLXP has sought to have multiple back-end business markets that can be 
supported by the technologies developed in pursuit of the prize. Yet, in this case, the data 
suggest that the wide variety of technologies under development is, more likely, the 
direct consequence of the diversity of teams and team goals, and are certainly allowed by 
the open-ended challenge definition and relaxed criteria of eligibility to enter the 
competition. 
 Two final considerations apply to this analysis. The GLXP is an ongoing prize 
competition and therefore the number of significant PTOs is likely to increase over time. 
This consideration is more relevant to the possible implementation of novel technologies. 
A hint of the near-term developments in terms of PTOs is given by the fact that, after 
three years of competition, similar proportions of both unconventional and conventional 
entrants have team members exclusively dedicated to business development or 
commercialization of the prize technologies. This suggests that more technologies may 
eventually be advanced toward commercialization. Finally, the assessment of the level of 
maturity of the technologies has been made at the level of the technology 
subsystem/system and is not detailed enough to capture the full range of possible new 
technologies at the level of, for example, materials or components. That might be a 
reason for the small number of novel technologies found in the GLXP, though, 
considering the competitive context, the lack of up-front funding, and the minimum 
possible engineering effort criterion, it seems less likely for teams—yet not impossible—
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to develop new basic principles or materials. Moreover, this analysis mostly depends on 
the information that teams publicize about their projects. 
 
Table 7.7: Examples of PTOs based on team goals 
 








 New solar panel-
antenna 
configuration 







 New conceptual 
approaches to 
mobility 
 New approaches to 
space development 
 Landers with 
payload capabilities 
 Propulsion systems 
 Navigation and 
control systems 
 Hopping rover 





 More affordable 
and simpler 





 Descent rocket 
motors 








 Creative solutions 
to specifically 
defined, known 
problems; a few 
new conceptual 
approaches 





of lunar services 
 Mostly high TRL 
levels 
 Fewer significant 
outputs 
 Development of 
technologies of a 
wide range of TRL 
levels 
Note: based on the analysis of 26 GLXP teams that entered the competition before December 2010. 





7.4 The overall effect on innovation 
 H4 anticipated that for any fixed technology sector and its general context, more 
significant prize incentives and more open-ended challenge definitions are more likely to 
induce innovation. The evidence suggests that, effectively, under certain conditions, 
increasing PIs are more likely to induce innovation. However, the effect of those 
incentives is indirect and other intervening factors are required to explain the complex 
incentives-innovation relationship. In general, the evidence suggests that technological 
breakthroughs cannot be directly induced but only enabled by prizes. 
 Figure 7.7 draws upon the model used in this research and the findings to present 
the main factors that significantly affect the innovation effect of the GLXP. The PIs 
position the competition in the right place from the media and public standpoint, and 
attracts diverse types of entrants. Yet, entrants—based on their perceptions, strategies, 
and resources—ultimately decide R&D effort levels in the competition and bring their 
ideas and focus on certain technologies. A few other factors may indirectly influence the 
ultimate output and innovation effect. The PC time/funding conditions influence the 
R&D approaches adopted by teams. The PC definition has also the dual effect of 
focusing and enabling efforts and technology outputs, though, in this case, the definition 
is very open-ended and, with regard to technical specifications, only minimum 
capabilities are required (i.e. it is more an enabling effect.) 
 The context of the competition has also a key role to regulate the prize effect. The 
GLXP addresses a technological problem for which solutions, relevant knowledge, and 
technologies are available, even if the problem posits new budget conditions. Broader 
trends and practices in the new space industry and other private space initiatives provide 
help in solving specific technical problems by example. The space sector also offers 
market opportunities (TIs) and some short-term demand for prize technologies. Yet, the 
broader economic context represented an unfavorable environment for doing business in 
252 
 
these first three years of competition. And, even with a favorable business context, the 
interests of potential customers and investors might have been in low orbit technologies 
and not in planetary exploration. In sum, the context moderates or intensifies—maybe 




Note: based on GLXP case. 
Source: own analysis. 
 
Figure 7.7: Main factors affecting the ultimate innovation effect of prizes 
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 From the more dynamic perspective of an ongoing competition, feedback effects 
are not likely to affect the causality patterns drawn by these factors within certain levels 
of activity. For example, increasing R&D activities (in magnitude or visibility) may 
attract more entrants or partners to the competition, and certain technologies developed 
by teams may change the perceptions of would-be entrants about the feasibility of the 
project. 
 The examination of the PTOs anticipates the ultimate innovation effect of the 
GLXP. Figure 7.8 shows graphically (and intuitively) that effect in terms of the 
advancement of the maturity of the prize technologies. The GLXP has induced R&D 
efforts at medium-high maturity levels and pushed developments further toward 
commercialization, with less emphasis on lower TRL levels. Though teams have 
proposed some novel conceptual designs and a few of them are under actual 
development, it is not clear yet whether those technologies will be further advanced and 
implemented. Moreover, the GLXP challenge does not involve producing radical 
innovations to win the competition. That means that, more generally, breakthrough 
innovations are not directly induced but only enabled by this competition. As described 
later, new development and mission approaches are likely to be the most innovative 
contribution of the GLXP to this field (which is a target of the sponsor for this prize.) 
 More in-depth examination of the prize innovation process unfolds its complexity. 
In the GLXP, there is a number of R&D ―threads‖ aligned with different stages of the 
―creation-to-implementation‖ innovation pathway (Figure 7.9). These are not necessarily 
parallel threads, but different components of the same process at different levels. For 
example, new concepts and experimental technologies (e.g. software algorithms, 
navigation systems, new concepts for planetary exploration) are tested during the 
competition but may never reach implementation/commercialization stages. There are 
also affordable systems that are part of new project management and mission approaches, 





Source: own analysis. 




Note: the chart is based on general categorization of outputs observed in the GLXP. 
Source: own analysis. 
 




 This process of innovation triggered by the GLXP raises questions regarding the 
efficiency of the incentives provided by prizes and the uncertainty implicit in 
competitions. Prizes may effectively induce R&D activity and advance technologies, but 
the ultimate characteristics of both R&D activities and final outputs are difficult to 
predict. Moreover, this also calls into question the efficiency of prize programs, which 
may depend on whether additional incentives and longer development lead times are 
offered for entrants to further advance low maturity technologies that ultimately might 
represent truly breakthroughs. There is little evidence that further research can draw upon 
to examine this topic. For example, John Harrison, the winner of the historic Longitude 
Prize, received different amounts of money over 25 years until he completed the most 
efficient version of his chronometer to measure longitude at sea (Sobel, 1996). The more 
recent DARPA Challenges provided seed funding to 11 qualified entrants in the form of a 
competitive proposal with awards up to $1 million each, dependent on performance. This 
helped some of the best performers, particularly those with smaller teams, to remain in 
the competition (Whitaker, 2010). 
 The broader innovation literature contributes another key concept to explain the 
innovation process induced by the GLXP. von Hippel (1976, 1977, 1982) introduced and 
developed the notion by which innovation may be produced by users of products and 
services and not only by suppliers, in both consumer and industrial markets. He has also 
tested the possibility to predict the sources of innovation and maintained that users 
innovate if they see an in-house benefit from doing so and typically do not consider 
whether other users have similar needs. Notably, innovations produced by those lead 
users have more commercial merit than regular products as they are generally preferred 
by all users (von Hippel, 1988). 
 Thinking of the GLXP‘s innovation as a user-led process has its appeal. The 
GLXP teams have engaged in a process to find existing solutions from diverse sources 
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(e.g. previous experiences, colleagues, existing components,) adapt them, and optimize 
their application to deliver and accomplish the feat within the boundaries of the solutions 
space defined by maximum schedule/costs and minimum capabilities. From this point of 
view, user-led innovation in prizes is a sector- and type-of-prize-specific phenomenon. 
Significant knowledge and technologies needed to accomplish the GLXP mission are 
readily available. Some of them are space grade technologies and others are technologies 
successfully adapted from other industries. This is enabled by broader trends of 
miniaturization and significant reduction of costs that teams have taken advantage of. 
Even teams that pursue commercialization are opening up new business opportunities for 
service delivery mostly based on the adaptation and implementation of technical 
solutions that otherwise would be primarily used for government-led space programs. 
 The evidence of the three case studies also shows how the innovation process in 
the new space industry is built upon the contribution of both prize entrants and ongoing 
industry projects and how prizes might lead to subsequent—efficient or inefficient—
technological developments and industry decisions. It may occur that a few entrants have 
a key role and dominate the dynamics and ultimate achievements of the competition and 
acquire enough visibility to potentially set industry standards and influence investment 
decisions. For example, the AXP was greatly marked by the achievements of Scaled 
Composites with additional contributions of a handful of other teams (most notably, de 
Da Vinci Project and ARCA.) More advanced, new versions of the cargo aircraft-
launcher/spacecraft configuration of Scaled Composites will be soon introduced by the 
company Virgin Galactic to offer the first regular suborbital tourism flights. 
Simultaneously, for example, XCOR—a private rocket engine and spaceflight 
development company that did not enter the AXP—has developed a reusable, single 
horizontal takeoff and horizontal landing vehicle, also with human transport capabilities 
(though in this case, for only one passenger.) These two alternative configurations may 
have more or less equivalent capabilities and efficiency, yet the AXP has given Scaled 
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Composites‘ achievements much global exposure. This visibility may ultimately 
influence investment decisions in the sector and, possibly, may have defined the decision 
of Virgin Galactic to invest in Scaled Composites‘ configuration. 
 Technology development in other prizes is a more widely distributed process as 
several entrants make significant advances. For example, Masten Space Systems and 
Armadillo Aerospace dominated the NGLLC, yet most of the teams developed and tested 
vehicles during four years of competition. Still, both companies have become key players 
at that moment and now in this emerging sector. Other companies such as Blue Origin 
have developed—yet more secretly—similar VTOL technologies. Blue Origin‘s New 
Shepard is inspired by the old NASA Delta Clipper DC-X concept (NASA, 2010a). 
These technologies may serve different niche markets but, also in this case, the visibility 
given by the prize may influence future technology development decisions (e.g. GLXP 
teams have consulted with or analyzed the designs of those NGLLC teams.) 
  To the author‘s knowledge, no GLXP-like mission is being undertaken by private 
entities other than the GLXP teams (there might be, for example, a withdrawn GLXP 
team that secretly continued its activities.) The GLXP has engaged 35 teams with varying 
contributions to this process. The visibility offered by the competition to the 
achievements of the teams may also have significant effects on further innovations. The 
achievement of the GLXP challenge with, for example, a hopper or a leg-enabled system 
rather than a more traditional wheeled-rover will certainly influence assessments on what 
the most efficient technologies for space exploration are. Alternative solutions might not 
be the most affordable or valuable from the commercial standpoint, yet they might 
ultimately be the most visible and signal—correctly or incorrectly—what methods, 
technologies, and markets industry and investors should aim for. 
 However, though prizes may be able to influence industry and investment 
decisions by showcasing the winning entry (or other significant prize outputs,) they are 
not necessarily able to signal the value of the technologies. This research has not gathered 
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positive evidence in this regard and the analysis of the context suggests that the 
perceptions of the industry sector in relation with the value of the prize technologies are 
not affected by the announcement of the prize. 
 The ultimate effect of the GLXP on innovation also depends to great extent on the 
special characteristics of the space sector. A sizable, yet uncertain potential market value 
and a demand-side restricted to only a few actors overshadow the incentives offered by 
the GLXP and also moderate its effects on innovation. As of today, the decision of 
NASA to buy data and fund hardware demonstrations is the main reason for 
commercialization to occur in this prize. Increasing demand would have not only 
attracted more entrants (through the perception of the benefit of reputation offered by the 
GLXP) but also induced a more intensive R&D effort and collaborations from partners. 
Private investors also request stronger commitments from NASA or other space agencies 
to fund space initiatives. In relation with the literature, this expands the potential of prizes 
to induce more vigorous R&D races as not only larger rewards but also other non-
monetary incentives have that positive effect. 
 On the other hand, the evolution of the new space industry is also part of the 
background of this competition. Past initiatives (e.g. LunaCorp, BlastOff!) had not 
benefited from the more promising context that now includes more successful business 
cases such as Armadillo Aerospace, Masten Space Systems, XCOR, SpaceX, and Scaled 
Composites. More general changes in beliefs regarding the potential for private space 
initiatives has benefited the GLXP as teams are more likely to attract investors and 
private customers. 
 The GLXP case also illustrates how the influence of the broader context may 
moderate the ultimate prize effects. The economic slowdown started in 2007 has affected 
the activities of teams and delayed their projects. Certainly, high return rates expected by 
private equity and venture capital to fund space projects have not contributed positively 
to the situation. Similar phenomena occurred in the case of the AXP with the economic 
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slowdown after the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, and after the increasing risk 
perceived in aerospace activities due to the loss of the space shuttle Columbia in 2003 
(Maryniak, 2010). On the upside, however, the GLXP has kept the R&D focus of teams 
that managed to attract sponsorships and other in-kind contributions from multiple 
sources and sectors to fund their projects. This suggests that prizes may be particularly 
useful to maintain levels of R&D activity and innovation in contexts of recession or 
business contraction cycles. Considering that some teams have entered the GLXP even in 
a context of economic recession, prizes might also help in recovering stagnated economic 
sectors. 
 The GLXP‘s challenge definition is very open-ended and has enabled the 
innovation processes described earlier. This type of open-ended challenge definition is a 
necessary condition to allow alternative solutions to technical problems and alternative 
approaches to find them, yet it is not an innovation driver in itself (e.g. open-ended 
challenges do not determine whether technological outputs are successfully introduced or 
commercialized.) There is a limit in which further relaxation of the prize requirements 
may have a negative effect on innovation, as the R&D effort would be less focused. On 
the other hand, a more specific challenge definition to deliver technologies with certain 
specifications might have induced a more focused effort at the cost of less diversity in 
approaches and proposed solutions. 
 The GLXP has induced increasing R&D activities and induced the development 
of technologies that may become significant innovations. Most of the teams are newly 
formed and have produced some significant technology output. The GLXP has been the 
main reason of half of the teams to engage in this type of project. A number of them have 
implemented those technologies in their missions or seek hardware/services 
commercialization. The GLXP has also created a new platform that facilitates the entry of 
new participants to the space sector. It accelerated and expanded existing projects or even 
helped to re-initiate projects started more than 10 years ago (e.g. LunaCorp and 
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Astrobotic.) Moreover, more than 80 companies, universities, and NGOs have directly or 
indirectly participated in (and learned from) technology development through 
partnerships with GLXP teams. The teams themselves engaged at least 500 people during 
2010. Most importantly, the GLXP led to the creation of networks of partnerships and 
collaborations that may transcend this competition. Though the global GLXP‘s R&D 
expenditures are still uncertain (and difficult to calculate with accuracy anyway,) teams 
may ultimately invest up to $465 million in their projects during the competition.
28
 
 This analysis of the effects of the GLXP on innovation considers the peculiar 
characteristics of space technologies. Space projects are discrete, one-off products that, 
generally, to be deemed truly innovative, must satisfy pre-established requirements and 
meet specific performance criteria or properties (Bain et al., 2001). Moreover, the 
potential customers in this sector are very limited in number and generally are those that 
establish the project requirements and develop the roadmaps for future technology 
development. The study of the effect of prizes linked to, for example, consumer product 
technologies may differ substantially from this analysis, as innovation in those other 
sectors is driven by information that companies have on markets with numerous 
customers and non-obvious inventions companies introduce to address them. Even 
further research on the effect of space prizes may require more in-depth, technical 
examination of the characteristics of the technology outputs and their implementation to 
fully understand the effect on innovation. Future research should also examine innovation 
processes in other entities not directly involved in the competition (e.g. partners, 
collaborators.) This research has drawn upon self-reported data yet those data were 
considered with caution due to the potential issues that self-reporting methods might 
introduce into the analysis.  
                                                          
28
 This is a very optimistic figure. It is calculated based on the mission budgets reported by seven teams and 
an average of $15 million for each of the remaining 9 teams with significant outputs that entered the GLXP 
before December 2010. The $15 million average is the minimum mission expenditure expected by the XPF 





8.1 Theoretical implications 
 Prizes are only one of the forms of intervention to stimulate technological 
innovation. Other much more widely utilized mechanisms are patents, research grants, 
and R&D contracts. The effect of these incentives has been generally investigated using 
formal economic modeling techniques and little empirical evidence has been contributed. 
In particular, the literature has mostly contributed models in which a prize sponsor offers 
a unique monetary reward—the cash purse—to induce increasing R&D activity in a 
specific technological field or the production of a single innovation. This innovation is, 
theoretically, placed in the public domain. Moreover, prize entrants have generally been 
considered rational, profit-maximizing innovators that factor out only monetary benefits, 
costs, and the probability of success in their choices and decisions to participate. 
 The findings of this research in four key themes (i.e. motivations, R&D activities, 
technology outputs, and effect on innovation) (summarized in Table 8.1) have shown 
that, in fact, prizes are a more complex mechanism that requires analyses of other entrant- 
and context-level factors and models with more advanced assumptions. This research has 
offered an innovation model applied to prizes that encompasses both entrant- and 
context- level factors in addition to the prize competition as unit of analysis. This model 
allows multiple types of monetary and non-monetary incentives, is flexible regarding the 






Table 8.1: Summary of research probes and general implications 
 Dimensions of GLXP case study 
Motivations R&D activities Technology outputs Effect on innovation 
Theme Weight of different types of 
incentives and relationship 
with the characteristics of 
entrants 
Characteristics of prize R&D 
activities and differences with 
traditional industry practices 
Prize technology outputs 
(PTOs) and their relationship 
with the characteristics of 
entrants 




H1: Type of entrants depends 
on types of incentives 
H2: R&D organization 
depends on lead times and 
funding requirements 
H3: Type of technology 
output depends on types of 
entrants 
H4: Innovation effect depends 




 Type of entrants  Design criteria (simplicity) 
 Technology sources (use of 
existing technologies) 
 R&D organization (degree of 
collaborative effort) 
 Degree of novelty of 
technologies 
 Implementation of 
technologies 
 Innovation effect 
Independent 
variables 
 Type of incentives (PIs, TIs)  Development lead 
times/funding requirement 
conditions 
 Type of entrants  Prize incentives (PIs) 




 Technological field 
 Broader context 
 Technological field  Prize Challenge (PC) 
definition 
 Technological field 
 Broader context 
Note: implications reflect findings from GLXP case and pilot cases. 




Table 8.1: Summary of research probes and general implications (Contd.) 
 Dimensions of GLXP case study 
Motivations R&D activities Technology outputs Effect on innovation 
Observed 
relationship 
Relationship between type of 
entrants and types of 
incentives is not 
straightforward yet present 
some patterns; priority goal-
based classification may be 
introduced to explain weight 
of diff. types of incentives. 
The effect of non-monetary 
incentives is significant. 
Designs, tech. sources, and 
collaborations are more likely 
to be associated with 
individual teams‘ goals, 
strategies, and resources, and 
are not directly influenced by 
prize. R&D 
activity/fundraising activities 
interaction is unique to this 
context. 
Evidence connecting type of 
entrants with PTOs is weak; 
stronger plausible 
explanations can be found in 
entrant goals, PC definition, 
and state of the art of the tech. 
The quality of the outputs is 
not predictable. 
Innovation effect depends on 
PIs but also on the 
characteristics of entrants, the 
technology sector, and 
broader context; open-ended 




Prizes can selectively 
incentivize individuals and 
organizations to advance 
technologies or pursue related 
goals using both monetary and 
non-monetary incentives. 
Prizes can induce increasing 
levels of R&D activity and 




competitions cannot be 
completely anticipated. 
Prizes can selectively focus on 
the advancement of 
technologies at different levels 
of maturity, yet the quality of 
the technological outputs is 
still unpredictable and 
depends on entrant-level 
factors. 
Prizes can induce innovation 
over and above what would 
have occurred anyway, yet 
their overall effect depends 
significantly on the 
characteristics of the prize 
entrants and the evolution of 
the context of the competition. 
Technological breakthroughs 
can be enabled but not directly 
induced. 




 Prizes can be, scholars suggest, an alternative to the patent system when they 
offer rewards equivalent to the social value of the innovation or in alternative schemes 
that combine the use of prizes with methods to gather information about the value of the 
technologies (Kremer, 1998; Shavell & van Ypersele, 1999; Scotchmer, 2005). That 
perspective, however, does not consider that the entrant‘s choice between prizes and 
alternative paths is not necessarily a rational, profit-maximizing decision and depends 
greatly on the value added by non-monetary benefits of competitions to the entrant‘s 
strategy. 
 In fact, modern technology prizes—which systematically offer rewards below (or 
equal to) expected R&D costs—complement and not replace patents and other incentive 
mechanisms. The ability of entrants to retain IP rights on their technologies enables the 
R&D process, particularly when the technology and funding gaps implicit in the prize 
challenge are significant or the prize is aimed at technology diffusion or 
commercialization. Entrants trade IP rights as a means to get access to key technologies 
and other resources such as expertise and labor for their projects. Patented prize 
technologies are still disclosed but not in the public domain. Moreover, hybrid prize 
schemes that include financial support for qualified entrants (e.g. R&D grants) or 
commitment to purchase prize technologies (e.g. procurement contracts) are potentially 
effective optional designs for these competitions. 
 In that context in which corporate and academic R&D choices are generally 
limited to other traditional incentive mechanisms, prizes can induce innovation. Their 
ability to do that is larger when there are larger prize incentives, more significant 
technology gaps implicit in the prize challenge, and open-ended challenge definitions. H4 
reflected this relationship properly but further elaboration unveiled intervening factors. 
The case studies demonstrate that more and more diverse entrants and more favorable 
conditions of the context for fundraising, technology sourcing, and/or commercialization, 
can also increase this ability of prizes. 
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 In a context in which there is a widespread use of prizes, however, their effects 
also depend on the uniqueness of competitions. The AXP, NGLLC, and GLXP have not 
had rival prizes held simultaneously and therefore do not fully represent that situation. 
Scaled Composites and XCOR, for example, chose different paths when the set of 
options included only entering a prize (i.e. the AXP) and the pursuit of contracts or 
traditional commercial development. More generally, a prize announced in a context in 
which no other equivalent competition (or no other any competition) is simultaneously 
held has more incentive power than a similar prize in a context in which other rival prizes 
also seek to attract entrants, resources, and the public‘s attention. 
 That implies that, in practice, the routine use of prizes, and/or challenge 
definitions that overlap, can weaken the incentive power of the mechanism. In the case 
studies, this is apparent in, for example, the incentives offered by competitions. In the 
case of the GLXP, entrants have found Google‘s sponsorship to be an important asset at 
the moment of raising funding from investors. Private sponsors and investors would not 
be attracted to the GLXP in the same manner if other important brands (or organizations) 
sponsored simultaneous space prizes. Moreover, in the process of disseminating the idea 
of the prize and the achievements of entrants, media attention to each competition may 
fade if an increasing number of prizes are announced. 
 Two types of incentives are perceived in technology prizes. Prize incentives are 
those created by the announcement and development of competitions and include the 
cash reward and other non-monetary benefits (e.g. reputation, visibility, opportunity to 
participate in technology development, opportunity to accomplish other personal and 
organizational goals, including the pursuit of valued ideals such as the contribution of 
S&T to society or the environment.) These incentives can be purposely created by prize 
sponsors. Technology incentives are those linked to the market value of the technologies 
involved in the prize competition. Prizes cannot influence or provide information on the 
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market value of these technologies but can still influence industry decisions by 
showcasing technological options side-by-side and publicizing the effort of participants. 
 At the core of the decisions to participate in these prizes is the belief about the 
feasibility and the social, personal, or commercial value of the technological pursuit. Yet, 
ultimately, the choice between prize participation and alternative paths of technology 
development with similar focus depends on either the value the competition adds to 
entrants‘ strategies or the opportunity given by the competition to accomplish other goals. 
Entrants focused on winning the competition—which may be a small share of all 
entries—and those with other diverse personal or organizational goals perceive the non-
monetary benefits of prize participation above other incentives. The probability of 
success may be implicit in the decisions of those who seek to win the competition, but its 
calculation is not straightforward and requires considering entrants‘ diverse goals and 
perceptions of the seriousness of other entries. Entrants focused on starting a new 
business based on the prize technologies are more likely to assess the potential market 
value of such technologies or the potential benefit of introducing those technologies in 
own processes. H1, simplified to probe a relationship between types of entrants and types 
of incentives, failed to capture how all these factors interact to define entrants‘ choices. 
 Overall, the monetary reward is not as important as other prize incentives. It is, 
however, still important to disseminate the idea of the prize: it helps to position the 
competition in the media and attract the public. From this perspective, the calculation of 
the monetary reward has to consider not the social value of innovations but the purpose 
of the competition and the amount necessary to attract attention in the technological field 
or industry. A sizable reward can also distinguish a competition from others. In prizes 
that seek commercialization of technologies, an appropriate reward may help to close 
business cases of entrants. When there are other significant non-monetary or technology 
incentives in place, the reward should represent an attractive recompense only (which 
depends on the type of entrant the sponsor is interested in, as described later.) 
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 When announced in a particular technological field or industry sector, prizes 
trigger new R&D activities and induce the convergence of ongoing R&D processes (that 
are internal or external to the sector) toward the prize challenge. The configuration of 
those R&D activities—which H2 sought to explain on the basis of prize-level factors 
such as limited development lead times and lack of up-front funding—is still difficult to 
anticipate and cannot be directly influenced by any particular prize design. Such 
configuration generally depends on the characteristics of entrants (e.g. background, 
experience, connections, strategies,) the technology gap the prize posits, and funding 
requirements implicit in the prize challenge. Compared with traditional industry 
practices, the most distinctive feature of prize R&D is its iterative development and the 
interaction between R&D and fundraising activities. Prize rules can nonetheless influence 
R&D activities if special requirements are set with that purpose. 
 By engaging numerous participants, prizes spread risks of R&D and commercial 
development broadly among individuals and organizations that participate directly or 
indirectly in competitions. Moreover, the evidence suggests that, generally, prize entrants 
are less risk-averse than traditional industry players, particularly those that are 
unconventional, i.e. individuals and organizations generally not involved with the prize 
technologies. However, compared to other incentive mechanisms, prizes involve higher 
programmatic risks as their R&D effects and quality of technological outputs are 
generally difficult to anticipate. 
 Both the extent to which the prize mechanism depends on its context and the fact 
that, in principle, winning a prize is not a sustainable business, suggest that prizes are not 
able to create markets by themselves. On the one hand, the conditions of the general 
context can frustrate (or facilitate) technology sourcing and fundraising efforts of entrants 
for R&D projects. This is more relevant for prizes that require significant funding and, in 
particular, for those aimed at commercialization of technologies, whose success also 
depends on the perceptions of entrants and their financiers about the market value of the 
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technologies. On the other hand, winning a prize is not necessarily economically 
attractive for entrants. Sponsors can systematically set rewards that are lower than 
expected R&D costs and still attract entrants by offering other valuable non-monetary 
incentives. 
 Similarly to contracts and grants, prizes can procure focused R&D. Using open-
ended challenge definitions and relaxed technical requirements in rules, prize technology 
outputs can be expected within a more or less defined solutions space (this allows 
exploring unorthodox solutions.) Using more strict specifications, prize outputs focus on 
the advancement of concrete technologies with the risk of constraining creativity or 
ignoring other valuable innovations. While H3 posited a relationship between types of 
entrants and the technologies they develop, the evidence revealed that the ultimate 
characteristics of the technology outputs depend on entrants‘ goals, the prize challenge 
definition, and the maturity level of the prize technologies. Entrants generally seek to 
perform the minimum possible R&D effort and draw upon simpler and existing 
technologies to win competitions. Entrants with other goals present a less distinctive 
pattern and may produce technologies of diverse quality, but these are not directly 
influenced by prize design. 
 The investigation of prize cases with different technological goals in the creation-
to-implementation innovation pathway has also shown that prizes may not be equally 
effective for all technological goals in a given field. Due to the sequential and cumulative 
nature of innovation, the relevant knowledge and technologies have to be available to 
competitors for prizes to successfully induce technology research, development, 
improvement, or diffusion/commercialization. In general, the larger the pool of 
knowledge and technologies readily available to address the problem, the higher the 
technology maturity levels the prize can aim for. Otherwise, entrants would need further 
incentives, support, and/or longer development lead times to be able to achieve the prize 
target. For example, to induce more basic research or discovery of new principles in a 
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field not investigated by corporate or academic research, prizes may require significantly 
longer development lead times. This calls into question the feasibility of some proposals 
to implement prizes in fields as diverse as agriculture, medicine, and nanotechnology, 
and suggests considering this perspective to make more efficient the literature‘s 
competitions (see, for example, Horrobin, 1986; Kremer, 2000; Masters, 2003; Anastas & 
Zimmerman, 2007; Charlton, 2007). 
 Prizes may lead to a socially undesirable duplication of R&D efforts in the sense 
that there may be many entrants in the pursuit of the same technological goal. This is 
particularly true when prize challenges are narrowly defined (Maurer & Scotchmer, 2004; 
Newell & Wilson, 2005). Yet, analyses that consider this to be an issue have not 
considered the social and economic benefits of increasing numbers of individuals and 
organizations involved in competitions, collaborations, and knowledge spillovers, which 
favor technical training, education, increasing interest in S&T, and the achievement of 
other personal and organizational goals of participants. Moreover, even when entrants 
produce similar technologies to achieve the prize challenge, the side-by-side comparison 
of their diversity at the subsystem- or lower levels and their R&D and project 
management approaches are a valuable source of knowledge for the sponsor, entrants, 
and industry players. 
 
8.2 The prize process 
 In practice, the innovation process in prizes begins when the sponsor announces a 
reward to attain certain technological goal and communicates the purpose and spirit of 
the competition. Both non-monetary incentives and the cash purse offered by the 
competition raise the interest of individuals and organizations with diverse goals 
(including goals beyond the prize) but similar beliefs about the feasibility and merit of the 
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pursuit. A proper announcement and a sizable cash reward also attract industry and media 
attention. 
 Individuals and organizations form teams to enter the competition and bring 
together companies, universities, independent R&D groups, entrepreneurs, and 
individuals with diverse expertise. Would-be entrants make their decision to enter the 
competition based on the value added by the prize to their strategies. Traditional industry 
players only enter the competition if there is a foreseeable commercial benefit in that. 
Other participants only engage indirectly. Partners, for example, may perceive a 
commercial benefit but only in the provision of services or products to teams. Volunteers 
may find in prizes a unique opportunity to participate in technology development without 
having to create a company or team. 
 With the announcement and first entrants, the prize competition creates a 
technology platform that adds value to the strategies of participants and comprises 
entrants, new and existing industry entities, R&D and business activities, new 
relationships and networks, and sets of rules that govern the competition. This platform 
attracts human, technical and monetary resources from diverse sectors. Numerous 
collaborations and knowledge spillovers can develop as well, including collaborations 
between teams when competitions are organized as races. This platform can transcend the 
competition and give birth to a technology-centered community. 
 The competition accelerates and/or re-directs ongoing industry projects, triggers 
new R&D processes and re-starts others. Teams raise funding, recruit new members, 
commercialize developments, and develop partnerships to source expertise and 
technologies, speed-up projects and reduce risks. The R&D effort to win the competition 
is likely to concentrate in a minor share of teams. The rest of the teams may have 
difficulties to raise funding or recruit members with appropriate expertise; or may 




 The R&D organization and effort of teams are ultimately determined by their 
goals, knowledge, skills, and available resources, and may not be directly influenced by 
the prize. Due to the lack of up-front funding, there are significant interactions between 
prize R&D and fundraising activities. This may divert efforts from R&D and, potentially, 
constrain technological development. Prize R&D activities may be also moderated or 
halted by sector crises or major economic slowdowns. Nonetheless, prizes induce 
converging R&D processes and are open to resources from sectors other than those of the 
prize technologies. Moreover, the GLXP demonstrates that less risk-averse teams may 
enter competitions even in those recessive contexts and maintain certain levels of R&D 
activity. 
 Though entrants seek to produce the technologies required to win the competition, 
prize outputs are difficult to anticipate. Competitors introduce methods and produce 
technologies in a wide range of maturity levels with focus on a level of maturity given by 
the state of the art of relevant technologies, the definition of the prize challenge, and the 
technology gap created by the prize. The ability of the competition to induce the 
introduction of novel methods and breakthrough technologies also depends on the 
successful recruitment of more and more diverse participants and the conditions of the 
broader context for technology sourcing and successful fundraising. 
 Prizes produce broader outcomes as well. Most importantly, prizes with open 
eligibility criteria democratize the process of technological development by engaging 
individuals and organizations generally not involved with the prize technologies and 
promoting collaborations among entrants and between them and partners. Prize 
participation also triggers significant learning processes in participating individuals and 
organizations. Prizes also signal the interest of the sponsor and showcase technological 
options by publicizing the R&D approaches, technologies, and achievements of all 
participants to audiences such as industry experts, investors, consumers, and policy-
makers. Hence, prizes may influence industry decisions, follow-up investments, and 
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regulatory measures related with the prize challenge. Similarly, prizes can raise public 
awareness on S&T topics when they attract the media to reach out to broader audiences. 
 
8.3 Team strategies 
 There are different perspectives to the R&D strategies followed by prize entrants 
to win the GLXP. Most of the features of these strategies can have application to other 
prize competitions and be particularly expected in other prizes aimed at 
commercialization of technologies. These examples provide useful insights for 
entrepreneurs, companies, and other individuals interested in prize participation. 
 Prizes are generally open to participants of diverse composition and may include 
companies, universities, independent R&D groups, entrepreneurs, or simply individuals 
attracted by the prize. This research was set out to analyze them based on their industry 
experience or familiarity with the prize technologies. From this perspective, teams can be 
classified into conventional and unconventional. The latter are those individuals and 
organizations that are not generally involved with the development of the prize 
technologies. These entrants are attracted by the opportunities to participate in a 
challenging project, learn, and contribute to society and would generally not pursue 
similar projects if the prize did not exist. They are generally organized as independent or 
non-profit entities and form teams that recruit above average number of people, including 
volunteers and students. These teams are generally less risk-averse and not always 
interested in the economic value of the technologies. 
 Teams enter prizes to win the competition and/or accomplish other diverse goals. 
This research classified teams based on generic priority goals to analyze Challenge 
teams, Industry/Start-up teams, and Diverse Majority teams. Challenge teams seek the 
shortest path to win the competition. They perform the minimum possible engineering 
effort, use simpler methods and technologies, and use existing technologies whenever 
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these are available. They distribute effort among partners and volunteers to accelerate 
their projects and minimize risks. Industry/Startup teams seek to create a sustainable 
business and, therefore, optimize their R&D effort for the development of commercial 
products and services. The prize target is still important but secondary in that regard. 
These teams tend to develop technologies with higher levels of maturity and design 
criteria linked to their business strategies. Low entry barriers to the competition allow the 
participation of Diverse Majority teams. These generally pursue goals that may or may 
not directly relate with the prize target. Their strategies are very diverse and linked to 
varied personal and organizational goals. 
 The analysis of the configuration of R&D activities at the team-level unveils at 
least four strategies to win the competition. In general, these are flat and flexible 
organizations and recruit team members with diverse backgrounds and experience (i.e. 
these are generally unconventional teams.) Their constant adaptation, collaborative effort, 
and use of communication tools for remote collaboration are also common traits of these 
teams. A strategic R&D feature is also the open innovation approach used by teams to 
leverage external research and complement internal technological activities with 
increasing knowledge flows. Flat, flexible, and collaborative teams can not only speed up 
technology development but also reduce project risks and costs. 
 Based on the organization of R&D activities, the four strategies identified by this 
research are: 
 Open source: this is the widest distributed effort, which leverages the R&D effort 
with participation of hundreds of volunteers from remote locations. A small core 
team still coordinates the effort and leads the project. This strategy is based on the 
non-profit organization of activities and sponsorship support. Partners and 
subgroups develop and test subsystems that compete with alternative designs and 
are later integrated into the main project. The number of connections with other 
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entities leads to complementary, diverse projects and new opportunities beyond 
the competition. 
 Partnerships Network: this strategy is a much focused effort that involves 
partnerships with key players from diverse sectors to source technologies and 
services that support the project. This is also a geographically distributed effort 
yet with a core, leading team. The organization of this effort is under continuous 
adaptation to maintain its competitiveness. IP rights on technologies are key to 
engage partners and, potentially, create a new business. 
 Entrepreneurial: this strategy involves a for-profit orientation for the prize project 
with the goal of becoming eventually a sustainable business based on the prize 
technologies or the provision of related services. Key university partners provide 
multidisciplinary know-how; key business partners and multiple revenue sources 
finance and support the prize project. Winning the competition is the top priority 
and the team‘s business model is adapted to accomplish such goal. 
 Universities partnership: this strategy brings together universities and a non-profit 
entity to take advantage of trained volunteers and specialized facilities needed for 
the project. The initiative seeks to implement methods that can be scaled up in 
similar yet larger projects. Though winning the competition is a priority, 
members‘ involvement is also related with the opportunity to accomplish other 
personal or professional goals such as gaining hands-on experience and 




8.4 R&D program and policy implications 
 Prizes are an incentive and support mechanism for technological development and 
also an indirect mechanism to influence industry and public perceptions about S&T 
issues. Prizes can target certain technologies, R&D performers and geographic areas, 
induce increasing levels of R&D activity and, under certain conditions, induce 
technological innovation as well. Prizes also leverage funding significantly due to their 
widespread, decentralized impact but involve higher programmatic risks than other more 
traditional mechanisms. Prizes can induce research, development, diffusion or 
commercialization of technologies, and diverse related effects (Table 8.2). This can be 
achieved by setting a number of parameters that focus the prize, such as the technological 
problem, prize incentives, and eligibility criteria for participation. 
 
Table 8.2: Potential technology-related effects of prizes 
Types of effects Specific effects 
On innovation, in 
general 
 New concepts and experimental technologies 
 Creative solutions to specific, well-defined problems 
 More affordable and simpler versions of existing systems 




 Induced collaborative R&D effort 
 Engagement of both conventional and unconventional entrants 
 Engagement of communities of interest (e.g. students, women) 
 Development of an innovation platform 
 Leveraged R&D investment (including attracting funding from 
other sectors) 
Note: the table is not comprehensive and shows only general effects based on research findings. 
Source: own analysis. 
 
 The selection of the proper technological problem has to consider four factors. 
First, prizes should address very specific problems for which the achievement of a 
solution is clear, verifiable, and visible to the sponsor, the competitors, and the public. 
Second, whether the relevant technologies to accomplish the prize challenge are available 
to all entrants define appropriate types of prizes and expected outcomes of competitions. 
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Third, prizes that involve advancing less mature technologies are likely to require longer 
development lead times, more significant incentives (created by the prize or linked to the 
prize technologies,) and/or further support (e.g. seed funding.) Fourth, the conditions of 
the context of the technological field can frustrate (or facilitate) fundraising efforts of 
prize entrants for certain targets. This is particularly relevant for prize projects that 
require significant funding or are aimed at commercializing technologies with uncertain 
market potential. 
 Prize programs can be designed to selectively target different points in the 
creation-to-implementation innovation pathway or TRL levels, from idea sourcing and 
experimental research to product launch and/or dissemination/adoption of new 
technologies. Prize sponsors, however, have to select the appropriate type of target for 
each technological goal. This research suggests four possible types of technology prizes 
according to the target maturity level of the prize outputs and the state of the art of the 
prize technologies (Table 8.3): 
 Prizes for novel solutions and concepts are aimed at creating new methods to 
perform certain technological functions. These prizes are appropriate when it is 
unclear what basic principles the solution should draw upon to solve the prize 
challenge. 
 Prizes for technology development are aimed at demonstrating technological 
feasibility. These prizes should be applied to problems for which the basic 
principles are known and/or experimental research was already performed. 
 Prizes for incremental improvements are aimed at advancing technologies with 
specific (commercial or other) applications. These prizes should be applied to 
further develop technologies with at least medium levels of maturity. 
 Prizes for technology implementation are aimed at accelerating diffusion, 
adoption, or development of end-user communities or markets that are held back 
for some reason. These prizes should be applied when the relevant technologies 
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are at medium or high levels of maturity and there are uncertain yet potential 
markets. 
 Prizes can also target individuals and groups of diverse age, professional 
background, or experience by both defining special criteria of eligibility or offering 
particular incentives (Table 8.4). Target communities may be defined as, for example, K-
12 students, engineering students, teachers, or government employees. This makes prizes 
an appropriate mechanism to engage people in Science, Technology, Engineering, and 
Mathematics (STEM) education or technical training programs. The eligibility criteria 
can be relaxed to attract more and more diverse entrants, but this can increase the cost of 
program operation significantly and change the spirit of the competition. 
 More generally, prizes may effectively attract individuals and companies that are 
less risk-averse for both technical and commercial endeavors. In particular, prize 
challenges that balance a sizable market potential and uncertainty about market segments, 
market values, and required capabilities to exploit them are more likely to engage less 
risk-averse entrepreneurs and discourage traditional industry players. 
 Prizes can be also implemented within specific regions or seek broader 
participation to tap into widely distributed ideas and creativity. For the aerospace 
industry, for example, the GLXP has represented the opportunity for certain countries to 
engage in the development of space technologies through the participation of individuals 
and private organizations, an opportunity that probably they would not have had 
otherwise. At the state/city level, prizes may help to mobilize resources into underserved 
areas. Regional targets require announcing competitions in proper venues to attract the 
attention of local entrepreneurs and other potential entrants. 
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Table 8.3: Types of prizes and possible target areas for prize programs 
 Types of prizes and target technology areas 
 
Prizes for novel solutions 
and concepts 
Prizes for technology 
development 
Prizes for incremental 
improvements 










Advance technologies with 
specific (commercial or other) 
applications 
Accelerate technology 
diffusion, adoption, or 
development of end-user 
communities or markets that 




Find or create a method to 
perform new function 
Develop technology to 
accomplish a feat 
Improve technology to achieve 
higher performance standards 
Implement technologies under 




of the art 
Unclear what basic principles 
the solution should draw upon 
Basic principles known, 
experimental research 
performed 
Existing technologies with at 
least medium level of maturity 
Existing technologies with 







    
Prize 
examples 
Food Preservation Prize, 
Longitude Prize 
Ansari X Prize NGLLC, DARPA Challenges GLXP 
Source: own analysis. 
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Tap into widely 
dispersed creativity to 
address technical or 
social issues 
Attract larger number of 
entrants 
Set prize challenge that more 




Set challenging technical goal 
Attract social entrepreneurs Set prize challenge that address 
problem considered socially 
worthwhile 
Attract general media and 
public attention 
Set larger cash purse 
Advance technologies 
for commercialization 
Attract entrepreneurs, less 
risk-averse companies 
Set prize challenge that address 
a problem considered 
commercially valuable, yet the 
proper business model is still 
uncertain 
Attract entrepreneurs and not 
traditional players 
Align prize challenge with 
potentially sizable, yet 
uncertain commercial 
opportunities; set cash purse 
that can close business cases for 
the prize technologies of 
startups 
Attract conventional entrants 
that seek commercialization 
Increase prize 
visibility/reputation by 
obtaining endorsement of key 
sector players 
Note: unconventional entrants refer to individuals and organizations not usually involved with the prize 
technologies; conventional entrants refer to individuals and organizations with industry experience with the 
prize technologies. 
Source: based on research findings. 
 
 Prizes can produce other valuable outcomes that are generally difficult to 
anticipate. Most importantly, prizes that are wide open for participation democratize the 
innovation process as they offer the opportunity to engage in technology development to 
certain groups of interest and organizations (e.g. students, minorities, the ―lone garage 
inventor,‖ professionals that work in large, centralized and bureaucratic organizations, 
independent research groups, NGOs.) This is also the opportunity for the sponsor to tap 
into the creativity and fresh ideas that those groups might contribute. 
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 Prizes also generate significant knowledge spillovers when they bring together 
new and pre-existing small and large companies, universities, and NGOs to develop prize 
technologies. Collaborations and other relationships may transcend the competition time 
frame and create problem solving communities. Collaborations between participating 
teams are more likely to occur when competitions are organized in the form of ―races‖—
such as the NGLLC—that bring teams together and foster interactions between them. 
 Increasing visibility of prize competitions can also raise public awareness and 
change beliefs about S&T topics linked to the sponsor‘s mission. Both successful historic 
and modern prizes have not only been able to attract individuals that believed in the 
feasibility and merit of the prize goal, but also have spread that belief to industry and the 
broader public. Success stories such as the Orteig Prize are the foundation of modern 
prizes and have inspired entrepreneurs, philanthropists, and other individuals that seek 
opportunities to participate in challenging projects. Sponsors of modern prizes have had 
powerful communication means at hand to disseminate the achievement of competitors 
and transform beliefs about scientific and technological possibilities. The inspirational 
value that prizes might create for innovations to come is as important as the immediate 
effects of their implementation. 
 Successful prize program design requires setting a number of parameters 
properly. Program managers should consider the following points. First, a significant part 
of the effort to implement programs has to be devoted to attract serious entries with 
diverse profiles. Second, the prize design should focus on the appropriate definition of 
the prize challenge and incorporate expert insights. Third, the costs of the prize program 
may exceed significantly the cash purse if additional support (e.g. seed funding) is 
offered to entrants. And, fourth, the success of prize programs is context-specific and 
competitions have implementation time frames that are more appropriate than others. 
 The prize challenge has to be technologically complex and ambitious from the 
programmatic standpoint yet also attractive and captivating for a number of potential 
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entrants that believe the challenge is feasible and has some merit. The definition of the 
challenge includes setting a prize deadline that allows, according to expert opinion, a 
reasonable lead time for technology development. To induce commercialization, 
challenge definitions can combine a) shorten development lead times to induce the 
introduction of commercially viable project management approaches with flexible, low 
overhead cost organizations; and, b) technological feats that require external funding to 
induce fundraising efforts and the introduction of new revenue models. 
 There is no single rule for determining the proper size of the cash purse. Some 
successful prizes have offered rewards of about one-third of the expected R&D costs to 
achieve the prize challenge. Cost estimates should rely on historical costs to develop 
similar technologies and discussion with entrepreneurs or industry experts. Competitions 
should balance the prize purse with the potential market value of the prize technologies 
and other benefits that the competition may offer to participants. 
 Table 8.5 shows examples of technology prize program goals and 
recommendations for the definition of the prize challenge and cash reward. Other more 
general recommendations apply to increase program effectiveness and efficiency: 1) 
prizes should balance the openness of the competition and the eligibility criteria (through 
the implementation of fees or a procedure to evaluate entry applications) to tap into 
widely dispersed creativity and allow only serious entries; 2) prizes should address 
problems that do not imply significant funding requirements for entrants; and, 3) when 
there is still a significant funding requirement, prizes should be announced only in 
favorable economic conditions. 
 Prizes can create attractive non-monetary incentives. A challenging project can 
drive curiosity, desire of participation, and desire to compete. Prizes can also offer the 
opportunity to gain reputation, publicity, and create a competitive environment that 
inspires people that seek recognition. Low entry-barriers to the competition also 
incentivize participation and give access to a set of resources available only through the 
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prize platform. In particular, the reputation/publicity value created by prizes supports the 
strategies of entrants that seek to enter markets that require a proven track record in 
successfully delivering technical solutions, such as aerospace, defense, and medicine. The 
official endorsement of the competition aimed at technology commercialization/diffusion 
by key industry players or industry/consumer organizations can increase the incentive 
power of the competition. 
 The registration period to enter competitions should remain open to allow would-
be entrants to evaluate the benefits of participation. Increasing activity in the competition 
can attract the attention of new participants as it disseminates through media channels. 
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Table 8.5: Examples of prize-based program goals and definition of key prize design parameters 
 Program goals (examples) 
Explore new, 
experimental methods 
and technologies that 
imply high-risk R&D 
Induce technological 












Type of prize Tech-based 
accomplishment 
Tech. development to 
demonstrate 
technological feasibility 







Target for maturity of 
prize technologies 
Low Medium Medium-High High 
Prize challenge Challenging, new 
problem with unknown 
solutions 
Develop new 
artifact/system to solve 
newly-defined problem 
New performance 
requirements for existing 
technologies 
Set schedule/cost 
conditions to accomplish 





Cash purse attractive for 
independent inventors, 
professionals 
Cash purse attractive for 
smaller industry players 
Cash purse to cover part 
of costs of incremental 
development 
Cash purse to potentially 




that build up on previous 
prizes can be used to 
attenuate programmatic 
risks. 
Only link prize challenge 
to sizable markets if 
these are uncertain. 
Set concrete, verifiable 
measures of 




technology adopters or 
customers. 
Source: own analysis. 
285 
 
 Rules should be kept simple, unambiguous, and easy to understand. They have to 
remain unchanged after the competition has been announced to avoid discouraging 
participating teams. Program managers should work with industry experts, entrepreneurs, 
and would-be entrants to get further insights to create the proper set of rules. Moreover, 
contrary to other incentive mechanisms, prizes are flexible in terms of design and allow 
setting multiple parameters to, for example, test special regulatory frameworks. Similarly, 
though in less controllable fashion, competitions can operate as a test bed for unorthodox 
methods and radical technologies when prizes incorporate open-ended challenges and no 
requirements to build specific technologies. In any case, fair and transparent rules allow 
comparing competing approaches to R&D, technologies, and business strategies in a 
level playing field. 
 Prizes can encourage flexible approaches to problem solving if they do not pose 
restrictions to R&D organization, which suggests their implementation in cases that 
traditional instruments are too restrictive. A comparison between prizes and NASA‘s 
SBIR/STTR program in selected dimensions is illustrative (Table 8.6). The networked 
configuration of prize activities and collaborative efforts observed in the GLXP, for 
example, may be not generally allowed under SBIR/STTR programs due to the 
requirements of in-house execution and no partnership. Moreover, while the SBIR/STTR 
program funds certain R&D effort, specific technology maturity levels, and standard 
development lead times (12-24 months,) prizes allow setting these parameters 




Table 8.6: Prizes compared to NASA’s SBIR/STTR programs (selected dimensions) 
 SBIR/STTR Prizes 
Selection process Competitive award with experts 
assessment (about 20-25 percent 
of proposals are awarded;) 
contractual relationship 




Small for-profit (in partnership 
with non-profit research 





Entry process Detailed proposal Entry fee (may require proposal 
as well) 
Technology area Solicitation with topics and 
subtopics proposed by agencies; 
Focus by phase: Phase I, low 
TRL levels (proof-of-concept); 
Phase II, medium TRL levels 
(development); Phase III, high 
TRL levels (commercialization)  
Prize challenge definition set by 
sponsor; May target different 
technology maturity levels 
Development lead 
times 
Varying by phase: 12-24 months Not restricted 
Reward Varying by phase: $100-750K Not restricted 
Partnerships with 
foreign firms 
No Not restricted 
R&D 
subcontracting 
SBIR: Phase I <25 percent, Phase 
II <50 percent 
STTR: small business >=40 





Gov. has non-exclusive paid-up 
license for the technologies; if 
performer does not exercise right 
to patent, invention is made 
public or patented by government 
Optional right to license, or 
request placing in public 
domain, or combination of 
them. 
Source: own analysis. 
 
 Since prizes may induce collaborative efforts across geographical boundaries, 
rules have to consider the regulatory framework specific to the industry sector, 
particularly when prizes involve technologies that may have dual-use or be considered 
inherently military in nature. In those cases, U.S. citizens and organizations that enter in 
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prize competitions to develop certain aerospace and defense technologies may need to 
abide by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR.) Program managers should 
explore special eligibility requirements for prize entrants and competition rules that 
regulate the use or destination of prize technologies in those cases. In some instances, this 
type of regulations may give national teams an advantage when they are able to source 
technologies that foreign teams do not have access to. 
 The key role that IP rights play in fundraising and commercialization activities of 
entrants puts forward the question of whether entrants should be allowed to retain IP 
rights when program managers want to further disseminate or advance technologies with 
follow-up competitions. If prize sponsors are willing to further disseminate or advance 
prize technologies, they shall enter in agreements to negotiate in good faith to license the 
technologies or have preferential access to commercial services offered by entrants. 
 To announce prizes, program managers should watch industry and broader trends 
to anticipate favorable contexts and the potential influence of factors external to the 
competition. Program managers should take advantage of related public events and think 
strategically to increase the program‘s visibility and reach out not only to those that may 
eventually enter the competition, but also to broader audiences including policy-makers 
and the general public. Online social network platforms and other communication means 
can help to engage more individuals with diverse backgrounds and experience and, thus, 
enable a more innovative technology development process. 
 Prize sponsors should also consider some drawbacks of the use of prizes. Most 
importantly, there is the potential negative effect of the widespread or routine use of 
prizes on their incentive power. To prevent this, program managers may use a portfolio 
perspective and use prizes only as a complement of more traditional programs. Prizes can 
initiate new lines of research, for example, and contracts support further development of 
prize outputs. If a multi-prize program is designed, program managers can implement 
sequential competitions that build up on previous results and posit increasingly difficult 
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challenges, simultaneous yet complementary global competitions, or similar yet 
regionally focused competitions. 
 The development/evolution of the prize competition, on the other hand, is 
generally difficult to anticipate, which raises concerns on the efficiency of the program 
spending from budgetary and societal standpoints. Prize managers cannot anticipate 
neither the approaches used to find the solution nor the levels of the R&D activity. 
Moreover, if entrants divert efforts from R&D considerably to seek funding, 
technological development may be constrained. In this case, prizes can induce a more 
focused R&D effort by providing seed funding or other forms of in-kind support such as 
access to special facilities or equipment for all entrants. Unfortunately, the very 
uncertainty that prize R&D processes involve impedes calculating an accurate estimate of 
the R&D costs and, thus, the optimal level of support. All this suggests that prizes should 
be considered as an alternative, experimental policy instrument to complement other 
traditional technology programs. 
 Prize R&D efforts may also be inefficient and originate activity that ultimately 
does not result in, for example, the introduction of technologies or the dissemination of 
the most appropriate methods. Uncertain methods of technology development in the 
pursuit of certain technological goals may also imply higher risks for individuals, the 
environment, and property. Therefore, program managers have to implement the 
necessary measures to limit liabilities. Moreover, the introduction of unorthodox 
approaches is an appealing idea in some circumstances, yet further work may be 
necessary to properly introduce and disseminate those methods as standard practices. 
Codification and documentation of procedures and methods, for example, may be 
necessary if teams are informal organizations that rely heavily upon trial-and-error or 
other informal approaches to R&D. 
 Finally, prize program evaluations require special considerations compared to 
other incentive mechanisms. The generally widely distributed R&D effort in prizes is 
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difficult to measure and, therefore, the assessment of the overall impact of the program is 
more complex as well. Surveying prize entrants and partners to gather data on their 
activities may raise confidentiality concerns on their part and even have a negative effect 
on the ability of the prize to attract entrants. Moreover, program evaluations have to 
consider the dynamics of the competition in terms of entrants (new teams, drop outs, 
mergers) and significant variations in the number of members/volunteers that teams 
engage. Data gathering to evaluate programs is likely to depend on self-reporting 
instruments and thus require appropriate design to favor data reliability and avoid 
unnecessary bureaucracy. 
 
8.5 Methodological considerations 
 This research has investigated prizes and the means by which they induce 
innovation using an empirical, multiple case-study methodology and multiple types of 
data sources. The iterative research process has—based on the analysis of previous 
research—introduced an innovation model applied to prizes, tested and revised the model 
with pilot case studies, analyzed the main case study, probed hypotheses, and revised 
theoretical aspects. The research was set out to answer four questions and probe four 
corresponding hypotheses that are deemed relevant from the point of view of both 
scientific inquiry and policy-making. 
 The analysis has been able to answer the research questions and make an 
important contribution to our knowledge of prizes. The hypotheses—created to reflect 
assumptions implicit in the prize literature—helped to frame a systematic data collection 
process for prize cases and triggered a more general yet fundamental discussion about the 
real effect of prizes. The probes allowed concluding that prizes do induce technological 
innovation under certain conditions (H4,) but the underlying effects of this phenomenon 
(implicit in H1, H2, and H3) are more complex than generally assumed. The analysis has 
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unveiled other intervening factors than those hypothetically anticipated and allowed 
setting a basis for further investigation and refinement of our approaches to investigate 
prizes. Future research projects should develop hypotheses that incorporate those factors 
and probe, for example, the incentive power of certain incentives considered individually, 
the entrant-level determinants of R&D configurations, and the relationship between 
technical aspects of prize outputs and prize configurations. 
 That iterative approach demonstrated to be appropriate to investigate prizes when 
there is a lack of prior research. The test cases helped to refine the model and provide 
methodological insights to investigate the main case. The main case contributed 
significant empirical evidence to gain better understanding of the phenomenon. Overall, 
the three cases contributed insights to develop new building blocks for a theory of prizes. 
Further research, however, should investigate and compare two or more cases, and cases 
in different technological fields and broader contexts, rather than following that 
sequential approach. That will help to gain better understanding of the potential of the 
prize mechanism under more diverse circumstances. 
 The innovation model proposed by this research has some advantages over the 
traditional economic modeling of prize mechanisms. Other models have generally 
considered only the monetary incentive and the production of one innovation, and have 
not considered other diverse motivations, the indirect participation of, for example, 
partners and volunteers, and the development of technologies that do not necessarily 
focus on the prize target. In this regard, the most important contribution of this research is 
an alternative model of innovation in prizes that do consider those factors and, 
particularly, assumes that R&D performers are not necessarily profit-maximizing and 
have diverse decision-making processes, knowledge, and skills. Moreover, this new 
model allows comparing modern with historic cases to understand the influence of the 
context on competitions and comparing prizes with other instances of innovation. 
Improvements in this innovation model applied to prizes should include the refinement of 
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the operationalization of research categories, the specification of other relationships 
between categories, and the investigation of new themes emerging from them. 
 The investigation of prizes without much prior empirical research required 
probing classifications of incentives and entrants to allow the operationalization of 
certain constructs. The classification of incentives into prize and technology incentives 
was appropriate for one of the first empirical research projects that investigates modern 
prizes. This research has shown how different types of incentives weigh on the decision 
of entrants to participate but has also highlighted the need to further address the topic in 
future research to assess the importance of each individual component of the set of 
incentives. On the other hand, this research has shown that entrants are very diverse and 
new classifications can be explored. The classification into conventional and 
unconventional is costly from the research standpoint, because it does not allow 
understanding all the diversity and complexity in variety of entrants. Considering the 
implementation of prizes, it is still useful for prize sponsors to know generally whether 
they will be able to engage individuals and organizations not familiar with the prize 
technologies. Yet, the priority goal-based classification—i.e. whether the entrant seeks to 
win the competition, start a new business, or other—may be more illuminating to 
understand strategies and the factors that can help to focus R&D efforts, despite its more 
complex operationalization. 
 Data on prize cases are generally scant. The information available on recent 
competitions has not been systematically collected and mostly contributed by anecdotal 
accounts and media coverage. Hence, this research sought to draw upon multiple types of 
data sources and data triangulation to increase its internal reliability. Visits and 
observation of team activities, in particular, have helped to gain a better understanding of 
entrants‘ organization and strategies, and also yielded valuable insights to better interpret 
data from questionnaires and documentary sources. This shows that real-time data from 
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ongoing competitions can also be more insightful than historical accounts for the study of 
certain innovation topics in prizes. 
 Future research should seek to develop, among others, methods to quantify and 
qualify the magnitude of the collaborative effort that includes volunteers and partners. 
For this, researchers will possibly draw upon self-reporting methods to gather data about 
entrants and their activities and collaborators. For this, questionnaire design shall balance 
more and more detailed questions with simplicity and low bureaucracy to increase 
response rates. Potential data sources for future research also include the data generally 
collected by prize sponsors about the activities of teams. This project, for example, has 
had the collaboration of the X Prize Foundation for data gathering. Future projects should 
explore methods to gather data systematically without interfering with competitions. 
 Finally, this research has also shown that the winning entry is not necessarily the 
most important technological development in the context of prizes. Findings of 
significant activity during the competition (in both teams and their partners) supports the 
idea by which the most interesting effect of prizes is not necessarily the winning entry but 
also the activities and outputs of runner-ups, other entrants, and other entities that 






 Inducement prizes–where cash rewards are given to motivate the attainment of 
targets—have been long used to stimulate individuals, groups, and communities to 
accomplish diverse types of goals. During the last fifty years, prizes proliferated in 
different formats and in many sectors as a widespread social process. Lately, prizes that 
reward the achievement of technological targets have increasingly attracted the attention 
of policy-makers, managers, philanthropists, and the media due to their potential to 
induce path-breaking innovations and accomplish related goals, such as economic 
recovery or the engagement of social groups to create innovation communities. Academic 
research, however, has barely investigated these prizes in spite of their long history, 
recent popularity, and notable potential. 
 This research has investigated technology prizes and the means by which they 
induce innovation or other effects related to technological development. The project was 
set out to engage four key aspects of prizes for which there have been significant 
knowledge gaps: the motivation of entrants, their R&D activities, their technology 
outputs, and the overall effect of prizes on innovation. Using an empirical, multiple case-
study methodology and multiple types of data sources, this research investigated three 
cases of recent aerospace technology prizes: a main case study, the Google Lunar X Prize 
(GLXP) for robotic Moon exploration; and two pilot cases, the Ansari X Prize (AXP) for 
the first private reusable manned spacecraft and the Northrop Grumman Lunar Lander 
Challenge (NGLLC) for flights of reusable rocket-powered vehicles. 
 Prizes are an incentive and support mechanism for technological development and 
also an indirect mechanism to influence industry and public perceptions about S&T 
issues. Prizes can selectively target certain technologies, R&D performers and geographic 
areas, induce increasing levels of R&D activity and, under certain conditions, induce 
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technological innovation as well. Prizes also leverage funding significantly due to their 
widespread, decentralized impact but involve higher programmatic risks than other more 
incentive traditional mechanisms such as R&D contracts and grants. Prizes can induce 
research, development, diffusion or commercialization of technologies, and diverse 
related effects. Prizes, however, are not always the best policy option and their successful 
implementation requires many parameters to be properly set. 
 Technology prizes offer varied incentives. Prize incentives are those created by 
the announcement and development of competitions and include the cash reward and 
other non-monetary benefits (e.g. reputation, visibility, opportunity to participate in 
technology development.) Technology incentives are those linked to the market value of 
the technologies involved in the competition. These incentives attract entrants with 
diverse characteristics. In modern technology prizes, non-monetary incentives, in 
particular, are more effective than other prize incentives to attract both unconventional 
entrants—individuals and organizations generally not involved with the prize 
technologies—and conventional entrants. The latter, however, generally use prizes as a 
means to produce technologies with market potential. The monetary reward is not as 
important as other prize incentives, yet it is still important to position the competition in 
the media and disseminate the idea of the prize. 
 Prizes can induce increasing R&D activities to target various technological goals, 
yet the evolution of prize competitions is generally difficult to anticipate. The overall 
organization of prize R&D activities depends on entrant-level factors such as entrants‘ 
goals, strategies, and resources, and is not directly influenced by prize design. The most 
remarkable characteristic of prize R&D activities is their interaction with fundraising 
efforts that, in some circumstances, may constrain the activities of entrants. Prizes can 
also selectively focus on the advancement of technologies at different levels of maturity, 
yet the quality of the technological outputs is difficult to anticipate and depends on 
entrant-level factors as well. The evidence shows that there is a weak relationship 
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between type of entrants and prize technology outputs, and that stronger plausible 
explanations can be found in entrants‘ goals, the prize challenge definition, and state of 
the art of the prize technologies. 
 Finally, prizes can induce innovation over and above what would have occurred 
in a context in which only more traditional incentive mechanisms are implemented, yet 
their overall effect depends significantly on the characteristics of the prize entrants and 
the evolution of the context of the competition. The ability of prizes to induce innovation 
is larger when there are larger prize incentives, more significant technology gaps implicit 
in the prize challenge, and open-ended challenge definitions. Complementary incentives 
and support may be needed in some circumstances to make prizes work. 
 The lack of previous research and empirical evidence on prize cases required 
making important decisions in terms of methodologies, data gathering, and analysis for 
this project. Most importantly, there was the trade-off between the comprehensiveness of 
the study and the degree of detail and strength of insights provided by the evidence. The 
researcher decided to balance both depth and breath with the goal of explaining the entire 
innovation process induced by prizes and contributing empirically-grounded insights for 
theory building. In terms of data gathering, this research required creating new data 
gathering instruments and coordinating the collection of significant amounts of data from 
multiple sources. The analysis required an intense effort to be able to disentangle the 
effects induced by the prize from those related with the characteristics of entrants or the 
context of the competitions. 
 Further empirical research will substantiate our knowledge and prize theories. 
Future research should seek to develop better data sources and methods to quantify and 
qualify the magnitude of the collaborative effort that includes volunteers and partners. 
The approach followed by this project demonstrates that real-time data from ongoing 
competitions can be more insightful than historical accounts to study innovation in prizes. 
This is related with the notion that the most interesting effect of prizes is not necessarily 
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the winning entry but also the activities and outputs of runner-ups, other entrants, and 
other entities that participate only indirectly. Though this research was not able to analyze 
the winning entry of the GLXP case, significant insights about the effect of the prize are 








Table A.1: Ansari X-Prize entrants 







Location Type of entrant
b
 
1 Acceleration Engineering N/A 1996 1 Bath, Michigan, 
USA 
Unconventional (volunteer; created 
for the competition) 
2 Advent Launch Services N/A 1996 100 Houston, Texas, 
USA 
Unconventional (created company 
after entering; mostly volunteers) 
3 Aeronautics and Cosmonautics 
Romanian Association (ARCA) 
1999 2002 8 Ramnicu Valcea, 
Romania 
Unconventional (non-governmental 
organization created by students) 
4 Armadillo Aerospace 2000 2002 6 Mesquite, Texas, 
USA 
Unconventional (volunteer) 
5 American Astronautics 
Corporation 
N/A 2003 N/A Oceanside, 
California, USA 
Unconventional (company created for 
the competition) 
6 Bristol Spaceplanes, Ltd 1991 1997 N/A Bristol, England, 
UK 
Unconventional (consulting company 
that re-directed its activities) 
7 Canadian Arrow N/A 2000 18 London, Ontario, 
Canada 
Unconventional (volunteer team with 
no experience in aerospace industry) 
8 The da Vinci Project N/A 2000 14 Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada 
Unconventional (volunteer) 
9 Pablo de Leon & Associates N/A 1997 6 Buenos Aires, 
Argentina 
Unconventional (company created for 
the competition) 
10 Discraft Corporation N/A 1997 N/A Portland, Oregon, 
USA 
N/A 
11 Flight Exploration N/A N/A N/A London, England, 
UK 
N/A 
12 Fundamental Technology Systems N/A 2000 7 Orlando, Florida, 
USA 
Unconventional (company that re-
directed its activities) 
13 HARC (High Altitute Research 
Corporation) 
N/A N/A N/A Huntsville, Alabama N/A 
Notes: a. Number of members is as of 2003 (otherwise indicated); b. Teams were classified into traditional and unconventional categories from the point of view 
of the similarity of their activities in relation to the prize challenge. 
Source: different sources cited in the text and references and analysis of the author. 
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Table A.1: Ansari X-Prize entrants (Contd.) 







Location Type of entrant
b
 
14 IL Aerospace Technologies N/A 2002 7 Zichron Ya'akov, 
Israel 
Unconventional (company created 
for the competition) 
15 Interorbital Systems 1996 2003 8 Mojave, California, 
USA 
Traditional (aerospace company) 
16 Kelly Space and Technology N/A N/A N/A San Bernadino, 
California, USA 
Traditional (aerospace company) 
17 Lone Star Space Access 
Corporation 
N/A N/A N/A Houston, Texas, USA N/A 
18 Micro-Space, Inc. N/A 2003 6 Denver, Colorado, 
USA 
Unconventional (company that re-
directed its activities) 
19 PanAero, Inc. 1997 1997 9 Fairfax, VA, USA Unconventional (company created 
for the competition and other goals) 
20 Pioneer Rocketplane, Inc. (now 
Rocketplane Kistler) 
2001 N/A N/A Oklahoma City, OK Traditional (company created in the 
spaceflight business) 
21 Scaled Composites N/A 2001 135 employees Mojave, California, 
USA 
Unconventional (aviation company) 
22 Space Transport Corporation 2002 2003 N/A N/A Unconventional (company created 
for the competition) 
23 Starchaser Industries 1998 1996 35 Cheshire, England, 
UK 
Unconventional (company created 
for the competition) 
24 Suborbital Corporation N/A N/A N/A Moscow, Russia N/A 
25 TGV Rockets N/A 1999 6 Bethesda, Maryland, 
USA 
Unconventional (company created 
for the competition) 
26 Vanguard Spacecraft N/A 2003 6 Bridgewater, 
Massachusetts, USA 
Unconventional (company created 
for the competition) 
Notes: a. Number of members is as of 2003 (otherwise indicated); b. Teams were classified into traditional and unconventional categories from the point of view 
of the similarity of their activities in relation to the prize challenge. 


































































and trust in 
sponsor 
N/A N/A N/A N/A Technology 
development 




Notes: N/A indicates data not available. (?) indicates contradictory evidence. 













































































































Notes: N/A indicates data not available. (?) indicates contradictory evidence. 
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s for aerospace 
development 
N/A Lack of funding 
 
Lack of funding 
 
 
Lack of funding Lack of funding 
Notes: N/A indicates data not available. (?) indicates contradictory evidence. 









































































based on prize 
developments 
Commercializa
tion was not a 
goal 
Commercializa
tion was a 














firm to enter 
the space 
tourism market 
N/A Pre-sold space 
flight to fund 
project 
 
Notes: N/A indicates data not available. (?) indicates contradictory evidence. 


















































































































135 6 12 (~100 
volunteers) 
8 14 (~500 
volunteers) 
9 35 















Notes: N/A indicates data not available. (?) indicates contradictory evidence. 




Table A.3: NGLLC entrants (2006-2009) 












1 Masten Space 
Systems 
2004 5 3 Traditional (Rocketry and propulsion company) 
2 Acuity 
Technologies 
1992 5 3 Unconventional (develops, manufactures, and supports components and 
systems for unmanned vehicles, robotics, and automation; this is first rocketry 
project) 
3 Micro-Space Before 
2004 
3 2 Unconventional (company that re-directed its activities) 
4 Armadillo 
Aerospace 
2000 8 4 Unconventional (all volunteers until 2007?) 
5 BonNova N/A 6 3 Unconventional (company that re-directed activities and create a team 
specifically for the competition; it is a design firm focused on innovative 
invention and eng. for aerospace and all industries) 
6 High Expectations 
Rocketry 
N/A 4 1 Unconventional (group that re-directed its rocketry, engineering, and software 
activities to enter the competition) 
Notes: a. Number of members is as of 2008 (or 2007 if data for 2008 were not found); b. Teams were classified into traditional and unconventional categories 
from the point of view of the similarity of their activities in relation to the prize challenge. 




Table A.3: NGLLC entrants (2006-2009) (Contd.) 












7 Paragon Labs 2000 9 2 Unconventional (re-directed activities; now develops suborbital launch 
vehicles and VTOL technologies) 
8 Speed Up N/A 1 1 Unconventional (volunteer with support from a private company, Frontier 
Astronautics) 
9 Phoenicia N/A 5 1 Unconventional (volunteers; the team was created to compete for the prize) 
10 Seraphim Works N/A N/A 1 N/A 
11 TrueZer0 N/A 4 1 Unconventional (small company that re-direct its activities) 
12 Unreasonable 
Rocket 
N/A 4 3 Unconventional (volunteers) 
Notes: a. Number of members is as of 2008 (or 2007 if data for 2008 were not found); b. Teams were classified into traditional and unconventional categories 
from the point of view of the similarity of their activities in relation to the prize challenge. 
Source: different sources cited in the text and references and analysis of the author. 
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Table A.4: Data gathering summary for embedded cases in NGLLC 
Dim. Categ. 
Selected teams 









Prize money and 
reputation 
Prize money and 
reputation 







Risk of participation 
and trust in sponsor 
Balance business risk Personal commitment 
to risky competition 
 
N/A Probability 












Efficiency, low cost, 
and simplicity 
Low cost Low cost, simplicity 
 Design 
sources 
Existing technologies Own know-how Fiction and other 
industries as well 


























iterations for modeling, 
analysis, and test 
N/A Relatively slow R&D 
process compared to 
other teams 






At least $3.5 million 
with support from 
wealthy leader and 
corporate sponsors 
$2.5 million, own 
resources (?) 




Bureaucratic issues to 
obtain experimental 
permit (?) 
N/A Lack of time to be 
ready for competition 
day 
Lack of time to be 
ready for competition 
day 
N/A 
Notes: N/A indicates data not available. (?) indicates contradictory evidence. 




Table A.4: Data gathering summary for embedded cases in NGLLC (Contd.) 
Dim. Categ. 
Selected teams 
























standards in size and 
weight 







may have influenced 
towards modular design 
Designs targeted a 
specific market yet it 
was still not readily 
available for 
commercialization 
Patent applications N/A Commercialization 
was not a goal but 
declared interest 
Notes: N/A indicates data not available. (?) indicates contradictory evidence. 






Table A.4: Data gathering summary for embedded cases in NGLLC (Contd.) 
Dim. Categ. 
Selected teams 













R&D team and later 
decided to join the 
prize) 
Traditional (small 





directed activities and 
create a team 




directed its rocketry, 
engineering, and 
software activities to 
enter the competition) 
Unconventional 
(small father and son 
team created to 








only after joining the 
AXP and several years 
of R&D 
Only one member with 
aerospace experience 
and the rest with internet 
technology background 
Leader participated in 
design of AXP‘s 
winning entry, yet 
very diverse 





background yet no 
experience with 
rocket engines until 
competition 
 




2006, 2007, 2008 (1
st
 
place level One), 2009 
(2
nd
 place level Two) 
2006, 2007, 2009 (1
st
 
place level Two, 2
nd
 
place level One) 
2007, 2008, 2009 
(withdrawn) 
2008 2007, 2008, 2009 
 Team 
members 
8 5 6 4 4 
 Location Mesquite, TX Mojave, CA Tarzana, CA Moscow, ID Solana Beach, CA 
Notes: N/A indicates data not available. (?) indicates contradictory evidence. 




Table A.5: GLXP entrants 
Team name Type of entity 








Odissey Moon For-profit  Multi-natl./Isle of Man No Dec-07 
 
ARCA Non-profit  Romania No Feb-08 
 
Chandah Independent USA Yes Feb-08 Jan-11 
Astrobotic For-profit  USA Yes Feb-08 
 
LUNARecon (Lunatrex) For-profit  USA No Feb-08 Dec-09 
SCSG Independent USA Yes Feb-08 Jun-08 
Micro-space For-profit  USA No Feb-08 Nov-10 
Italia N/A Italia Yes Feb-08 
 
Frednet Non-profit  Multi-national Yes Feb-08 
 
Quantum3 For-profit  USA Yes Feb-08 Feb-09 
Selene Independent China, Germany Yes May-08 
 
Stellar For-profit  USA Yes May-08 
 
Jurban Part of larger org. (Non-profit) USA Yes May-08 
 
Advaeros For-profit  Multi-national No May-08 Nov-10 
Independence X Part of larger org. (Non-profit) Malaysia Yes Sep-08 
 
Omega Envoy Non-profit  USA No Oct-08 
 
Next Giant Leap For-profit  USA Yes Dec-08 
 
Euroluna Non-profit  Danish, Swiss, Italian Yes Dec-08 
 
Synergy Moon N/A Multi-national Yes Feb-09 
 
White Label Space Non-profit  Multi-national Yes May-09 
 




Table A.5: GLXP teams (Contd.) 
Team name Type of entity 








Part Time Scientists For-profit  Germany Yes Jun-09 
 
Selenokhod For-profit  Russia No Sep-09 
 
C-Base Open Moon Non-profit  Germany Yes Oct-09 
 
Barcelona Moon For-profit  Spain Yes Apr-10 
 
Rocket City Space Pioneers Part of larger org. (For-profit) USA Yes Sep-10 
 
Moon Express For-profit  USA No Oct-10 
 
Teams that entered after data gathering finished: 
Team Space IL Non-profit  Israel Yes Jan-11 
 
Mystical Moon N/A Multi-national Yes Feb-11 
 
Team Puli Independent Hungary Yes Feb-11 
 
SpaceMETA team Independent Brazil Yes Feb-11 
 
Plan B For-profit  Canada No Feb-11 
 
Penn State Lunar Lion Team Non-profit  USA Yes Feb-11 
 
Angelicum For-profit  Chile No Feb-11 
 
Team Indus For-profit  India Yes Feb-11 
 
Team Phoenicia For-profit  USA No Feb-11 
 




Table A.6: Additional reasons to participate in the GLXP given by questionnaire respondents 
Type of motivation 
Teams 
Additional motivations given in questionnaire 
T6 T22 T26 T14 T13 T19 
Entertainment       "Have fun"; "Entertainment value" 
Opportunity to demonstrate technical 
capability  
     "Proving capability of the open source community" 
Learning       "Improve complex team management for other projects" 
Benefits to society       
"Help spreading / raising interest within youth in science & 
technology" 
Opportunity to gather resources to 
pursue other types of projects 
      
"Help raising money from non space related companies for 
space projects" 
Religious       
"Opportunity to Showcase and Testify to the Lord Jesus 
Christ's Blessings, Provision and Assistance for His Followers 
who are involved in Innovative Technology!" 
Demonstrate technological concept       
"To validate a technical concept originally conceived in the 
mid-1960s" 
Opportunity to engage in aerospace 
development, hands-on experience 










Note: the table shows additional reasons to participate (i.e. not given as pre-defined options in questionnaire) as indicated by six teams. 
Source: questionnaire applied to GLXP teams. 
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Table A.7: Top reasons to participate in the GLXP according to interviewed team members 
Type of motivation 
Importance of motivation for each team 
Related team quotations (selected examples) 
T20 T13 T14 T11 T4 T6 T16 
Participation in challenging project        “…like doing something that is really difficult to do.” 
Competition        
“We are constantly stimulated by competition, which 
leads us to push our limits.” 
Intrinsic motivation        
“the team itself is a really proactive people. [...] 
…people that are always doing something... [...] 
…people that in anyway would do something.” 
Commercialization of prize 
technologies  
      
“We have great hopes though that we could grow 
customers on the commercial side…” 
Opportunity to gather resources to 
pursue this type of project 
       
“...only in the competition we can do this. If we do this in 
our spare time without the competition, for the 
companies has no value or it doesn’t make sense for to 
spend money or energy or components.” 
Professional reputation        
“…want to be recognized as a competitor, that’s already 
very valuable to me.” 
Opportunity to participate as an 
additional incentive to accomplish 
organizational goals 












Note: only reasons emphasized (positively or negatively) by interviewees are shown; when needed, the examples omit part of the text to maintain the anonymity 
of teams. 





Table A.7: Top reasons to participate in the GLXP according to interviewed team members (Contd.) 
Type of motivation 
Importance of motivation for each team 
Related team quotations (selected examples) 
T20 T13 T14 T11 T4 T6 T16 
Demonstrate technological concept        
“…looked at the Google Lunar X Prize as a perfect way 
to demonstrate the […] concept” 
Demonstrate technological 
leadership 
       “When you lead a team, the world expects you to win.” 
Opportunity to engage in aerospace 
development, hands-on experience 
       
“…wanted to be a part of something real and be able to 
make something different.” 
Learning        “…for me it was mostly learning everything.” 
Commercialization of expertise        
“One thing that we thought about later on was that we 
could, if someone is interested, offering them our 
collaborative work.” 
Networking        
“The benefits that I have is that I’m getting in contact 
with a lot of interesting people.” 












Note: only reasons emphasized (positively or negatively) by interviewees are shown; when needed, the examples omit part of the text to maintain the anonymity 
of teams. 









T20 T13 T14 T11 T4 T6 T16 
Reusability X    X  X 




X   X   X 





   X X  X 
Meet requirements and 
minimize failure and 




X    X   
“…do less engineering and 




X   X    
Creative, simple solutions 
that work efficiently; 
“…getting us from A to B as 
fast as possible.” (T20, 
2010) 
Minimalism     X   
Minimum capabilities 
required to accomplish 
mission. 
Robustness     X   
System that resists many 
mission days. 
Scalability       X 
“…going to be useful in the 
future when we want to 
pursue larger missions…” 
(T16, 2010) 
Note: the table shows additional design criteria mentioned in interviews yet not offered as options in 
questionnaire. 








Table A.9: Coding summary for GLXP team interviews 
Dimension: Motivation Category: Perceived incentives 
Team Coded data 
T10 Opportunity to engage in a unique (international, competitive, dynamic,) challenging project taking advantage of strong background and 
be recognized for that; prize money is not very important; team seek to learn and eventually may try to earn money from 
commercialization. of technology. or expertise. 
T13 Opportunity to engage in a unique, challenging project as an additional incentive to achieve related organizational goals; similar 
experience with prizes help decision to enter. 
T14 Use the opportunity to demonstrate capabilities of proprietary tech. for landers (pending patents filed when entering the competition;) 
prize money is considered to cover expenses. Withdrawn after considering own goals not aligned with sponsor‘s. 
T11 Overall, prize money is not an incentive; the challenging engineering goal is the most attractive; the competition offers the elements 
(reputation before 3rd parties, focus, competitive environment) to make this type of project doable; intrinsic motivation is strong, 
proactive team members. Seek to win and commercialize proven expertise after that. Learning is a plus yet not a goal. 
T4 Seek to demonstrate technological leadership and build commercial enterprise at the same time; perception of potentially sizable new 
markets to exploit; the competition offers the elements (reputation before 3rd parties, focus, competitive environment) to make this type 
of project doable. Winning the competition is a key component in the team‘s strategy. 
T6 Opportunity to participate in an event linked to potential commercial opportunities that can be pursued using publicity, personal 
reputation, or networks given by participation. 
T16 Opportunity to engage with space tech. dev. and gain professional reputation and experience; the team analyzes potential markets for the 
technologies they develop. Challenging engineering goal also motivates. 
Source: own analysis.  
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Table A.9: Coding summary for GLXP team interviews (Contd.) 
Dimension: Motivation Category: Perceived risk 
Team Coded data 
T10 Technical risks assessed; seeks to diversify mission risks by engaging sponsors and partners; project risk is managed by allocating most 
complex tasks to most trusted partners. 
T13 Deviate from organizational goals of higher priority. 
T14 N/A 
T11 Technical risks assessed; seeks to diversify mission risks by engaging sponsors and partners. 
T4 Technical risks assessed and managed; new tech. configurations aimed at mitigating risk in mission‘s critical points. 
T6 There are no risks in participation. Technical and programmatic risks not considered yet. 
T16 Technical risks assessed and managed using NASA-like procedures; seeks to diversify mission risks by engaging sponsors and partners. 





Table A.9: Coding summary for GLXP team interviews (Contd.) 
Dimension: R&D activities Category: Design criteria 
Team Coded data 
T10 Min. tech. dev. effort; cheap and quick; simple and smart designs reduce no. of components; std. proc. for rocket motor design; ―not 
fancy things, just something that works;‖ some efficiency and prfm. loss tolerated; start from scratch to design a custom sys. that can be 
used for other missions; commercial. does not affect design; lack of access to some tech. (e.g. to enable night survival) forces certain 
mission design. 
T13 N/A 
T14 Core tech. is based on technologies developed since the 1960s by the founders; seek to demonstrate use of spinning lander concept. 
T11 Simple and smart are the key criteria; simplicity of the mission to accomplish allows significant simplification of tech. dev., even with 
small budget (the latter considered to be equivalent to prize money) and time constraint; electronics redundancy to assure performance. 
T4 Less engineering dev. and increasing use of existing cheaper components influences design characteristics and evolution; creative 
solutions are used otherwise; minimalist, customized design constrained by launch capabilities; robustness; budget expands to match 
required design rather to adjust to prize money; seek performance for continuing activity after prize. 
T6 Cheap, low tech., new approaches brought from non-aerospace backgrounds. 
T16 High performance and optimized designs to match slim margins of mass and budget (the latter considered to be equivalent to the prize 
money); compatibility with commercially available components; low cost; lander with simplified, conventional design that reduces 
moving parts and increases reliability; designs with commercial orientation (e.g. scalability to allow use in future missions.) 




Table A.9: Coding summary for GLXP team interviews (Contd.) 
Dimension: R&D activities Category: Design sources 
Team Coded data 
T10 Significant, multidisciplinary knowledge and experience available from previous work; research into previous missions; external expert 
advice (wide network available); available yet old space agency's doc. (NASA) for rocket design; other ref. material available in-house 
or published online or provided by companies; designs by other teams are not an important source; inputs from members with comm. 
background. 
T13 Developed own tech. based on Ansari X Prize experience and new design based on organizational needs. 
T14 Significant knowledge and experience available from previous work; for main subsystems (power, telemetry, propulsion) using own 
designs based on previous experience (speeds up things considerably); new landing radar under preliminary design. 
T11 Extensive network of partners and manuf.; feedback from project presentations at diff. venues; multi-disciplinary work groups with non-
aerospace participants; own creativity applied to existing tech. solutions and mission boundaries (i.e. prize req.); feedback from external 
experts (aerospace agency); feedback from team's website; doc. from space agencies (NASA); ―there is not much to learn from other 
teams‖ 
T4 Significant insights from trial and error; previous aerospace and robotics experience; creative solutions to problems learnt from agency‘s 
missions; collaborations with other academic departments; requirements resulting from sourcing existing technologies. 
T6 Different insights contributed by non-aerospace team members. (team have not progressed significantly in terms of outputs) 
T16 Previous projects by agencies; commercially readily available components; significant communication with prize teams from other 
competitions (NGLLC); industry companies; external experts; designs by other teams are not an important source. 




Table A.9: Coding summary for GLXP team interviews (Contd.) 
Dimension: R&D activities Category: Technology sources 
Team Coded data 
T10 Use of off-the-shelf and modified components and manuf. Partners, incl. launcher and break stage; in-house lander's descent motor based 
on standard designs; rest of lander built with support of main corp. partner; rover built by univ. partner; other local firms build models 
and mockups; electronic controllers and actuators sourced from firms abroad; software, electr. sourced from foreign partners; 
commercial, non-aerospace electronic components; test services for rocket motors available from foreign lab; natl. partner provides 
structural elements in special mat.; comm. subsystem by foreign univ. partner;  negotiation and sponsorship opp. used to source tech. 
T13 Launcher and transfer vehicle developed in-house (uses tech. already developed for Ansari X Prize); seeks propulsion systems and 
avionics from third-parties. 
T14 Launcher and upper stage are existing, proven commercial solutions (SpaceX and ATK). (team didn‘t make any additional progress 
before withdrawn) 
T11 Extensive network of partners provides tech. for each subsystem; launcher is available commercial solution; lander and rover assembled 
with support of univ. partners and sourced parts by partners (in-house manufacturing capabilities are not required for the chosen 
organizational structure). 
T4 Partners provide technologies for various subsystems; ―friend companies‖ also contribute (anywhere between 5-20% of costs may be 
covered with this type of contributions); launcher and upper stages from existing solutions (SpaceX and ATK); rest of subsystems is 
customized and built in-house or by other companies; lander's rocket is surplus part from NASA's program; commercially available, non-
aerospace electronic components. 
T6 Seeks to source existing commercially available technologies for all subsystems except the lander; use design equipment from 
universities. 
T16 Launcher is commercially available solution (SpaceX); upper stage will be built using existing standard commercially available rocket 
motor; extensive use of compatible off-the-shelf components (in-house manufacturing capabilities are limited) and equipment; rover and 
lander assembled with support of univ. partners. 
Source: own analysis.  
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Table A.9: Coding summary for GLXP team interviews (Contd.) 
Dimension: R&D activities Category: Organization of R&D 
Team Coded data 
T10 Prize team with space agency-like elements in internal organization; flexible organizational approach, no hierarchies, non-profit 
coordination and execution by network of corporate partners; international division of work with formal comm.; readily available access 
to pro.  network and significant knowledge from previous projects; direct engagement resulting from smaller multi-disciplinary teams 
(which may in turn slow down devs.); R&D approach strongly dependent on external funding; there is specialization in some subsystems 
but also members working on multiple aspects (e.g. lander dev.); standard dev. procedures; own design and outsourced manuf.; test 
facilities provided by local and foreign partners; "no one person understands the whole system." 
T13 Trial and error approach to R&D. Centralized, in-house production. Some subsystems developed by partners. 
T14 Quick turnaround based on subcontracting production and launch. Delegation of production to partners. 
T11 International division of work, sub-teams; fresh, multi-disciplinary non-aerospace approach to problem-solving; low cost dev. structure 
(thanks to formal and informal connections with univ. facilities and equipment); agile organization yet top-bottom approach allows 
delegation, facilitates control by core team, and speed ups dev.; direct comm. channels and optimized workflow allow internal idea 
sourcing without bureaucracy; rapid prototyping and testing; manuf. of components and subsystems sourced from wide network of 
partners; use of software tools to coordinate virtual meetings and work groups; open sharing of information; org. structure evolves 
significantly to maintain flexibility as the team grows (strong focus on org. matters.) 
T4 Flat organization with strong academic components; leading univ. is main R&D center, multi-disciplinary inter-departmental 
collaborations; sub-groups; decentralized R&D is also undertaken by network of "friend companies"; forced, very near term, complete 
conceptual system design that is optimized in further dev.; "craft culture": focus on trial and error, iterative prototyping and testing cycles 
evolve design ("real success comes from failing fast and failing often‖), simulation only supports that process; creative problem-solving 
instances result from lack of resources to acquire commercially available technologies or need to adapt sourced components; emphasis 
on informal, face to face comm. 
T6 Informal and decentralized organization; ―The groups are the places where the life is taking place. [...] They work from their homes.‖; no 
access to network of univ. or corporate partners; weak organization of communication and work flows. 
T16 Flat, cost effective organization with decentralized sub-groups; small core team with knowledge about all aspects (this speeds up dev. 
and gets to accomplishments); local division of dev. work between univ. partners but members engaged in multiple tasks (which requires 
combined skills); internal telecomm. to coordinate work, few face to face meetings (this may cause mistakes); flat organization with 
academic components; access to network of corporate partners and former prize teams; access to specialized test and assembly facilities; 
rapid prototyping and analysis based on actual test results (and not simulation). 




Table A.9: Coding summary for GLXP team interviews (Contd.) 
Dimension: R&D activities Category: R&D effort 
Team Coded data 
T10 $50 million mission; no money raised yet; design phase at the moment; volunteer team effort; lack of funding does not affect design 
criteria but forces internal re-organization of work (towards fundraising) and plans to rely upon partners to develop and test; need to 
speed up forces reduction of engineering effort which is planned to be sourced from partners; significant organizational and co-
ordination effort; GLXP is the only project of the team. 
T13 Significant engineering effort in all phases of the mission; testing of unconventional solutions; GLXP is one of the projects of the team. 
T14 $25 million mission; volunteer effort with limited, out-of-pocket spending before withdrawn (6-7 months of participation with own 
funding); manufacturing and assembly planned to be delegated to partner company; some planned fund raising to coordinate effort and 
pay for certain equipment; GLXP is the only project of the team. 
T11 Significant work performed by students, part at univ. facilities; significant work on other aspects of participation (fundraising, internal 
organization, public relations, feedback gathering); full-time fundraising and PR effort; part-time engineering work with few exceptions; 
sponsorship and partnership contributions applied to dev. effort exclusively; presentations help to gather new human resources; quick 
prototyping turnaround; short-cycle iterative design, modeling, and testing; GLXP is the only project of the team. 
T4 $90 million mission; significant full-time work on fundraising and commercialization of prize technologies and related services; 
significant human, knowledge resources and facilities available from univ.; most significant dev. work on spacecraft landing and rover; 
GLXP is one of the projects of the team. 
T6 Small effort not backed by any company or univ.; effort is mostly done to find partners and gather other resources; model devs. with 
promotional purposes; GLXP is the only project of the team. 
T16 <$30 million mission; design phase at the moment; significant volunteer effort; important test facilities available to the team, yet not all 
the necessary manufacturing equipment; most significant dev. effort in on lander and communications; GLXP is the only project of the 
team. 




Table A.9: Coding summary for GLXP team interviews (Contd.) 
Dimension: R&D activities Category: Constraints 
Team Coded data 
T10 Need to speed up forces to combine tasks (e.g. prepare working models that serve multiple purposes) and reduce to only those strictly 
necessary; lack of access to certain componentry forces changes in mission approach and systems design; all possible dev. work done 
internally until funding is raised. 
T13 N/A 
T14 Requirements of rules for high-definition video system conflicted with own developments. 
T11 Rules were a constraint at the beginning, now are generally conducive rather than restrictive, in spite of having some rules with difficult 
interpretation; some rules affect systems design and mission approach; prize deadline is not a concern. 
T4 Funding is the big challenge. 
T6 Lack of access to networks in the aerospace sector; funding; rules are not conducive with regard to some aspects of organization. 
T16 Funding is main potential constraint; prize deadline is not a problem with full funding, but time advantage of other teams is a concern; 
rules are "reasonable"; students-team profile makes difficult to get partners. 




Table A.9: Coding summary for GLXP team interviews (Contd.) 
Dimension: Technology outputs Category: Technology outputs 
Team Coded data 
T10 Design phase; no testing so far; no significant innovation achieved; new dev. in terms of rocket engine expected to be commercialized; 
seeks to develop new system and platform for planetary exploration with partners. 
T13 Only GLXP team that successfully tested launcher, telemetry, control and command flight systems, and data transmission systems. 
T14 Team withdrew before actual dev.; designs were in progress but main conceptual dev. was already proven in multiple missions before 
entering the competition. Key technologies are patented or patent-pending. 
T11 Design and testing of rover, lander, and communications system; multiple new devs. of subsystems for different parts of the mission (e.g. 
transfer, communications, rover, and organization.) Designs do not significantly affected by potential commercialization of services 
(only some payload space reserved;) IP on new technologies and processes or rights on scientific data are exchanged with partners only 
when need to source technologies or funding. 
T4 Development and testing phases; contract for launcher already made; ―60% is common denominator and 40% is always unique and 
special‖; some devs. are forced by the rules (sometimes reducing efficiency of the system); rover design and testing; lander design. 
Technologies are licensed from main R&D center at univ. 
T6 Very early phase of the project; no significant tech. outputs. Commercialization of technologies is not main interest; sub-groups would 
retain IP of devs.; in early stage, seeks funding from merchandising. 
T16 Initial phase of dev.; camera under design; suspension system test and built, lander prototypes being built, rover under dev. and testing. 
Scalable configuration to offer different payload size ranges in eventual commercialization. In general, seeks to develop products and 
process that can be transferred to commercial fabrication; interested in patenting technologies, yet significant devs. will be shared; some 
rights are given away to fund project (NASA and other contracts.) 




Table A.9: Coding summary for GLXP team interviews (Contd.) 
Dimension: Team characteristics Category: Experience/background 
Team Coded data 
T10 Core team with extensive space agency and aerospace industry (large company) experience; participated in innovative aerospace projects 
for tech. demonstration; collaborators with amateur rocketry experience. [Conventional] 
T13 Team created by students to promote space activities; past prize experience. [Unconventional] 
T14 Core team with extensive aerospace industry experience in large companies. [Conventional] 
T11 Core team with mostly IT/software and diverse science backgrounds; significant proportion of students; key members with business and 
space agency experience. [Unconventional] 
T4 Multi-disciplinary engineering backgrounds and business and prize experience; previous (own) work on designing lunar projects. 
[Unconventional] 
T6 Diverse backgrounds (including Physics, IT, Design, and Arts) and small business experience. [Unconventional] 
T16 Core team comprises mostly aerospace students. [Unconventional] 




Table A.9: Coding summary for GLXP team interviews (Contd.) 
Dimension: Team characteristics Category: Strategy/goals 
Team Coded data 
T10 Engineering challenge approach, not business approach to the prize; seeks to create sponsorship opportunity, branding and advertising 
platform; network of tech. partners may eventually commercialize devs.; collaborators may continue further devs. on subsystems (lander 
rocket motor) to commercialize as well; commercial payload probable but not considered yet. Core team seeks professional 
reputation/publicity. Other workgroups seek commercialization. 
T13 Team established to increase the level of aerospace activities in its country and the desire to promote innovative research projects. No 
intention to commercialize technologies. 
T14 The main goal is demonstrating that a proprietary technological concept works. 
T11 The main goal is participation and technical accomplishment, focus on winning the competition; inspiring students and the general 
public; some members seek to create new enterprise based on prize technologies. Seeks to create sponsorship opportunity; seeks to 
eventually commercialize expertise, consulting services. 
T4 Demonstrate technological leadership and create space commercial enterprise. Seeks to sell payload capability to finance dev. to reduce 
need of investors; target future NASA contracts and diverse commercial customers; when mission accomplished, will sell services 
related to Moon presence. 
T6 Core team seeks professional reputation/publicity/networking; some workgroups with focus on winning the competition. 
T16 Learning, further space activities beyond the prize; commercialization is evaluated. Commercial opportunities arising; may change to a 
for-profit form in the future to commercialize. 




Table A.10: Overall assessment of selected historic prizes 
 
Longitude Prize Orteig Prize Kremer Prize 
Year 1714-1765 1919-1927 1959-1977 
Type of prize 
Technology-based achievement, unknown solution 




Purpose Develop a new method to 
measure longitude at sea 




 Up to £ 20,000 $25,000 About $100,000 
Challenge 
was about... 
Developing a new method Accomplishing a feat that 
required the right balance of 
technology/skills 
Complete a human-powered 
flight within timeframe in 
designated course (this 
certainly demanded 
building a new type of 
aircraft at that time) 
Context Significant industry need; 
catastrophic accidents at sea 
due to lack of proper 
instruments 
Ten years of aviation 
rivalry and competitions; 
increasing interest in 
aviation 
Ultra lightweight materials 
enabled new techniques of 
construction 
Entrants Independent inventors Recognized and 






Flight skills, technology 
adaptation, courage 





of very diverse methods, 
diverse technologies. 
 
Winning entry: New 
precision mechanisms (e.g. 
circular balances, bi-
metallic strips, caged roller 
bearings) 
Multiple attempts with 




day, adapted aircraft (i.e. 
solo flight, lighter plane, no 
security equipment) 
Multiple attempts with 
diverse configurations. 
 
Winning entry: Use of 
ultra-lightweight materials 
Overall effect Introduction of a novel 
method (chronometer) to 
measure longitude 
Demonstration of existing 
capabilities to accomplish 
the feat 
New approach to 
accomplish the feat (i.e. 
ultra-light plane with large 
wing area at very slow 
speeds) 
Note: a. historic value. 




Table A.11: Overall assessment of selected modern prizes 
 
Ansari X Prize DARPA Challenges NGLLC GLXP 
Year 1996-2004 2004, 2005, 2007 2006-2009 2007-present 
Type of 
prize 
Prizes for technology 
demonstration, 
unknown solution 
Prizes for technology demonstration, well-
defined problems with existing solutions 
Technology-based 
achievement, well-




Ansari Family (XPF) DARPA NASA, Northrop 
Grumman (XPF) 
Google (XPF) 







of VTOL vehicles 
Commercial 
development of lunar 
technologies 




Building a vehicle 
and accomplishing a 
feat under certain 
operational 
conditions 
Building a vehicle 
and demonstrating 
technological 
efficiency in a 
designated course 








Context Some evidence of 
potential of space 
tourism market 
Congress request for 
tech. dev. for DoD 
that is also related 
with potential civil 
use as well 
Emerging new space 
sector and new 
NASA programs for 
tech. dev. 
New players in 
aerospace, new race 
between countries 
and trend towards 
commercialization 















































Winning entry: New 
















accomplish the feat 
Advanced navigation 
technologies that 
enabled first time 
autonomous vehicle 
















Note: the chart shows the cumulative number of teams since the prize announcement. 
Source: X Prize Foundation. 




Note: N=17 cases; questionnaire‘s labels indicating motivations are shorten in the figure to facilitate 
presentation of data. 
Source: questionnaire applied to GLXP teams. 
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Knowledge and skills acquired from competition
Benefits for society
Recognition from family, friends, or colleagues
Commercialization of technologies
Participation in technical and intellectual challenge
Development of technologies for other purposes
Business, professional, or personal reputation




















Note: N=16 cases; assessment of risks made by questionnaire respondents in relation to given options. 
Source: questionnaire applied to GLXP teams. 
 




Note: N=16 cases. 
Source: questionnaire applied to GLXP teams. 
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Assume excessive financial risk
Not being paid by the prize sponsor
Embark on approach that is not the most adequate
Compromise other activities of the team members























































Note: N=16 cases. 
Source: questionnaire applied to GLXP teams. 
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